ATTORNEY GENERAL Under provisions set out in the Texas Constitution, the Texas Government Code, Title 4, sec.402.042 and numerous statutes, the attorney general is authorized to write advisory opinions for state and local officials. These advisory opinions are requested by agencies or officials when they are confronted with unique or unusually difficult legal questions. The attorney general also determines, under authority of the Texas Open Records Act, whether information requested for release from governmental agencies may be held from public disclosure. Requests for opinions, opinions, and open record decisions are summarized for publication in the Texas Register. The Attorney General responds to many requests for opinions and open records decisions with letter opinions. A letter opinion has the same force and effect as a formal Attorney General Opinion, and represents the opinion of the Attorney General unless and until it is modified or overruled by a subsequent letter opinion, a formal Attorney General Opinion, or a decision of a court of record. To request copies of opinions, phone (512) 462-0011. To inquire about pending requests for opinions, phone (512) 463-2110. Opinions DM-379 (RQ-792). Request from David R. Smith, M.D., Commissioner of Health, Texas Department of Health, 1100 West 49th Street, Austin, Texas 78756-3199, concerning whether the Family Code, sec.231.006 regarding eligibility of child support obligors to enter into contracts paid with state funds, applies to Medicaid providers. Summary of Opinion. Providers that contract to participate in the Texas Medicaid program must submit a statement regarding child support payments pursuant to the Family Code, sec.231.006. DM-380 (RQ-863). Request from the Honorable Patrick J. Fleming, Parker County Attorney, One Courthouse Square, Weatherford, Texas 76086, concerning whether the Parker County Hospital District is responsible for the payment of health care costs for inmates in the Parker County Jail who are "eligible residents" of the hospital district under the Health and Safety Code, Chapter 61 and related questions. Summary of Opinion. The Parker County Hospital District must provide necessary medical and hospital care to inmates of the county jail who reside in Parker County. In the alternative, the hospital district may reimburse the providers of such care. Whether the medical and hospital care the hospital district must provide includes outpatient and inpatient care, dental care, and pharmaceutical costs is a matter left to the discretion of the governing body of the Parker County Hospital District, except that the hospital district may not provide fewer services than required by law. With respect to an inmate of the Parker County Jail who resides in another county, outside the boundaries of a hospital district or the service area of a public hospital and who is eligible for health care assistance under chapter 61 of the Health and Safety Code, the inmate's county of residence is responsible for the costs of health care assistance provided to the inmate. If the inmate resides within the boundaries of another hospital district, that hospital district is responsible to the Parker County Hospital District for the costs of any health care services the home hospital district is required to provide, as well as any additional services the home hospital district regularly provides. If the inmate resides within the service area of a public hospital, the public hospital must reimburse the Parker County Hospital District for the costs of inpatient and outpatient hospital services provided to an eligible inmate of the Parker County Jail, as well as the costs of any other health care assistance the home public hospital regularly provides. Generally, the inmate's county of residence is responsible for the remaining costs of health care assistance. If the Parker County Hospital District provides health care assistance to an inmate in the Parker County Jail who is eligible for assistance under the Health and Safety Code, Chapter 61 and who resides in another county, hospital district, or the service area of a public hospital, the hospital district may bill the governmental entity or entities that is ultimately liable for the costs. An indigent inmate who resides in another state is ultimately liable for the costs of the medical services he or she has enjoyed. A hospital district may not subrogate itself to the right of an eligible inmate to reimbursement if the inmate resides outside the state. The Parker County Hospital District must provide to an eligible inmate of the Parker County Jail who is a resident of Parker County all essential medical care. The hospital district also must provide all health care assistance the federal law requires it to provide. Whether a hospital district provides other services is within the discretion of the hospital district's governing body. In developing its own eligibility standards and application, documentation, and verification procedures, a hospital district may refer for guidance to the standards and application, documentation, and verification procedures the Department of Health has adopted pursuant to Health and Safety Code, sec.61.006. The hospital district also may refer for guidance to the list of information an applicant for health care assistance from a county must provide, pursuant to Health and Safety Code, sec.61.007. A hospital district may not adopt eligibility standards or application, documentation, and verification procedures inconsistent with its enabling act, nor may a hospital district establish standards and procedures that circumvent the hospital district's constitutional duty under the Texas Constitution, Article IX, sec.9. If a hospital district renders health care assistance to an eligible state prisoner housed in the county jail, the hospital district is paid for the services in accordance with Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 104.002(d) and Health and Safety Code, Chapter 61. A county may levy taxes for medical costs incurred by eligible inmates of the county jail who reside in another county if the tax is in accordance with the county budget. The county commissioners court must determine that the imposition of the tax for this purpose serves a public purpose. Whether a particular cause of action is available or appropriate to protest a hospital district governing board's dereliction of duties depends upon the facts of the situation. DM-381 (RQ-767, RQ-789). Request from the Honorable Fred Hill, Chair, House Committee on Urban Affairs, Texas House of Representatives, P.O. Box 2910, Austin, Texas 78768-2910, and the Honorable Doyle Willis, Chair, Select Committee on Veterans Affairs, Texas House of Representatives, P.O. Box 2910, Austin, Texas 78768-2910, concerning whether police officers of a home-rule city must comply with the provisions of the Texas Constitution, Article XVI, sec.1 every two years, and related questions. Summary of Opinion. The Texas Constitution, Article XVI, sec.1 requires elected take an oath of office, and, pursuant to an amendment approved by the voters on November 7, 1989, to sign and file a statement with the secretary of state before taking the oath of office. In the absence of judicial guidance on whether city police officers must take the oath and file the statement required by Article XVI, sec.1, we cannot determine whether or not a city police officer for purposes of these provisions. We therefore advise you to err on the side of caution, and to assume that a police officer must take the oath required by the Texas Constitution, Article XVI, sec.1 until the courts answer this question. The opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is especially important, because it is the court that addresses questions of the validity of a search and seizure conducted by a police officer. Employees of the police department who are not peace officers within the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 2.12 are not required by the Texas Constitution, Article XVI, sec.1 to take the oath of office or file the statement. We find no procedure whereby police officers who have already been hired may comply with the oath provision retroactively, but we advise police officers who have not complied with this provision to do so as soon as possible. Officers under a civil service system who were appointed and took the constitutional oath before the 1989 amendment need not now file the statement required by that amendment. Article XVI, sec.30b provides that the two-year term limitation of Article XVI, sec.30 does not apply to an officer appointed under a municipal civil service system established by statute or charter, if appointment to and removal from office are governed by the civil service provisions. Arrests made in accordance with statute by de facto police officers are valid. An individual may be a de facto police officer, even though he has not taken the oath of office. DM-382 (RQ-757). Request from the Honorable Tim Curry, Criminal District Attorney, Tarrant County, 401 West Belknap, Fort Worth, Texas 76196-0201, concerning whether a district clerk may require an advance deposit of fees for service of process by a sheriff or constable; whether deferred collection of the fee for service of civil process by a sheriff or constable constitutes a loan of credit under the Texas Constitution, Article III, sec.52, or Article XI, sec.3. Summary of Opinion. A district clerk is not authorized to require an advance deposit of fees for service of citation in a case pending in the county in which the sheriff or constable is to serve process. The requirements in the rules of civil procedure that fees for service of process by a sheriff or constable be taxed as costs and that such costs be collected by execution only after judgment do not constitute a lending of credit or a grant of a thing of value in violation of the Texas Constitution. We disapprove of Attorney General Opinions Number 2996, MW-461, JM-533, JM-749, and JM-1229, and any other prior opinions of this office insofar as they state or imply that a mere credit sale of goods or services by the State or one of its political subdivisions violates the credit clauses of the constitution. DM-383 (RQ-711). Request from the Honorable Thomas Cameron, Winkler County Attorney, P.O. Box 1015, Kermit, Texas 79745, concerning whether a jail facility is subject to ad valorem taxes when a county occupies it for county purposes under a lease- purchase contract with a private entity. To determine whether a jail facility that a county leases under a lease-purchase agreement is subject to ad valorem taxation, a court must examine the facts and construe relevant contracts. To make such a determination, a court likely would consider whether the county holds equitable title to the jail facility, that is, whether the county is in possession of the facility and whether the county may compel the lessor to convey legal title to the property if the county fully performs the conditions specified in the contract. DM-384 (RQ-862). Request from the Honorable John Vance, Dallas County District Attorney, 411 Elm Street, Dallas, Texas 75202, and the Honorable Hardy L. Wilkerson, Howard County Attorney P.O. Box 2096, Big Spring, Texas 79721, concerning whether the Family Code, sec.1.045 and sec.1.07(a)(1) requiring an applicant for a marriage license to state under oath that he or she does not owe delinquent court-ordered child support, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Summary of Opinion. Family Code, sec.1.045 and sec.1.07(a)(1), requiring an applicant for a marriage license to state under oath that he or she does not owe delinquent court-ordered child support, unnecessarily impinge on the right to marry and therefore violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. DM-385 (RQ-848). Request from the Honorable Steven C. Hilbig, Bexar County Criminal District Attorney, Bexar County Justice Center, 300 Dolorosa, Suite 5072, San Antonio, Texas 78205-3030, concerning whether a deputy constable may be classified as an "employee" pursuant to the Local Government Code, Chapter 158. Summary of Opinion. A county civil service commission in a county with a basic civil service system created under the Local Government Code, Chapter 158, subchapter A may adopt a rule defining deputy constables as "employees" covered by the system. When the county civil service commission in a basic subchapter A civil service system adopts a rule defining deputy constables as "employees," the deputy constables become subject to the coverage of the civil service system. DM-386 (RQ-839). Request from the Honorable Chris Harris, Chair Senate Committee on Administration, Texas State Senate, P.O. Box 12068, Austin, Texas 78711, concerning whether the Texas Education Agency may, under Texas Civil Statutes, Article 4413(29c), sec.9A, supply certificates of completion to a public school in the state whose driver education course does not meet the standards of and has not been approved by the Texas Education Agency or the Department of Public Safety and related questions. Summary of Opinion. Any public school offering the program of organized instruction in driver education and traffic safety that the Texas Education Agency has adopted pursuant to the Education Code, sec.29.902(a) is offering an "approved driver education course" for purposes of Texas Civil Statutes, Article 4413(29c), sec.9A. The Texas Education Agency must, in accordance with Article 4413(29c), sec.9A, supply such a public school with "serially numbered driver education certificates tobe used for certifying completion" of the course. Texas Civil Statutes, Article 4413(29c), requires a licensed driving safety school, upon which license the commissioner of education has imposed conditions pursuant to Article 4413(29c), sec.13(f), to pay an application fee under sec.13(b)(1)(G) unless the school desires to change the driving safety course it offers. Additionally, a licensed driving safety school, upon which license the commissioner has imposed conditions, need not apply for a new license. TRD-9605752 Request for Opinions ID# 38426. Request from the Honorable Kenny Marchant, Chair, Committee on Financial Institutions, Texas House of Representatives, P.O. Box 2910, Austin, Texas 78768-2910, concerning responsibility of the Dallas County Treasurer with regard to the investment and reporting of various funds. ID# 38539. Request from the Honorable Richard J. Miller, Bell County Attorney, P.O. Box 1127, Belton, Texas 76513, concerning prosecutorial responsibility of a county attorney in justice court. ID# 38587. Request from the Honorable Kenny Marchant, Chair, Committee on Financial Institutions, Texas House of Representatives, P.O. Box 2910, Austin, Texas 78768-2910, concerning whether a municipal hospital authority created under Health and Safety Code, Chapter 262, may lease land to a private entity for construction and operation of a facility that is not a "hospital project". ID# 38593. Request from William G. Burnett, Executive Director, Texas Department of Transportation, 125 East 11th Street, Austin, Texas 78701-2483, concerning whether the Texas Department of Transportation may lease the use of its right- of-way to a private entity ID# 38603. Request from the Honorable Bill Weinacht, Reeves County Attorney, P.O. Box 825, Pecos, Texas 79772 concerning whether a county commissioner who makes an installment agreement with the tax assessor-collector for installment payment of delinquent taxes pursuant to the Tax Code, sec.33.02, thereby becomes "interested in a contract with the county" in violation of the Local Government Code, sec.81.002. ID# 38613. Request from Rebecca E. Forkner, Executive Director, Texas State Board of Examiners of Psychologists, 333 Guadalupe, Suite 2-450, Austin, Texas 78701, concerning duties of the Psychological Associate Advisory Committee to the State Board of Examiners of Psychologists ID# 38628. Request from Helen Campbell, Commissioner, Fire Fighter's' Pension Commissioner, 3910 South IH-35, Suite 235, Austin, Texas 78704, concerning authority of a volunteer fire department to withdraw from the Texas Local Fire Fighters Retirement Fund. ID# 38631. Request from the Honorable John Vance, District Attorney of Dallas County, Frank Crowley Courts Building, 133 North Industrial Boulevard, LB 19, Dallas, Texas 75207-4399, concerning whether a county may computerize arrest warrants and supporting affidavits and thereby dispense with printing paper copies. TRD-9605680