TITLE 16.ECONOMIC REGULATION

Part 1. RAILROAD COMMISSION OF TEXAS

Chapter 3. OIL AND GAS DIVISION

16 TAC §§3.5, 3.8, 3.14, 3.32, 3.37, 3.38, 3.57, 3.73, 3.78, 3.86, 3.96

The Railroad Commission of Texas withdraws the proposed amendments to §3.78, relating to Fees, Performance Bonds and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required To Be Filed, published in the March 26, 2004, issue of the Texas Register (29 TexReg 3017), and proposes amendments to §3.14, relating to Plugging, and most of the same and additional amendments to §3.78, with a new title of "Fees and Financial Security Requirements." The Commission also proposes amendments to §§3.5 (Application to Drill, Deepen, Reenter, or Plug Back), 3.8 (Water Protection), 3.32 (Gas Well Gas and Casinghead Gas Shall Be Utilized for Legal Purposes), 3.37 (Statewide Spacing Rule), 3.38 (Well Densities), 3.57 (Reclaiming Tank Bottoms, Other Hydrocarbon Wastes, and Other Waste Materials), 3.73 (Pipeline Connection; Cancellation of Certificate of Compliance; Severance), 3.86 (Horizontal Drainhole Wells), and 3.96 (Underground Storage of Gas In Productive or Depleted Reservoirs) for the purposes of correcting references to the title of §3.78 as it is proposed to be amended, correcting references to other Commission rules or forms, correcting the name of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, and making other technical changes.

The Commission withdraws the proposed amendments to §3.78, concerning financial security requirements for operators of bay and offshore wells, which were published March 26, 2004, in order to propose additional amendments to §3.78. The original proposed amendments were published with a 60-day comment period, and the Commission received one comment, filed by Texas Oil and Gas Association (TxOGA). The Commission must propose additional amendments to §3.78 and §3.14 to implement universal bonding under Texas Natural Resources Code, §§91.103, 91.104, 91.1041, 91.1042, 91.107, and 91.109, which become effective September 1, 2004, pursuant to Senate Bill 310, 77th Legislature (2001). To make all the necessary amendments effective on or about September 1, 2004, the Commission re-proposes amendments to §3.78 concerning financial security for operators of bay and offshore wells, with clarifying changes from the amendments which were published March 26, 2004, and proposes additional amendments to §3.14 and §3.78 to implement universal bonding.

The comments filed by TxOGA regarding the withdrawn amendments to §3.78 will be considered in connection with this rulemaking. TxOGA suggested that the proposed additional financial security requirement applicable to inactive wells that formerly produced oil or gas and injection and disposal wells in bays and offshore be made to apply only to inactive bay and offshore injection and disposal wells. The Commission has declined to propose this change because the Commission has determined that proposed entry level financial security for bay and offshore wells generally is insufficient to cover estimated plugging liability for injection and disposal wells, active or inactive, in bays and offshore.

In addition, Commission records disclose that currently there are only 21 bay wells used as injection or disposal wells by 17 operators. Of these operators, only 14 would be required to file additional financial security above the required entry level financial security for bay wells under the amendments to §3.78 now proposed. These proposed amendments permit operators of bay and offshore injection and disposal wells to challenge presumed estimated plugging liability associated with these wells at a hearing called for this purpose. The changes proposed by TxOGA are not deemed advisable or necessary in these circumstances.

The Commission proposes amendments to §3.14(a)(1) to redefine "unbonded operator" and to §3.14(b)(2)(A) to provide for extensions of the deadline for plugging inactive wells operated by an unbonded operator during the interim period between September 1, 2004, and the first date for annual renewal of the operator's organization report after September 1, 2004. The proposed amendments to §3.14 also delete paragraph (3) of subsection (b) relating to financial security requirements for transferees of wells and leases. Other proposed amendments to §3.14 correct the title of §3.78 as proposed to be amended, the title of §3.14(b) and a reference in §3.14(a)(2) to another Commission rule, and are non-substantive in nature.

The proposed amendments to §3.14(a)(1) and §3.14(b)(2)(A) are necessary because although pursuant to Texas Natural Resources Code, §§91.103 and 91.104 universal bonding is effective September 1, 2004, an operator that files a nonrefundable annual fee as financial security prior to September 1, 2004, will not be required to file a performance bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit as financial security until the first date for annual renewal of the operator's organization report after September 1, 2004. An operator that has filed a performance bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit as financial security is considered to have automatically applied for a plugging extension for inactive wells, but proposed §3.14(b)(2)(A) is necessary to provide for obtaining of plugging extensions by an unbonded operator during the interim period between September 1, 2004, and the date on which the operator is required to file a performance bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit as financial security. The fee associated with an application by an unbonded operator for a plugging extension referenced in current §3.14(b)(2)(A)(iv) is proposed to be eliminated as required by Texas Natural Resources Code, §85.2021, as amended effective September 1, 2004. The amendment deleting §3.14(b)(3) is proposed because that provision is duplicated in §3.78.

The Commission proposes the amendments to §3.78, pertaining to financial security for operators of bay and offshore wells, pursuant to the provisions of Texas Natural Resources Code, §91.1041 and §91.1042, which require the Commission to adopt rules setting a reasonable amount of financial security for each bay or offshore well above the base amount of financial security required to be submitted by each operator.

The proposed amendments to §3.78 amend the definition of "bay well," add a definition of "Director," and add wording in proposed new subsection (g) concerning the amount of bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit required of operators of bay and offshore wells. The proposed amendments will strengthen and promote the efficient use of the state's Oil Field Clean Up Fund ("OFCUF"). Broadened financial security requirements will ensure that operators of bay and offshore wells possess sufficient financial security to fund clean-up and plugging operations. The proposed expanded financial security requirements will allow the Commission to use more effectively the resources of the OFCUF.

Based on state-funded plugging operations managed by the Commission for bay wells from 2000 through 2003, Commission staff has determined that the minimum average cost to plug an abandoned bay well is approximately $60,000. This estimate reflects the use of specialized equipment, mobilization costs, and access issues created by the location of bay wells. Based on state-funded plugging operations managed by the Commission for offshore wells in 2003 and information provided by industry regarding actual plugging costs, Commission staff has determined that the minimum average cost to plug an abandoned offshore well is approximately $100,000. As with bay wells, the estimated minimum cost to plug an abandoned offshore well reflects the use of specialized equipment, mobilization costs, and access issues created by the location of offshore wells. Based on this information, the Commission presumes for the purpose of the proposed additional financial security requirements for bay and offshore wells that the minimum average cost to plug a bay well is $60,000 and the minimum average cost to plug an offshore well is $100,000. The proposed amendments revise the definition of "bay well" in subsection (a)(5) to specifically reflect the additional plugging costs associated with the use of specialized equipment, mobilization costs, and access issues created by the location of bay wells.

Commission records show that as of May 15, 2004, 135 operators operated 730 bay wells and 302 offshore wells. For 93 of the 135 operators, the current provisions of §3.78 require the posting of $50,000 or less in financial security. When compared to the Commission staff determinations of the minimum average costs to plug abandoned bay and offshore wells, the estimated cost to plug a single well exceeds the total amount of financial security currently required for the majority of bay and offshore well operators. Additionally, Commission records show that 26 of the 135 operators do not have active organization reports on file with the Commission and 22 opted to pay a nonrefundable annual fee as financial security. These 26 delinquent operators are responsible for 65 abandoned bay wells and 20 abandoned offshore wells with a total estimated minimum plugging cost of $5,900,000. Review of Commission records also indicates that 8 of the 26 delinquent operators acquired inactive bay or offshore wells that were never restored to production. The abandonment of these wells without adequate financial security to pay for plugging costs illustrates the most compelling rationale for the proposed amendments expanding the financial security requirements for bay and offshore wells.

The proposed financial security requirements for operators of bay and offshore wells were developed by Commission staff following suggestions received from industry at the public meeting held on March 8, 2003, in Houston, Texas. Additionally, Commission staff solicited comments from interested persons from November 2003 through January 2004 by posting a draft of the proposed amendments on the Commission's website. Commission staff also mailed copies of the proposed amendments to each operator of bay and offshore wells. The Commission received written comments from 14 operators and one organization, TxOGA, during the informal comment period. The majority of the comments received from operators suggested that the Commission had not properly characterized specific wells as bay wells because the wells' surface locations are on land. The Commission has reviewed and revised its classification process for bay wells to address this issue, but because the classification process is not part of §3.78, or any other rule proposed to be amended, there is no need to amend the rule proposal on the basis of these comments.

TxOGA presented one of the few substantive comments, noting general support for the proposed amendments, but suggesting that the Commission evaluate the impact of the proposal on the surety bond market. Commission staff performed an analysis of the impact on the surety marketplace by comparing Commission records identifying the surety companies which have issued surety bonds accepted by the Commission in the past 12 months against the United States Department of the Treasury Listing of Approved Sureties (Department Circular 570: 2003 Revision). The Department of Treasury Listing includes the underwriting limitation for bonds issued by the identified companies, and also notes that a surety company can issue bonds in excess of its underwriting limitation as long as the excess amount is protected by reinsurance, coinsurance, or other specified methods. Comparison of the Commission list with the most recently published underwriting limitations in the Department of Treasury circular indicates that the cumulative potential underwriting limitation, without consideration of reinsurance, is $4,500,000,000.

The proposed amendments, when applied to the current operators of all currently recognized bay and offshore wells, will require the posting of financial security with a maximum cumulative total of $37,440,000. Under the proposed amendments, the actual cumulative total of additional financial security may be offset by potential reductions in both the entry level financial security and any inactive well financial security required to be filed. When the minimum average costs to plug abandoned bay and offshore wells are applied to the current population of bay and offshore wells, the total estimated minimum cost to plug all bay and offshore wells is $75,740,000. Based on this analysis, the Commission concludes that the additional financial security requirements under the proposed amendments will not result in a significant impact on the surety market. The Commission finds that the amounts of additional financial security required for bay and offshore wells by these proposed amendments will ensure that operators of bay and offshore wells possess sufficient financial security to fund any necessary clean-up and plugging operations.

The additional financial security requirements for operators of bay and offshore wells in the proposed amendments to current subsection (j), now subsection (g) of §3.78, comprise three parts: (1) an entry level financial security requirement applicable to all operators; (2) an inactive well financial security requirement applicable to inactive wells and injection and disposal wells on a well-by-well basis; and (3) a potential administrative reduction to the inactive well financial security requirement based on the demonstrated net worth of the company.

The entry level financial security requirement recognizes the statutory mandate that all operators of bay and offshore wells post additional financial security to reflect the additional cost of bay and offshore plugging operations. The proposal requires that all bay well operators post entry level financial security of $60,000, the estimated cost to plug a single bay well, as security for their bay well operations. Offshore operators, or operators of both bay and offshore wells, are required to post entry level financial security of $100,000, the estimated cost to plug a single offshore well, as security for their offshore well operations. The proposal also allows an operator to apply for an administrative reduction of the entry level financial security requirement on a dollar-for-dollar basis up to the total entry level amount. To obtain this administrative reduction, an operator must provide documentation that it has posted financial assurance with other governmental entities and that the Commission either can be assigned the proceeds or can independently call on the financial assurance posted with the other governmental entity.

The inactive well financial security requirement recognizes the increased likelihood that the Commission will be required to expend state-managed funds to plug a well if the well has been inactive for more than 12 months. To address this increased likelihood, the proposal requires the posting of $60,000 per well for every inactive bay well beyond the first inactive bay well and $100,000 per well for every inactive offshore well beyond the first inactive offshore well. This requirement also applies to bay and offshore wells used for injection or disposal, which are considered to have estimated plugging liability exceeding the entry level financial security for bay and offshore wells generally. The presumed estimated plugging liability associated with these wells may be challenged at a hearing at which an applicant must show clear and convincing evidence that the presumed plugging liability should not apply to a specific well or wells.

The proposed amendments to §3.78 relating to financial security for operators of bay and offshore wells also allow for an administrative reduction from the additional financial security required for inactive bay and offshore wells of up to 25% of the operator's net worth where: (1) the operator has five wells or fewer, or at least half of the operator's wells are actively producing; (2) the operator provides a certification from an independent auditor confirming the operator's net worth based on the operator's financial statement from the most recently completed fiscal year; and (3) none of the operator's wells or operations have been found to be in violation of Commission rules resulting in pollution or any hazard to the health or safety of the public in the last 12 months.

The potential administrative reduction is patterned on guidelines adopted by the United States Department of the Interior Minerals Management Service in its rules published in 30 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 256. Under the Commission's proposal, an operator would be eligible for a reduction of any additional financial security required for inactive bay and offshore wells by subtracting the estimated active well plugging liability from 25% of its net worth as certified by an independent auditor that has employed generally accepted accounting principles to confirm the operator's stated net worth based on the most recently completed fiscal year. The certification standard is the same standard currently used by the Commission in its rules for evaluating self bonding for businesses engaged in surface coal mining (§12.309(j), relating to Terms and Conditions of the Bond). The remainder would be applied to reduce the additional financial security required for inactive bay and offshore wells. The reduction formula can be expressed as:

.25(net worth) - (active well liability) = (amount of possible reduction) .

The following example illustrates the application of the formula.

Operator A currently operates 15 offshore wells, six of which are inactive. The financial security under the proposed amendment would be the $100,000 entry level amount plus $500,000 for the inactive wells. To obtain a reduction in the $500,000 inactive well amount, the operator provides appropriate certification that the net worth of the company is $5,000,000. Applying the formula, 25% of the operator's net worth, or $1,250,000, would be measured against the total active well liability of $900,000, (9 x $100,000 per well). The difference of $350,000 would allow the operator to be eligible for a reduction of $350,000 against the $500,000 inactive well financial security requirement. In this example, the total financial security required from the operator for bay and offshore operations would be $250,000, (the $100,000 entry level requirement plus the $150,000 reduced inactive well financial security requirement) instead of $600,000. The example is expressed mathematically as follows:

.25(5,000,000 net worth) - 900,000 total active well liability = 350,000 reduction

500,000 inactive well financial security requirement - 350,000 reduction

= 150,000 reduced financial security requirement

150,000 inactive well financial security + 100,000 entry level financial security

= 250,000 total financial security

Under the same example, if the operator's certified net worth totaled $5,600,000 or greater, the formula would have reduced the $500,000 inactive well financial security requirement to zero, leaving only the $100,000 entry level requirement:

.25(5,600,000) - 900,000 = 500,000

In this same example, if the operator's certified net worth totaled $3,600,000 or less, there would be no basis for an administrative reduction of the inactive well financial security requirement, and the operator would be required to post the full $500,000 inactive well financial security requirement:

.25(3,600,000) - 900,000 = 0

If the Commission denies a request for an administrative reduction of the inactive well financial security requirement, the operator may request a hearing to consider additional evidence on the request. It is anticipated that allowing an administrative reduction of the inactive well financial security requirement will provide an equivalent guaranty that an operator possesses sufficient assets to fund any necessary clean-up or plugging expenses associated with the inactive bay and offshore wells or injection and disposal wells in bays and offshore, while limiting the impact of the inactive well financial security requirement on the working capital of operators and the surety bond market.

In addition to the proposed amendments to §3.78 that relate to financial security of operators of bay and offshore wells, the Commission proposes other amendments to §3.78 to implement universal bonding requirements for all non-exempt operators mandated by Texas Natural Resources Code, §§91.103, 91.104, 91.1041, 91.1042, 91.107, and 91.109, that become effective September 1, 2004, pursuant to Senate Bill 310, 77th Legislature (2001).

The Commission proposes an amendment to the title of §3.78 to delete a reference to alternate forms of financial security and to clarify the scope of §3.78. Amendments are proposed to §3.78 to delete various provisions that refer or relate to alternate forms of financial security. The proposed universal bonding amendments to §3.78 amend subsection (d) to clarify that this subsection does not apply to operators that are exempt from financial security requirements and add new paragraph (4) to subsection (d) to provide that an operator that has a current and active organization report and filed a nonrefundable annual fee as its financial security prior to September 1, 2004, may continue to perform operations subject to the Commission's jurisdiction with such financial security until the first date after September 1, 2004, for annual renewal of the operator's organization report, at which time the operator must file financial security as required by proposed §3.78(g).

Current §3.78(i) is deleted by the proposed amendments because it is inconsistent with the Commission's implementation of House Bill 942, 78th Legislature (2003). The Commission also proposes amendments to §3.78 to add new subsection (g) relating to the amount of bonds, letters of credit, and cash deposits which operators are required to file as financial security. These provisions are consistent with current subsection (j)(1) - (2), which are proposed to be deleted, with the addition of other provisions relating to the additional amount of financial security required of operators of bay and offshore wells. Other proposed amendments to §3.78 make technical corrections in current provisions of this section for purposes of clarification.

The proposed amendments to §3.78 relating to universal bonding are necessary to implement Texas Natural Resources Code, §§91.103, 91.104, 91.1041, 91.1042, 91.107, and 91.109, that become effective September 1, 2004, pursuant to Senate Bill 310, 77th Legislature (2001). Under these statutory provisions, effective September 1, 2004, all operators that are not exempt from financial security requirements must have an individual or blanket performance bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit as financial security. Effective September 1, 2004, the filing of an alternate form of financial security to obtain or renew an operator's organization report will no longer be permitted. On and after September 1, 2004, operators will be required to comply with the new universal bonding requirements as of the date of initial filing or renewal of their organization report.

Historically, a substantial majority of orphaned wells that have been plugged with Commission-managed funds from the OFCUF have been wells for which unbonded operators were responsible. The proposed amendments to §3.14 and §3.78 relating to universal bonding will provide additional financial security that inactive wells will be plugged and pollution cleaned up, with corresponding benefits to the OFCUF and the environment.

The Commission also proposes amendments to §§3.5, 3.8, 3.32, 3.37, 3.38, 3.57, 3.73, 3.86, and 3.96 to correct the title of §3.78 as proposed to be amended, correct titles or numbers of other Commission rules, delete references to Commission rules that no longer exist, correct the name of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, and make other technical changes. These proposed amendments do not make substantive changes, and are necessary provide accuracy and consistency to the Commission's rules.

Leslie Savage, Planning and Administration, Oil and Gas Division, has determined that for each year of the first five years the rules as proposed will be in effect, the fiscal implications as a result of enforcing or administering amended §§3.14 and 3.78 will be a cost to the state of $60,000 in fiscal year 2004, $162,100 in fiscal year 2005, $73,274 in fiscal year 2006, and $36,637 in each of fiscal years 2007, 2008, and 2009. These costs would result from programming for bay/offshore/land wells and financial security changes, changes to the financial security information packages, and changes in processing of financial security instruments. In addition, elimination of certain fees as revenue to the Oilfield Cleanup Fund (OFCUF) will result in an annual loss of revenue to the OFCUF of approximately $1,924,791; however, the rule amendments should reduce the well plugging liability to the OFCUF.

The fiscal year 2005 costs include costs for staff involved with document revision and process analysis; computer programming (bay and offshore well identification data base, changes to the P-4/P-5 system to calculate additional financial security for transfers of bay and offshore wells, P-5 fact sheet and P-4 transfer programs to consider bay/offshore well identifications); and field staff to respond to complaints resulting from anticipated initial, short-term increase in non-compliance and bay/offshore well classification identification/verification. The fiscal years 2006 through 2009 costs include those for inspection for noncompliance and enforcement.

The Commission began work this fiscal year (Fiscal Year 2004) with respect to bay and offshore well identification. The Commission estimates that the programming work necessary to implement and enforce these rule amendments will be approximately $120,000 if contract programming is used. The cost will be less if the Commission is able to use in-house programmers. For the purpose of this estimate, costs incurred for programming each of fiscal years 2004 and 2005 are estimated at approximately $60,000. The Commission will absorb maintenance costs during the remaining fiscal years 2007 through 2009.

The rule amendments eliminate the $1,000 P-5 fee option. For the period from March 25, 2003, through March 25, 2004, the Commission processed 171 P-5s where the operator paid a $1,000 fee as financial security. At this time, there are approximately 105 operators who filed the $1,000 P-5 fee. In addition, the rule amendments also eliminate the W-1X extension fee revenue currently going to the OFCUF. The Commission processed 310 W-1Xs at $300 each for a total of $93,000. Furthermore, the amendments eliminate the Option 4 fee of 12.5% of bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit, of which $1,660,791 was collected in the same period. Therefore, there will be a decrease of $1,924,791 in revenue to the OFCUF.

During the first two years of implementation, there will likely be an increase in complaints and enforcement referrals as a result of the proposed amendments as certain operators fail to meet their regulatory responsibility and discontinue operations. The Commission estimates that inspections resulting from increased complaints on non-compliant wells and inspections to verify classification as bay/offshore/land based wells and resulting enforcement will require the work equivalent to three Engineer Tech III positions in fiscal year 2005, at a cost of approximately $97,700. The Commission estimates that the costs will decrease to $48,850 (1.5 positions) in fiscal year 2006, and will be approximately $36,637 in the remaining fiscal years 2007, 2008, and 2009.

The Commission anticipates that the operators of a certain portion of wells that currently have W-1X extensions and file the $1,000 P-5 fee will not secure the required bonds and will orphan these wells. Thus, the non-compliant well count is expected to initially increase; however, the number of wells plugged with state funds is not expected to increase as a result of the increase in the number of non-compliant wells. It may, in fact, decrease. The number of wells plugged with state funds is dictated by the revenues going into the OFCUF. With the anticipated increase in non-compliance as a result of the new requirements and operators choosing other compliance alternatives (organizational bonds/letters of credit, plugging, return to production), there will be a proportionate decrease in revenues.

Some of the additional wells that become non-compliant as a result of this rulemaking may be evaluated for plugging with state funds. If the wells are determined to be eligible for plugging they will be prioritized along with other candidates for plugging in order to determine which wells are plugged with the limited funds available.

There will be no effect on local government.

Texas Government Code, §2006.002, requires a state agency considering adoption of a rule that would have an adverse economic effect on small businesses or micro-businesses to reduce the effect if doing so is legal and feasible considering the purpose of the statutes under which the rule is to be adopted. Before adopting a rule that would have an adverse economic effect on small businesses, a state agency must prepare a statement of the effect of the rule on small businesses, which must include an analysis of the cost of compliance with the rule for small businesses and a comparison of that cost with the cost of compliance for the largest businesses affected by the rule, using cost for each employee, cost for each hour of labor, or cost for each $100 of sales.

Ms. Savage has estimated that the cost of compliance with the proposed amendments to §3.78 relating to financial security required of operators of bay and offshore wells for the individual, small business, or micro-business producer will be an additional business expense for the premium for the bond obtained. Operators may also incur an additional business expense for the certification of net worth by an independent auditor if the operator has inactive or injection wells and seeks an administrative reduction of the inactive well financial security requirement. Additionally, operators who request a hearing may incur costs associated with preparing for and attending the hearing, including but not limited to costs for hiring legal counsel and other experts, preparing documents and other evidence, and traveling to Austin for the hearing.

Ms. Savage has also determined that under Texas Government Code, §2006.002(c)(2), the additional financial security required under the proposed amendments relating to operators of bay and offshore wells does not show a disproportionate economic impact on small businesses or micro- businesses because the Commission finds that the operators of bay and offshore wells are not likely to fall within the definitions of these terms in Texas Government Code, §2006.001. This determination is consistent with the findings published in the Federal Register in the preamble to rules and regulations adopted by the United States Department of the Interior Minerals Management Service related to surety bond provisions for offshore leases in 30 Code of Federal Regulations Part 256 (See 62 Federal Register 27953-27954). Exploration and development costs for bay and offshore oil and gas leases often exceed several million dollars. In general, the entities that engage in such exploration, development, and production activities would not be considered small due to the technical expertise, financial resources, and experience necessary to safely conduct such activities in an environmentally responsible manner.

With respect to the impact on small businesses as defined under Texas Government Code, §2006.002(c)(2), Texas Natural Resources Code, §§91.1041 and 91.1042 mandate that additional financial security be filed for each bay and offshore well operated. The statutes do not distinguish between the size of an organization and the number of bay and offshore wells the organization operates, and the Commission has no authority to exempt small business or micro-business operators of bay and offshore wells from the requirements of Texas Natural Resources Code, §§91.1041 and 91.1042.

Because operators are not required to make filings with the Commission reporting number of employees, labor costs, amount of sales, or gross receipts, the Commission cannot definitively determine whether a particular operator may be a small business or a micro-business. However, for the purpose of performing the comparison mandated by Texas Government Code, §2006.002(c)(2), the Commission has analyzed the estimated maximum impact of the proposed amendments on two hypothetical bay and offshore well operators. One of the operators would be characterized as a small business under Texas Government Code, §2006.001(2), based on imputed annual sales revenue of less than $1 million. The other hypothetical operator would be characterized as one of the largest businesses under Texas Government Code, §2006.001(2), based on imputed annual sales revenue of more than $1 million.

The hypothetical businesses are based on the number of active and inactive bay and offshore wells and the total number of wells operated. The comparison also calculates the cost of the additional financial security requirement by using the annual fee of 12.5% of the minimum financial security required, which an operator may opt to pay under current §3.78(d)(4), even though the fees and premiums associated with letters of credit and surety bonds may in fact be less costly than the 12.5% rate. Because the Commission does not have annual gross receipts information from its operators, the Commission used a substitute: for both hypothetical operators, the Commission calculated an imputed annual sales revenue amount using 2003 production reported to the Commission and the 2003 average domestic first purchase price of $27.45 per barrel of crude oil or condensate and average wellhead price of $5.09 per mcf of natural gas, as reported by the Energy Information Administration through November 2003 for crude oil and through September 2003 for natural gas.

The hypothetical small business operator has one active bay well and therefore would be required to file minimum additional financial security of $60,000 under the proposed amendments. As noted above, the Commission estimates the cost of obtaining the additional financial security to be not more than 12.5% of $60,000 or $7,500. This hypothetical operator reported production in 2003 of 14,088 barrels of crude oil and 43,533 mcf of natural gas from its wells for an imputed sales revenue amount of $608,298.57. The estimated maximum cost of compliance for this hypothetical small business operator would be $1.23 for each $100 in imputed sales revenue.

The hypothetical largest business has 18 inactive offshore wells and 21 active offshore wells. This operator would be required to file additional financial security of $1,800,000. In 2003, this operator reported production of 56,051 barrels of crude oil and 2,461,809 mcf of natural gas, for total imputed total sales revenue of $14,069,206. As noted above, the Commission estimates the cost of obtaining the additional financial security to be 12.5% of $1,800,000 or $225,000. The estimated maximum cost of compliance for this hypothetical operator would be $1.59 for each $100 in imputed sales revenue.

The Commission recognizes that the hypothetical small business operator used in this comparison might not strictly meet the definition of "small business" in Texas Government Code, §2006.001(2). Because the Commission does not have any information on operators' annual gross receipts, and because the imputed sales revenue is calculated to be less than $1 million, the Commission finds that this comparison substantially complies with the requirement of Texas Government Code, §§2006.002 and 2001.024(a)(8). Further, in an attempt to disclose the actual impact of the proposed amendments under Texas Government Code, §2006.002(c)(2), the Commission has calculated the estimated maximum potential additional financial assurance required for every affected operator, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure: 16 TAC Chapter 3--Preamble

Additionally, operators of bay and offshore wells may be eligible for a reduced financial security amount either administratively or after a hearing if an administrative reduction is denied. Finally, under the proposed amendments, operators can reduce the amount of additional financial security required for inactive bay and offshore wells by restoring any shut-in wells to active production.

Ms. Savage has also estimated the cost to individual, small, and micro-business operators of compliance with the proposed amendments to §3.14 and §3.78 relating to universal bonding. This cost will consist of annual premiums for individual or blanket performance bonds and any applicable bank fees for issuance of letters of credit. Loss of use of capital filed as financial security in the form of a cash deposit or pledged as collateral to obtain a performance bond or letter of credit may also be a cost factor for individual, small, and micro-business operators. Depending on the circumstances of a particular operator, these costs of compliance may be offset, in whole or in part, by savings realized as a result of elimination of nonrefundable annual fees as forms of financial security and elimination of annual fees for obtaining plugging extensions for inactive wells.

The Commission does not have access to definitive data regarding the amount of annual premiums charged to operators subject to the Commission's jurisdiction for the issuance of individual or blanket performance bonds or bank fees charged to such operators for issuance of letters of credit. For the purpose of its analysis of the cost of compliance with the proposed amendments to §3.78 relating to financial security requirements for operators of bay and offshore wells, the Commission assumed an annual bond premium of not more than 12.5%.

The Commission estimates that a substantial majority of individual, small, and micro-business well operators have fewer than 100 wells. An individual, small business, or micro-business operator of 10 or fewer wells paying a bond premium of 12.5% of the face amount of the required $25,000 blanket bond would incur an annual bond cost of $3,125. A similar operator of more than 10 but fewer than 100 wells paying a bond premium of 12.5% of the face amount of the required $50,000 blanket bond would incur an annual bond cost of $6,250. These are the same annual costs that are incurred by operators filing financial security in the form of the nonrefundable annual fee provided by current §3.78(d)(4), now proposed to be deleted, and also, such operators currently are required to pay an annual fee of $300 per inactive well to obtain plugging extensions pursuant to current §3.14(b)(2)(A)(iv) and §3.78(b)(6), which are also proposed to be deleted.

Presently, individual, small business, and micro-business operators who are eligible to file financial security in the form of the annual nonrefundable fee provided by current §3.78(d)(3), now proposed to be deleted, incur an annual cost of $1,000, but operators filing this form of financial security currently are required to pay the annual $300 per inactive well fee to obtain plugging extensions, a fee being eliminated by the proposed universal bonding amendments to §3.14 and §3.78.

The Commission estimates that the 12.5% annual bond premium assumed by the Commission for the purpose of estimating the cost of compliance with the proposed amendments by individual, small business, and micro-business operators is the maximum premium any such operator will be required to pay. The Commission anticipates that the actual annual premium to these operators will be a lesser amount. In the course of the 2003 rulemaking involving previous amendments to §3.78, the Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, believed by the Commission to be an association whose members are primarily individual, small business, and micro-business operators, filed comments informing the Commission that in an April 2003 survey of its members, only 5.8% of the respondents stated that they were experiencing annual bond premiums of more than 3%. The Commission also anticipates that bank fees incurred by individual, small business, and micro- business operators to obtain issuance of letters of credit will be substantially less than 12.5% of the face amount of the letters of credit.

While the Commission does not have access to data disclosing gross receipts, number of employees, or hours of labor of operators subject to the Commission's jurisdiction enabling it to make a definitive analysis of the precise economic effect of the proposed universal bonding amendments on small and micro- businesses of the type required by Texas Government Code, §2006.002, Ms. Savage has nonetheless estimated the cost of compliance per employee and per $100 of sales for these operators. Production during 2003 of oil and gas by operators that filed an alternate form of financial security and the 2003 average domestic first purchase price of $27.45 per barrel of crude oil and average wellhead price of $5.09 per mcf of natural gas, as reported by the Energy Information Administration through November 2003 for crude oil and through September 2003 for natural gas have been used in these estimates.

Texas Government Code, §2006.001 defines "micro-business" as a legal entity that, among other things, has not more than 20 employees, and a "small business" as a legal entity that, among other things, has fewer than 100 employees or less than $1 million in annual gross receipts. The Commission's estimates assume that: (1) an operator filing an alternate form of financial security and reporting 2003 production which, at 2003 prices, accounts for gross receipts of less than $500,000, is a micro-business operator; (2) an operator filing an alternate form of financial security and reporting 2003 production which, at 2003 prices, accounts for gross receipts of at least $500,000 but less than $1 million in annual gross receipts, is a small business operator.

From 2003 production records and records of the Commission's P-5/Financial Assurance Unit, Ms. Savage has determined that the average "small business" operator, as previously defined, that filed an alternate form of financial security operated 12 wells and had production which, at 2003 prices, accounted for $704,546 in gross receipts. On this basis, the Commission estimates that the per $100 of sales cost to the "average" small business operator of compliance with the proposed universal bonding amendments to §3.14 and §3.78 will be approximately: (1) $0.89, if a $50,000 blanket bond covering 12 wells is filed and the annual bond premium is 12.5% of the bond amount; or (2) $0.21, if a $50,000 blanket bond covering 12 wells is filed and the annual bond premium is 3% of the bond amount.

From the same data, Ms. Savage has determined that the average micro-business operator, as previously defined, that filed an alternate form of financial security operated 12 wells and had 2003 production which, at 2003 prices, accounted for approximately $80,155 in gross receipts. On this basis, the Commission estimates that the per $100 of sales cost to the "average" micro-business operator of compliance with the proposed universal bonding amendments to §3.14 and §3.78 will be approximately: (1) $7.80, if a $50,000 blanket bond covering 12 wells is filed and the annual bond premium is 12.5% of the bond amount; or (2) $1.87, if a $50,000 blanket bond covering 12 wells is filed and the annual bond premium is 3% of the bond amount.

Assuming that the "average" small business operator, as previously defined, has 30 employees, the annual per employee cost of compliance with the proposed universal bonding amendments to §3.14 and §3.78 will be approximately; (1) $208.33, if a $50,000 blanket bond is filed and the annual bond premium is 12.5% of the bond amount; or (2) $50.00, if a $50,000 blanket bond is filed and the annual bond premium is 3% of the bond amount. Assuming that the "average" micro-business operator, as previously defined, has 6 employees, the annual per employee cost of compliance with the universal bonding amendments to §3.14 and §3.78 will be approximately: (1) $1,041.67, if a $50,000 blanket bond is filed and the annual bond premium is 12.5% of the bond amount, or (2) $250.00, if a $50,000 blanket bond is filed and the annual bond premium is 3%.

The Commission has considered that the amount of the required bond under §3.78 is a function of the total depth of all wells operated, in the case of individual performance bonds, and a function of the number of wells operated, in the case of blanket performance bonds. Individual small business and micro-business operators may therefore incur actual compliance costs per $100 of sales and per employee that are lower or higher than those the Commission has estimated for the "average" small business or micro-business operator, depending on the depth or number of wells operated, the number of employees of the operator, and the operator's gross receipts. The incremental per $100 of sales and per employee cost of compliance with the proposed universal bonding amendments to §3.78 for small business and micro- business operators that have previously filed an alternate form of financial security will be materially less than the cost estimated in the previous analyses or will be zero, because the annual cost of obtaining a bond or letter of credit will be offset, in whole or in part, by the annual nonrefundable fees these operators now file as financial security and the annual fees they are required to pay to obtain plugging extensions for inactive wells. The Commission has considered also that some small business and micro-business operators now file an individual or blanket performance bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit as financial security and that the proposed universal bonding amendments to §3.14 and §3.78 will not increase the cost of compliance to these operators.

Comparison of the cost to small business and micro-business operators of compliance with the proposed universal bonding amendments to §3.14 and §3.78 with the cost of compliance to the largest businesses affected by the proposed amendments is complicated by the fact that most all of the largest operators subject to the Commission's jurisdiction are not affected by the amendments. These large operators, for the most part, already file a performance bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit as financial security. The largest operator, in terms of gross receipts identified by the Commission based on 2003 production of oil and gas, that filed an alternate form of financial security operates 10 wells and had 2003 production which, at 2003 prices, accounted for gross receipts of approximately $44,997,000. Assuming that this operator filed a blanket bond in the amount of $25,000, the annual per $100 of sales cost of compliance with the proposed universal bonding amendments to §3.14 and §3.78 would be a fraction of one cent whether the annual bond premium is 12.5% or 3% of the bond amount.

Assuming that a large business operator has 100 employees, the annual per employee cost to the operator of compliance with the proposed universal bonding amendments to §3.78 would be approximately: (1) $31.25, if a blanket bond in the amount of $25,000 is filed and the annual bond premium is 12.5% of the bond amount; (2) $7.50, if a blanket bond in the amount of $25,000 is filed and the annual bond premium is 3% of the bond amount; (3) $62.50, if a blanket bond in the amount of $50,000 is filed and the annual bond premium is 12.5% of the bond amount; (4) $15.00, if a blanket bond in the amount of $50,000 is filed and the annual bond premium is 3% of the bond amount; (5) $312.50, if a blanket bond in the amount of $250,000 is filed and the annual bond premium is 12.5% of the bond amount; or (6) $75.00, if a blanket bond in the amount of $250,000 is filed and the annual bond premium is 3% of the bond amount.

The Commission does not foreclose the possibility that some individual, small business, and micro-business operators may have difficulty in obtaining a performance bond or letter of credit or be unable to file a cash deposit. However, under Texas Natural Resources Code, §§91.103 and 91.104, as amended by Senate Bill 310, 77th Legislature (2001), effective September 1, 2004, the Commission does not have the discretion to exempt small and micro-business operators from the requirement that all non-exempt operators file financial security in the form of an individual or blanket performance bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit. As of April 28, 2004, there were 5,689 operators having activities which as of that date required the filing of financial security, and of these, 5,122 had filed financial security in the form of an individual or blanket performance bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit. As of January 18, 2001, only 8.6% of all operators had filed one of these forms of financial security. Senate Bill 310, amending Texas Natural Resources Code, §§91.103 and 91.104, to require universal bonding effective September 1, 2004, was enacted in 2001, and the Commission anticipates that operators will have had sufficient time to prepare for universal bonding so that the number of operators that are unable to comply will be minimal.

Ms. Savage has estimated that there will be no economic effect on small business and micro-business operators of the proposed technical amendments to §§3.5, 3.8, 3.32, 3.37, 3.38, 3.57, 3.73, 3.86, and 3.96, because the amendments are non-substantive in nature.

James M. Doherty, Hearings Examiner, Hearings Section, Office of General Counsel, has determined that for each year of the first five years that the amendments will be in effect, the primary public benefit will be the implementation of universal bonding and additional financial security for bay and offshore wells required by the Legislature. This additional financial security should reduce the amount of funds required from the OFCUF to plug inactive and abandoned wells, including bay and offshore wells. Funds from the OFCUF will then be available for clean-up and plugging operations in the areas of greatest need.

The Commission proposes that the amendments will become effective on September 1, 2004. This proposed effective date is required in order to comply with Texas Natural Resources Code, §§91.103, 91.104, 91.1041, 91.1042, 91.107, and 91.109.

Comments on the proposal may be submitted to Rules Coordinator, Office of General Counsel, Railroad Commission of Texas, P.O. Box 12967, Austin, Texas 78711-2967; online at www.rrc.state.tx.us/rules/commentform.html; or by electronic mail to rulescoordinator@rrc.state.tx.us. The Commission will accept comments for 30 days after publication in the Texas Register . Comments should refer to Docket No. 20-0239008. The Commission encourages all interested persons to submit comments no later than the deadline. The Commission cannot guarantee that comments submitted after the deadline will be considered. For further information, call James M. Doherty at (512) 463-7152. The status of Commission rulemakings in progress is available at www.rrc.state.tx.us/rules/proposed.html.

The Commission proposes the amendments to §§3.5, 3.8, 3.14, 3.32, 3.37, 3.38, 3.57, 3.73, 3.78, 3.86, and 3.96 pursuant to subsection (b) of Texas Government Code, §2001.006, which authorizes the Commission to adopt rules in preparation for the implementation of legislation that has become law but has not taken effect; and pursuant to Texas Natural Resources Code, §§81.051 and 81.052, which provide the Commission with jurisdiction over all persons owning or engaged in drilling or operating oil or gas wells in Texas and the authority to adopt all necessary rules for governing and regulating persons and their operations under the jurisdiction of the Commission, and under the provisions of Texas Natural Resources Code, §§91.103, 91.104, 91.1041, 91.1042, 91.107, and 91.109 which relate to financial security requirements for operators subject to the Commission's jurisdiction.

Texas Natural Resources Code, §§81.051, 81.052, 81.0521, 81.0522, 85.202, 85.2021, 88.011, 91.101, 91.1013, 91.103, 91.104, 91.1041, 91.1042, 91.105-91.108, 91.109, 91.1091, 91.111-91.113, and 91.142, are affected by the proposed amendments.

Statutory authority: Texas Government Code, §2001.006, and Texas Natural Resources Code, §§81.051, 81.052, 81.0521, 81.0522, 85.202, 85.2021, 88.011, 91.101, 91.1013, 91.103, 91.104, 91.1041, 91.1042, 91.105-91.108, 91.109, 91.1091, 91.111-91.113, and 91.142.

Cross-reference to statutes: Texas Government Code, §2001.006, and Texas Natural Resources Code, §§81.051, 81.052, 81.0521, 81.0522, 85.202, 85.2021, 88.011, 91.101, 91.1013, 91.103, 91.104, 91.1041, 91.1042, 91.105-91.108, 91.109, 91.1091, 91.111-91.113, and 91.142.

Issued in Austin, Texas on June 8, 2004.

§3.5.Application To Drill, Deepen, Reenter, or Plug Back.

(a) - (c) (No change.)

(d) Testing of existing wells in other reservoirs inside the casing. For an existing well, an operator may request authorization to commence operations to deepen inside the casing or plug back prior to the granting of a permit to deepen or plug back.

(1) (No change.)

(2) Operations of deepening inside the casing or plugging back shall not be commenced until the district office has reviewed and approved the request. Testing pursuant to this authorization shall be completed within 90 days from the date the district office approves the request.

(A) - (B) (No change.)

(C) Within 30 days of completion of testing, the operator must either file an application for a permit to produce a reservoir tested pursuant to this subsection or file an amended completion report in accordance with §3.16 of this title (relating to Log and Completion or [ of ] Plugging Report) (Statewide Rule 16) with a copy of the request signed by the district office and a statement that a permit to produce a tested reservoir is not being sought, or if the well has been plugged and abandoned, a plugging report including reservoir and perforation data. If a permit is not obtained for the tested reservoirs and/or an allowable is not assigned, the producer shall report all test production in the producer's monthly report filed for the last permitted reservoir in which the well was completed and may request authorization to sell the test production. The test production may be sold after such authorization is granted.

(e) (No change.)

(f) Drilling permit fee. With each application or materially amended application, the applicant shall submit to the commission a nonrefundable fee as determined by §3.78 of this title (relating to Fees and Financial Security Requirements [ Fees, Performance Bonds, and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required To Be Filed ]) (Statewide Rule 78).

(g) (No change.)

(h) Plats. An application to drill, deepen, plug back, or reenter shall be accompanied by a neat, accurate plat, with a scale of one inch equals 1,000 feet. The plat for the initial well on the lease, pooled unit, or unitized tract shall show the entire lease, pooled unit, or tract, including all tracts being pooled. If necessary to show the entire lease, the scale may be one inch equals 2,000 feet. Plats for subsequent wells on a lease or pooled unit shall show at least the lease or pooled unit line nearest the proposed location and the nearest survey/section lines. The Division Director or the director's delegate may approve plats with other scales upon request.

(1) - (2) (No change.)

(3) Requirements for plats as provided for in §3.11, §3.37, §3.38, and §3.86 of this title (relating to Inclination and Directional Surveys Required, Statewide Spacing Rule, Well Densities, and Horizontal Drainhole Wells) may supplement or replace the plat requirements set out above.

§3.8.Water Protection.

(a) - (c) (No change.)

(d) Pollution control.

(1) Prohibited disposal methods. Except for those disposal methods authorized for certain wastes by paragraph (3) of this subsection, subsection (e) of this section, or §3.98 of this title (relating to Standards for Management of Hazardous Oil and Gas Waste), or disposal methods required to be permitted pursuant to §3.9 of this title (relating to Disposal Wells) (Rule 9) or §3.46 of this title (relating to Fluid Injection into Productive Reservoirs) (Rule 46), no person may dispose of any oil and gas wastes by any method without obtaining a permit to dispose of such wastes. The disposal methods prohibited by this paragraph include, but are not limited to, the unpermitted discharge of oil field brines, geothermal resource waters, or other mineralized waters, or drilling fluids into any watercourse or drainageway, including any drainage ditch, dry creek, flowing creek, river, or any other body of surface water. [ For any disposal method required to be permitted pursuant to §3.75 of this title (relating to Discharges to Waters of the State) (Rule 77), no permit issued under this section or authorization contained in this section satisfies the requirements of §3.75. ]

(2) - (9) (No change.)

(e) (No change.)

(f) Oil and gas waste haulers.

(1) A person who transports oil and gas waste for hire by any method other than by pipeline shall not haul or dispose of oil and gas waste off a lease, unit, or other oil or gas property where it is generated unless such transporter has qualified for and been issued an oil and gas waste hauler permit by the commission. Hauling of inert waste, asbestos-containing material regulated under the Clean Air Act (42 USC §§7401 et seq), polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) waste regulated under the Toxic Substances Control Act (15 USCA §§2601 et seq), or hazardous oil and gas waste subject to regulation under §3.98 of this title (relating to Standards for Management of Hazardous Oil and Gas Waste), is excluded from this subsection. This subsection is not applicable to the hauling of oil and gas wastes for recycling. For purposes of this subsection, injection of salt water or other oil and gas waste into an oil and gas reservoir for purposes of enhanced recovery does not qualify as recycling. A person who has a salt water hauler permit does not need to apply for an oil and gas waste hauler permit until the person is scheduled to file an application for permit renewal.

(A) Application for an oil and gas waste hauler permit will be made on the commission-prescribed form, and in accordance with the instructions thereon, and must be accompanied by:

(i) the permit application fee required by §3.78 of this title (relating to Fees and Financial Security Requirements [ Fees, Performance Bonds, and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required To Be Filed ]) (Statewide Rule 78);

(ii) - (iv) (No change.)

(B) - (C) (No change.)

(2) (No change.)

(g) (No change.)

(h) Penalties. Violations of this section may subject a person to penalties and remedies specified in the Texas Natural Resources Code, Title 3, and any other statutes administered by the commission. The certificate of compliance for any oil, gas, or geothermal resource well may be revoked in the manner provided in §3.73 [ §3.68 ] of this title (relating to Pipeline Connection; Cancellation of Certificate of Compliance; Severance [ Pipeline Connection and Severance ]) (Rule 73) or violation of this section.

(i) Coordination between the Railroad Commission of Texas and the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality or its successor agencies. The Railroad Commission and the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality both have adopted by rule a memorandum of understanding regarding the division of jurisdiction between the agencies over wastes that result from, or are related to, activities associated with the exploration, development, and production of oil, gas, or geothermal resources, and the refining of oil. The memorandum of understanding is adopted in §3.30 of this title (relating to Memorandum of Understanding between the Railroad Commission of Texas (RRC) and the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ)). [ Adoption of memorandum of understanding by reference. The memorandum of understanding between the Railroad Commission of Texas, the Texas Water Commission, and the Texas Department of Health, which concerns the division of jurisdiction among the agencies over wastes that result from, or are related to, activities associated with the exploration, development, and production of oil, gas, or geothermal resources, and the refining of oil, is adopted by reference. The effective date of the memorandum of understanding adopted by reference is December 1, 1987. Copies of the memorandum of understanding are available upon request from the Railroad Commission of Texas, Oil and Gas Division, Underground Injection Control Section, P.O. Drawer 12967, Austin, Texas 78711-2967, (512) 463-6790. ]

(j) Consistency with the Texas Coastal Management Program. The provisions of this subsection apply only to activities that occur in the coastal zone and that are subject to the CMP rules.

(1) Specific Policies.

(A) (No change.)

(B) Discharge of Oil and Gas Waste to Surface Waters. The following provisions apply to discharges of oil and gas waste that occur in the coastal zone:

(i) no discharge of oil and gas waste to surface waters may cause a violation of the Texas Surface Water Quality Standards adopted by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality or its successor agencies [ Natural Resource Conservation Commission ] and codified at Title 30, Texas Administrative Code, Chapter 307;

(ii) - (iv) (No change.)

(v) the commission shall notify the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality or its successor agencies [ Natural Resource Conservation Commission ] and the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department upon receipt of an application for a permit to discharge oil and gas waste that is comprised, in whole or in part, of produced waters to waters under tidal influence.

(C) - (D) (No change.)

(2) - (3) (No change.)

§3.14.Plugging.

(a) Definitions and application to plug.

(1) The following words and terms, when used in this section, shall have the following meanings, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:

(A) - (K) (No change.)

(L) Unbonded operator--An operator that has a current and active organization report on file with the Commission that filed a nonrefundable annual fee as financial security prior to September 1, 2004, and is not required by §3.78 of this title (relating to Fees and Financial Security Requirements) to file an individual performance bond, blanket performance bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit as its financial security until the first date for annual renewal of the operator's organization report after September 1, 2004 [ but that does not have a current individual performance bond, blanket performance bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit as its financial security under §3.78 of this title (relating to Fees, Performance Bonds, and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required to be Filed) (Statewide Rule 78) ].

(M) - (N) (No change.)

(2) The operator shall give the Commission notice of its intention to plug any well or wells drilled for oil, gas, or geothermal resources or for any other purpose over which the Commission has jurisdiction, except those specifically addressed in §3.100(e)(1) [ §3.100(f)(1) ] of this title (relating to Seismic Holes and Core Holes) (Statewide Rule 100), prior to plugging. The operator shall deliver or transmit the written notice to the district office on the appropriate form.

(3) - (5) (No change.)

(b) Commencement of plugging operations , [ and ] extensions , and testing .

(1) (No change.)

(2) Plugging operations on each dry or inactive well shall be commenced within a period of one year after drilling or operations cease and shall proceed with due diligence until completed. Plugging operations on delinquent inactive wells shall be commenced immediately unless the well is restored to active operation. For good cause, a reasonable extension of time in which to start the plugging operations may be granted pursuant to the following procedures.

(A) Plugging of inactive wells operated by unbonded operators. During the interim period between September 1, 2004, and the first date for annual renewal of an unbonded operator's organization report after September 1, 2004, the [ The ] Commission or its delegate may administratively grant an extension of up to one year of the deadline for plugging an inactive well that is operated by an unbonded operator if the following criteria are met:

(i) The well and associated facilities are in compliance with all other laws and Commission rules;

(ii) The operator's organization report is current and active;

(iii) The operator has, and upon request provides evidence of, a good faith claim to a continuing right to operate the well; and

[ (iv) The operator has paid the proper fee as provided in §3.78 of this title (relating to Fees, Performance Bonds, and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required To Be Filed) (Statewide Rule 78); and]

(iv) [ (v) ] The operator has tested the well in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (3) of this subsection [ subparagraph (D) of this paragraph ] and files with its application proof of either:

(I) a fluid level test conducted within 90 days prior to the application for a plugging extension demonstrating that any fluid in the wellbore is at least 250 feet below the base of the deepest usable quality water stratum; or,

(II) a hydraulic pressure test conducted during the period the well has been inactive and not more than four years prior to the date of application demonstrating the mechanical integrity of the well.

(B) Plugging of inactive wells operated by bonded operators. An operator that maintains valid, Commission-approved financial security in the form of an individual performance bond, blanket performance bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit as provided in §3.78 of this title (relating to Fees and Financial Security Requirements [ Fees, Performance Bonds, and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required to be Filed ]) (Statewide Rule 78) will be granted a one-year plugging extension for each well it operates that has been inactive for 12 months or more at the time its annual organizational report is approved by the Commission if the following criteria are met:

(i) The well and associated facilities are in compliance with all laws and Commission rules; and,

(ii) The operator has, and upon request provides evidence of, a good faith claim to a continuing right to operate the well.

(C) Revocation or denial of plugging extension.

(i) The Commission or its delegate may revoke a plugging extension if the operator of the well that is the subject of the extension fails to maintain the well and all associated facilities in compliance with Commission rules; fails to maintain a current and accurate organizational report on file with the Commission; fails to provide the Commission, upon request, with evidence of a continuing good faith claim to operate the well; or fails to obtain or maintain financial security as required by §3.78 of this title (relating to Fees and Financial Security Requirements [ Fees, Performance Bonds, and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required to be Filed ]) (Statewide Rule 78).

(ii) If the Commission or its delegate declines to grant or continue a plugging extension or revokes a previously granted extension, the operator shall either return the well to active operation or, within 30 days, plug the well or request a hearing on the matter.

(3) [ (D) ] The operator of any well more than 25 years old that becomes inactive and subject to the provisions of this subsection [ paragraph ] or the operator of any well for which a plugging extension is sought under the terms of subparagraph (A) of paragraph (2) of this subsection [ this paragraph ] shall plug the well or successfully conduct a fluid level or hydraulic pressure test establishing that the well does not pose a potential threat of harm to natural resources, including surface and subsurface water, oil and gas.

(A) [ (i) ] In general, a fluid level test is a sufficient test for purposes of this paragraph [ subparagraph ]. The operator shall give the district office written notice specifying the date and approximate time it intends to conduct the fluid level test at least 48 hours prior to conducting the test; however, upon a showing of undue hardship, the district director or the director's delegate may grant a written waiver or reduction of the notice requirement for a specific well test. The director or the director's delegate may require alternate methods of testing if necessary to ensure the well does not pose a potential threat of harm to natural resources. Alternate methods of testing may be approved by the director or the director's delegate by written application and upon a showing that such a test will provide information sufficient to determine that the well does not pose a threat to natural resources.

(B) [ (ii) ] No test other than a fluid level test shall be acceptable without prior approval from the district director or the director's delegate. The district director or the director's delegate shall be notified at least 48 hours before any test other than a fluid level test is conducted. Mechanical integrity test results shall be filed with the district office and fluid level test results shall be filed with the Commission in Austin. Test results shall be filed on a Commission-approved form, within 30 days of the completion of the test. Upon request, the operator shall file the actual test data for any mechanical integrity or fluid level test that it has conducted.

(C) [ (iii) ] Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (B) of this paragraph [ clause (ii) of this subparagraph ], a hydraulic pressure test may be conducted without prior approval from the district director or the director's delegate, provided that the operator gives the district office written notice specifying the date and approximate time for the test at least 48 hours prior to the time the test will be conducted, the production casing is tested to a depth of at least 250 feet below the base of usable quality water strata, or 100 feet below the top of cement behind the production casing, whichever is deeper, and the minimum test pressure is greater than or equal to 250 psig for a period of at least 30 minutes.

(D) [ (iv) ] If the operator performs a hydraulic pressure test in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (C) of this paragraph [ clause (iii) of this subparagraph ], the well shall be exempt from further testing for five years from the date of the test, except to the extent that [ compliance with paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of this section requires more frequent testing. Further, ] the Commission or its delegate may require the operator to perform testing more frequently to ensure that the well does not pose a threat of harm to natural resources. The Commission or its delegate may approve less frequent well tests under this paragraph [ subparagraph ] upon written request and for good cause shown provided that less frequent testing will not increase the threat of harm to natural resources.

(E) [ (v) ] A well subject to the testing requirements of this paragraph [ subparagraph ] shall not be returned to active operation unless a fluid level test of the well has been performed within 12 months prior to the return to activity or a mechanical integrity test of the well has been performed within 60 months prior to the return to activity.

[ (3) Transfer of operatorship. A transfer of operatorship submitted for any well or lease will not be approved unless the operator acquiring the well or lease has on file with the Commission financial security as provided in §3.78 of this title (relating to Fees, Performance Bonds, and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required to be Filed) (Statewide Rule 78).]

(4) - (5) (No change.)

(c) - (k) (No change.)

§3.32.Gas Well Gas and Casinghead Gas Shall Be Utilized for Legal Purposes.

(a) The following words and terms, when used in this section, shall have the following meanings, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.

(1) Fugitive emissions--Releases of gas from lease production, gathering, compression, or gas plant equipment components, including emissions from valve stems, pressure relief valves, flanges and connections, gas-operated valves, compressor and pump seals, pumping well stuffing boxes, casing-to-casing bradenheads subject to the provisions of §3.17 of this title (relating to Pressure on Bradenhead [ in Oil, Gas or Geothermal Resource Operations ]), pits, and sumps, that cannot reasonably be captured and sold or routed to a vent or flare.

(2) - (5) (No change.)

(b) Activities authorized by this section may be subject to rules and regulations promulgated by the United States Environmental Protection Agency under the federal Clean Air Act or the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality [ Natural Resources Conservation commission ] under the Texas Clean Air Act.

(c) - (e) (No change.)

(f) Gas Releases in Oil and Gas Production Operations.

(1) The following releases of gas resulting from routine oil and gas production operations are necessary in the efficient drilling and operation of oil and gas wells and are hereby authorized subject to the requirements of subsection (e) of this section. The released gas shall be measured or estimated in accordance with §3.27 of this title (relating to Gas To Be Measured and Surface Commingling of Gas ) and reported and charged against lease allowable production.

(A) - (E) (No change.)

(2) The commission or the commission's delegate may administratively grant or renew an exception to the requirements or limitations of this subsection subject to the requirements of subsection (h) to allow additional releases of gas if the operator of a well or production facility presents information to show the necessity for the release. The volume of gas that is released must be measured or estimated in accordance with §3.27 of this title (relating to Gas To Be Measured and Surface Commingling of Gas ) and reported on the appropriate commission form and shall be charged to the operator's allowable production. Necessity for the release includes, but is not limited to, the following situations:

(A) - (E) (No change.)

(g) Gas releases from gas gathering system, gas plant or gas handling operations.

(1) The operator of a gas gathering system, gas plant, gas compressor facility or other gas handling equipment not directly associated with lease production of gas, shall not intentionally allow gas to be released for a period of more than 24 hours after the start of an upset condition. The operator shall notify the appropriate commission district office by telephone or facsimile as soon as reasonably possible after the release of gas begins. The volume of gas that is released must be measured or estimated in accordance with §3.27 of this title (relating to Gas To Be Measured and Surface Commingling of Gas ) and reported on the appropriate commission form. The provisions of this subsection do not apply to accidental releases which are subject to or reported pursuant to any other commission rule.

(2) (No change.)

(h) Exceptions. The commission or the commission's delegate may administratively grant an exception authorized by this section provided that the requirements of this subsection are met.

(1) The request for an exception shall be accompanied by the fee required by §3.78(b)(5) of this title (relating to Fees and Financial Security Requirements [ Fees, Performance Bonds and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required To Be Filed ]).

(2) - (7) (No change.)

(8) One application for exception to the requirements of this section may be filed for multiple releases from gas wells, commission-designated oil leases, gas gathering systems, gas compressors or other gas handling facilities when the release of gas is the result of a full or partial shut-down of a gas gathering system, gas plant, gas compressor or other gas handling facility under subsection (f)(1)(C) or (g)(1). Each well, lease or facility must be clearly identified by the applicant and a single fee paid under §3.78(b)(5) of this title (relating to Fees and Financial Security Requirements [ Fees, Performance Bonds and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required To Be Filed ]).

(i) Renewal and Amendment of Exceptions.

(1) - (2) (No change.)

(3) An operator shall file an application and fee for renewal of an exception with the commission 21 days prior to expiration of the existing exception authority. The request for renewal shall be accompanied by the fee required by §3.78(b)(5) of this title (relating to Fees and Financial Security Requirements [ Fees, Performance Bonds and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required To Be Filed ]).

(4) - (6) (No change.)

(j) (No change.)

§3.37.Statewide Spacing Rule.

(a) Distance requirements.

(1) (No change.)

(2) When an exception to this section is desired, application shall be made by filing the proper fee as provided in §3.78 of this title (relating to Fees and Financial Security Requirements [ Fees, Performance Bonds, and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required To Be Filed ]) and the appropriate form according to the instructions on the form, accompanied by a plat as described in subsection (c) of this section. A person acquainted with the facts pertinent to the application shall certify that all facts stated in it are true and within the knowledge of that person.

(A) - (B) (No change.)

(3) (No change.)

(b) - (m) (No change.)

§3.38.Well Densities.

(a) - (f) (No change.)

(g) Filing requirements.

(1) Application. An application for permit to drill shall include the fees required in §3.78 of this title (relating to Fees and Financial Security Requirements [ Fees, Performance Bonds, and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required To Be Filed ]) and shall be certified by a person acquainted with the facts, stating that all information in the application is true and complete to the best of that person's knowledge.

(2) - (4) (No change.)

(5) Certifications. Certifications required under paragraphs (3) and (4) of this subsection shall be filed on Form W-1A [ (revised 5/2001) ], Substandard Acreage Certification.

(A) - (E) (No change.)

(h) - (i) (No change.)

§3.57.Reclaiming Tank Bottoms, Other Hydrocarbon Wastes, and Other Waste Materials.

(a) (No change.)

(b) Definitions. The following words and terms, when used in this section, shall have the following meanings, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.

(1) Tank bottoms--A mixture of crude oil or lease condensate, water, and other substances that is concentrated at the bottom of producing lease tanks and pipeline storage tanks (commonly referred to as basic sediment and water or BS&W ).

(2) - (5) (No change.)

(c) Permitting process.

(1) - (9) (No change.)

(10) Reclamation plants permitted under this section shall file financial security as required under §3.78(l) [ §3.78(r) ] of this title (relating to Fees and Financial Security Requirements [ Fees, Performance Bonds and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required To Be Filed ]).

(d) Operation of a reclamation plant.

(1) The following provisions apply to any removal of tank bottoms or other hydrocarbon wastes from any oil producing lease tank, pipeline storage tank, or other production facility.

(A) Notwithstanding the provisions of §3.85(a)(8) [ §3.72(a)(8) ] of this title (relating to Manifest To Accompany Each Transport of Liquid Hydrocarbons by Vehicle), an operator of a reclamation plant or an authorized person shall execute a manifest in accordance with §3.85 [ §3.72 ] of this title (relating to Manifest To Accompany Each Transport of Liquid Hydrocarbons by Vehicle), upon each removal of tank bottoms or other hydrocarbon wastes from any oil producing lease tank, pipeline storage tank, or other production facility. In addition to the information required pursuant to §3.85 [ §3.72 ] of this title (relating to Manifest To Accompany Each Transport of Liquid Hydrocarbons by Vehicle), the operator of the reclamation plant or other authorized person shall also include on the manifest:

(i) - (ii) (No change.)

(B) - (C) (No change.)

(2) - (3) (No change.)

(e) - (h) (No change.)

§3.73.Pipeline Connection; Cancellation of Certificate of Compliance; Severance.

(a) - (f) (No change.)

(g) If a certificate of compliance has been cancelled, the Commission may not issue a new certificate of compliance until the owner or operator of the property covered by the certificate of compliance submits to the Commission a reissuance fee as required by §3.78 of this title (relating to Fees and Financial Security Requirements [ Fees, Performance Bonds and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required To Be Filed ]) (Statewide Rule 78); and

(1) - (2) (No change.)

(h) - (j) (No change.)

§3.78. Fees and Financial Security Requirements [ Fees, Performance Bonds and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required To Be Filed ].

(a) Definitions. The following words and terms, when used in this section, shall have the following meanings, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:

(1) - (2) (No change.)

[ (3) An acceptable record of compliance--]

[ (A) A record of compliance showing:]

[ (i) No enforcement orders issued; and]

[ (ii) No outstanding violations; or]

[ (B) A record of compliance showing:]

[ (i) Only one enforcement order, provided the order specifies that it shall not be considered to meet the elements of subparagraph (A) of this definition and provided the requirements of the order are met;]

[ (ii) No enforcement orders issued other than those that are resolved in the order referenced in clause (i) of this subparagraph;]

[ (iii) No outstanding violations other than those resolved in the order referenced in clause (i) of this subparagraph.]

(3) [ (4) ] Commercial facility--A facility whose owner or operator receives compensation from others for the storage, reclamation, treatment, or disposal of oil field fluids or oil and gas wastes that are wholly or partially trucked or hauled to the facility and whose primary business purpose is to provide these services for compensation if:

(A) the facility is permitted under §3.8 of this title (relating to Water Protection);

(B) the facility is permitted under §3.57 of this title (relating to Reclaiming Tank Bottoms, Other Hydrocarbon Wastes, and Other Waste Materials);

(C) the facility is permitted under §3.9 of this title (relating to Disposal Wells) and a collecting pit permitted under §3.8 is located at the facility; or

(D) the facility is permitted under §3.46 of this title (relating to Fluid Injection into Productive Reservoirs) and a collecting pit permitted under §3.8 is located at the facility.

(4) [ (5) ] Financial security--An individual performance bond, blanket performance bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit filed with the Commission.

[ (6) Alternate form of financial security--Payment of a nonrefundable annual fee to the Commission.]

(5) [ (7) ] Bay well--Any well under the jurisdiction of the Commission for which the surface location is either:

(A) located in or on a lake, river, stream, canal, estuary, bayou, or other inland [ navigable ] waters of the state and which requires plugging by means other than conventional land- based methods, including, but not limited to, use of a barge, use of a boat, dredging, or building a causeway or other access road to bring in the necessary equipment to plug the well ; or,

(B) located on state lands seaward of the mean high tide line of the Gulf of Mexico in water of a depth at mean high tide of not more than 100 feet that is sheltered from the direct action of the open seas of the Gulf of Mexico.

(6) [ (8) ] Land well--Any well subject to Commission jurisdiction for which the surface location is not in or on inland or coastal waters.

(7) [ (9) ] Offshore well--Any well subject to Commission jurisdiction for which the surface location is on state lands in or on the Gulf of Mexico, that is not a bay well.

(8) [ (10) ] Officers and owners--Any persons owning or controlling an organization including officers, directors, general partners, sole proprietors, owners of more than 25% ownership interest, any trustee of an organization, and any person determined by a final judgment or final administrative order to have exercised control over the organization.

(9) [ (11) ] Letter of credit--An irrevocable letter of credit issued:

(A) on a Commission-approved form;

(B) by and drawn on a third party bank authorized under state or federal law to do business in Texas; and

(C) renewed and continued in effect until the conditions of the letter of credit have been met or its release is approved by the Commission or its authorized delegate.

(10) [ (12) ] Bond--A surety instrument issued:

(A) on a Commission-approved form;

(B) by and drawn on a third party corporate surety authorized under state law to issue surety bonds in Texas; and

(C) renewed and continued in effect until the conditions of the bond have been met or its release is approved by the Commission or its authorized delegate.

(11) Director--The director of the Commission's Oil and Gas Division or the director's delegate.

(b) Filing fees. The following filing fees are required to be paid to the Railroad Commission.

(1) - (5) (No change.)

[ (6) With each application for an extension of time to plug a well pursuant to Commission rules, an applicant who has filed an alternate form of financial security as provided for under this rule, shall submit to the Commission a nonrefundable fee of $300.]

(6) [ (7) ] With each application for an oil and gas waste disposal well permit, the applicant shall submit to the Commission a nonrefundable fee of $100 per well.

(7) [ (8) ] With each application for a fluid injection well permit, the applicant shall submit to the Commission a nonrefundable fee of $200 per well. Fluid injection well means any well used to inject fluid or gas into the ground in connection with the exploration or production of oil or gas other than an oil and gas waste disposal well.

(8) [ (9) ] With each application for a permit to discharge to surface water other than a permit for a discharge that meets national pollutant discharge elimination system (NPDES) requirements for agricultural or wildlife use, the applicant shall submit to the Commission a nonrefundable fee of $300.

(9) [ (10) ] If a certificate of compliance for an oil lease or gas well has been canceled for violation of one or more Commission rules, the operator shall submit to the Commission a nonrefundable fee of $300 for each severance or seal order issued for the well or lease before the Commission may reissue the certificate pursuant to §3.58 of this title (relating to Oil, Gas, or Geothermal Resource Producer's Reports) (Statewide Rule 58).

(10) [ (11) ] With each application for issuance, renewal, or material amendment of an oil and gas waste hauler's permit, the applicant shall submit to the Commission a nonrefundable fee of $100.

(11) [ (12) ] With each Natural Gas Policy Act (15 United States Code §§3301-3432) application, the applicant shall submit to the Commission a nonrefundable fee of $150.

(12) [ (13) ] Hazardous waste generation fee. A person who generates hazardous oil and gas waste, as that term is defined in §3.98 of this title (relating to Standards for Management of Hazardous Oil and Gas Waste), shall pay to the Commission the fees specified in §3.98(z).

(13) [ (14) ] A check or money order for any of the aforementioned fees shall be made payable to the Railroad Commission of Texas. If the check accompanying an application is not honored upon presentment, the permit issued on the basis of that application, the allowable assigned, the exception to a statewide rule granted on the basis of the application, [ the extension of time to plug a well, ] the certificate of compliance reissued, or the Natural Gas Policy Act category determination made on the basis of the application may be suspended or revoked.

(14) [ (15) ] If an operator submits a check that is not honored on presentment, the operator shall, for a period of 24 months after the check was presented, submit any payments in the form of a credit card, cashier's check, or cash.

(c) (No change.)

(d) Financial security [ and alternate forms of financial security ]. Except for those operators exempted under subsection (g)(7) of this section, any [ Any ] person, including any firm, partnership, joint stock association, corporation, or other organization, required by Texas Natural Resources Code, §91.142, to file an organization report with the Commission must also file financial security in one of the following forms:

(1) an individual performance bond;

(2) a blanket performance bond; or

[ (3) a nonrefundable annual fee of $1,000, if:]

[ (A) the Commission or its designee determines that individual and blanket performance bonds as specified by this section are not obtainable at reasonable prices as provided for under subsection (f) of this section;]

[ (B) the person can demonstrate to the Commission an acceptable record of compliance with all Commission rules, orders, licenses, permits, or certificates that relate to safety or the prevention or control of pollution for the previous 48 months and the person has no outstanding violations; and]

[ (C) if the person is a firm, partnership, joint stock association, corporation, or other organization, its officers, directors, general partners, or owners of more than 25% ownership interest or any trustee must also not have any outstanding violations.]

[ (4) a nonrefundable annual fee equal to 12.5% of the face amount of the performance bond that otherwise would be required; or]

(3) [ (5) ] a letter of credit or cash deposit in the same amount as required for an individual performance bond or blanket performance bond.

(4) An unbonded operator that has a current and active organization report and filed a nonrefundable annual fee as its financial security prior to September 1, 2004, may continue to perform operations subject to the Commission's jurisdiction with such financial security until the first date after September 1, 2004, for annual renewal of the operator's organization report, at which time the operator shall file financial security as required by subsection (g) of this section.

[ (e) Eligibility for nonrefundable $1,000 fee.]

[ (1) A person filing an organization report for the first time in order to perform any Commission-regulated operations is a new organization and is not eligible to file the nonrefundable fee of $1,000.]

[ (2) A person who filed an initial organization report less than 48 months prior to the current filing is not eligible to file the nonrefundable fee of $1,000.]

[ (3) A change in name, without any other organizational change, of a person registered with the Commission does not indicate a new organization. If the Commission determines that only a name change has occurred, then a person operating under a new name may file the nonrefundable fee of $1,000 if the person meets all other eligibility requirements.]

[ (4) An individual registered with the Commission as a sole proprietor or who is a general partner of a partnership that is registered with the Commission and who reorganizes his or her oil and gas operations under a new legal entity or establishes a new and separate entity will be considered to have satisfied the 48- month eligibility requirement for filing the nonrefundable fee of $1,000.]

[ (5) A surviving or new corporation or other entity resulting from a merger under the Texas Business Corporation Act, Part Five, may file the nonrefundable fee of $1,000 if:]

[ (A) the existing record of compliance for each entity that is a party to the merger qualifies;]

[ (B) the records of compliance for the officers and owners of the surviving or new entities qualify; and]

[ (C) the number of surviving or new entities eligible does not exceed the number of parties registered with the Commission at the time of the merger.]

[ (6) In any Commission enforcement proceeding, if a person is determined not to be the responsible party for a violation and is dismissed from the proceeding for that reason, that violation shall not be considered in determining whether that person has an acceptable record of compliance.]

[ (f) Availability of bonds.]

[ (1) In determining the applicability of the $1,000 nonrefundable fee as provided for under this section, the Commission presumes that individual and blanket performance bonds are obtainable at reasonable prices.]

[ (2) An operator who is otherwise eligible under this section to file a $1,000 nonrefundable annual fee may request an administrative determination that individual and blanket performance bonds are not available to that operator at reasonable prices. In order to support an administrative determination that bonds are not obtainable by a requesting operator at reasonable prices, the operator must submit declination letters to the Commission's P-5/Financial Assurance Department establishing that three companies from a list maintained by the Commission that have issued a bond filed with the Commission in the past 12 months will not issue a bond to the requesting operator or will only issue a bond to the operator for an annual fee in excess of 6% of the face amount of the bond.]

[ (3) If an operator requesting a determination that bonds are not available to it has a bond as its current financial assurance, one of the three declination letters must be from that operator's current surety.]

[ (4) If an operator's application for the $1,000 nonrefundable fee is administratively denied, the operator may request a hearing to determine eligibility for the $1,000 nonrefundable fee. The Commission shall consider cash or other collateral requirements, along with the premium and any other surety company requirements, in determining if bonds are available to the requesting operator at a reasonable price.]

(e) [ (g) ] Forms for financial security. Operators shall submit bonds and letters of credit on forms prescribed by the Commission.

(f) [ (h) ] Filing deadlines for financial security. Operators shall submit required financial security at the time of filing an initial organization report or upon yearly renewal, or as otherwise required under [ subsection (m) of ] this section.

[ (i) New operators. A person filing an organization report for the first time is a new organization and is not eligible to file an individual performance bond for the first year of operation.]

(g) Amount of financial security. An operator required to file financial security under subsection (d) of this section shall file financial security described in this subsection.

(1) Types and amounts of financial security required.

(A) A person operating one or more wells may file an individual performance bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit in an amount equal to the sum of $2.00 for each foot of total well depth for each well operated.

(B) A person operating one or more wells may file a blanket bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit to cover all wells for which a bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit is required in an amount equal to the sum of the base amount determined by the total number of wells operated. A person performing multiple operations shall be required to file only one blanket bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit unless the person is operating a commercial facility, in which case the person also shall comply with the financial security requirements of subsection (l) of this section. The financial security amount shall be at least the base amount determined by the total number of wells operated or $25,000, whichever is greater. The base amount is determined as follows:

(i) The base amount for a person operating 10 or fewer wells or performs other operations shall be $25,000.

(ii) The base amount for a person operating more than 10 but fewer than 100 wells shall be $50,000.

(iii) The base amount for a person operating 100 or more wells shall be $250,000.

(2) Additional financial security for bay wells.

(A) All operators of bay wells shall file additional financial security of no less than $60,000 in addition to any other financial security that is required under this section for any other Commission-regulated activities.

(B) For each bay well that is not currently producing oil or gas and has not produced oil or gas within the past 12 months, including injection and disposal wells, the operator shall file additional financial security of $60,000. An operator shall not be required to file additional financial security in addition to the $60,000 amount set under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph if the operator operates only a single inactive bay well.

(C) In the case of a bay well that has been inactive for 12 consecutive months or longer and that is not used for disposal or injection, the well shall remain subject to the provisions of subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, regardless of any minimal activity, until the well has reported production of at least 10 barrels of oil for oil wells or 100 mcf of gas for gas wells each month for at least three consecutive months.

(3) Additional financial security for offshore wells.

(A) All operators of offshore wells and operators of both bay wells and offshore wells shall file additional financial security of no less than $100,000 in addition to any other financial security that is required under this section for any other Commission regulated activities.

(B) For each offshore well that is not currently producing oil or gas and has not produced oil or gas within the past 12 months, including injection and disposal wells, the operator shall file an additional amount of financial security of $100,000. An operator shall not be required to file additional financial security in addition to the $100,000 amount set under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph if the operator operates only a single inactive offshore well.

(C) In the case of an offshore well that has been inactive for 12 consecutive months or longer and that is not used for disposal or injection, the well shall remain classified as inactive for purposes of this section, regardless of any minimal activity, until the well has reported production of at least 10 barrels of oil for oil wells or 100 mcf of gas for gas wells each month for at least three consecutive months.

(4) Reduction of the additional financial security that is required for bay and/or offshore wells. An operator may request a reduction of either the additional $60,000 in financial security required for all operators of bay wells, or the additional $100,000 in financial security required for all operators of offshore wells and operators of both bay wells and offshore wells.

(A) The director may administratively approve the reduction if the operator provides documentation that it currently has acceptable financial assurance in place to satisfy any financial assurance requirements established by local authorities. The operator must show that the bond or other form of financial assurance can be called on by or assigned to the Commission under the following circumstances:

(i) a well is likely to pollute or is polluting any ground or surface water or is allowing the uncontrolled escape of formation fluids from the strata in which they were originally located; or

(ii) a well is not being maintained in compliance with Commission rules or state law relating to plugging or the prevention or control of pollution; or

(iii) the operator has failed to renew and maintain an organization report filing as required by §3.1 of this title (relating to Organization Report; Retention of Records; Notice Requirements) and this section.

(B) If the director administratively denies a requested reduction, the operator may request a hearing to determine whether the reduction should be granted.

(5) Reduction in additional financial security required for bay and/or offshore wells that are not actively producing oil and natural gas. An operator may request that Commission consider a reduction in any additional financial security requirement for the operation of bay and/or offshore wells that are not actively producing oil and natural gas or that are used for disposal or injection in an amount not to exceed the remainder of 25% of the operator's certified net worth based on the independently audited calculation for the most recently completed fiscal year minus the Commission's estimate of the operator's total plugging liability for all of the operator's active bay and/or offshore wells.

(A) The director may administratively grant a full or partial reduction if the operator meets the following criteria:

(i) the operator has either five or fewer bay and offshore wells or at least half of the operator's bay and offshore wells are actively producing oil and natural gas;

(ii) the operator provides to the Commission certification of its net worth from an independent auditor that has employed generally accepted accounting principles to confirm the operator's stated net worth based on the most recently available and independently audited calculation;

(iii) the reduction is less than or equal to the remainder of 25% of the operator's certified net worth minus the Commission's estimate of the operator's total plugging liability for all of the operator's active bay and offshore wells;

(iv) none of the operator's wells or operations, including any land-based wells, have been found by Commission staff to be violating or to have violated any Commission rule that resulted in pollution or in any hazard to the health or safety of the public in the last 12 months.

(B) If the director administratively denies the requested reduction, an operator may request a hearing to determine if a full or partial reduction should be granted.

(C) The operator may also request a hearing to challenge the Commission's presumed estimate of the operator's plugging liability for bay and offshore wells as applied to any additional financial security required for any inactive bay and offshore wells. The operator shall present clear and convincing evidence that the estimated plugging liability is less than the amount estimated by the Commission. Notice of the hearing shall be provided by the Commission to the owners of the surface estate and the owners of the mineral estate for any well that is a subject of the requested hearing, and all other affected persons as identified by the operator or otherwise required by the Commission.

[ (j) Amount of bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit. ]

[ (1) A person who operates one or more wells may file an individual performance bond, letter of credit or cash deposit in an amount equal to $2.00 for each foot of total well depth for each well, plus an additional amount to be determined by the Commission in a subsequent rulemaking for each bay and offshore well operated.]

[ (2) A person operating wells may file a blanket bond, letter of credit or cash deposit to cover all wells for which a bond, letter of credit or cash deposit is required in an amount equal to the sum of:]

[ (A) A base amount determined by the total number of wells operated, as follows:]

[ (i) a person who operates 10 or fewer wells shall have a base amount of $25,000;]

[ (ii) a person who operates more than 10 but fewer than 100 wells shall have a base amount of $50,000; and]

[ (iii) a person who operates 100 or more wells shall have a base amount of $250,000, plus;]

[ (B) an additional amount, to be determined by the Commission in a subsequent rulemaking, for each bay well operated, plus]

[ (C) an additional amount, to be determined by the Commission in a subsequent rulemaking, for each offshore well operated.]

(6) [ (3) ] Persons with non-well operations not exempted under paragraph (7) of this subsection. A person performing other operations who is not an operator of wells and who is not a person whose only activity is as a first purchaser, survey company, salt water hauler, gas nominator, gas purchaser or well plugger [ choosing to cover all operations by a blanket performance bond, letter of credit or cash deposit ] shall file financial security [ a bond, letter of credit or cash deposit ] in the amount of $25,000.

(7) [ (4) ] Persons exempt from financial security requirements. No financial security [ bond, letter of credit, cash deposit or alternate form of financial security ] is required of a person who is not an operator of wells if the person's only activity is as a first purchaser, survey company, salt water hauler, gas nominator, gas purchaser and/or well plugger.

(8) [ (5) ] Persons with both well and non-well operations. If a person is engaged [ A person who engages ] in more than one activity or operation, including well operation, for which financial security [ a bond or alternate form of financial security ] is required , the person is not required to file financial security [ a separate bond or alternate form of financial security ] for each activity or operation in which the person is engaged. The person is required to file financial security [ a bond or alternate form of financial security ] only in the greatest amount required for any [ the ] activity or operation in which the person engages [ for which a bond or alternate form of financial security in the greatest amount is required ]. The financial security [ bond or alternate form of financial security ] filed covers all of the activities and operations for which financial security [ a bond or alternate form of financial security ] is required. The provisions of this paragraph do not exempt a person from the financial security required under subsection (l) [ (o) ] of this section.

(9) [ (6) ] Financial security amounts are the minimum amounts required by this section to be filed. A person may file a greater amount if desired.

(h) [ (k) ] Financial security conditions. [ Bond Conditions. ] Any financial security required under this section is subject to the conditions that the operator will plug and abandon all wells and control, abate, and clean up pollution associated with the oil and gas operations and activities covered under the required financial security in accordance with applicable state law and permits, rules, and orders of the Commission.

(i) [ (l) ] Conditions for cash deposits. Operators shall tender cash deposits in United States currency or certified cashiers check only. All cash deposits will be placed in a special account within the Oil Field Clean Up Fund account. Any interest accruing on cash deposits will be deposited into the Oil Clean Up Fund pursuant to Texas Natural Resources Code, §91.111(c)(8). The Commission will not refund a cash deposit until either financial security [ or an alternate form of financial security ] is accepted by the Commission as provided for under this section or an operator ceases all activity.

(j) [ (m) ] Well or lease transfer.

(1) The Commission shall not approve a transfer of operatorship submitted for any well or lease unless the operator acquiring the well or lease has on file with the Commission [ one of the following approved forms of ] financial security in an amount sufficient to cover both its current operations and the wells or leases being transferred[ : ]

[ (A) an individual performance bond, letter of credit or cash deposit; or]

[ (B) a blanket performance bond, letter of credit or cash deposit ].

(2) Any existing financial security covering the well or lease proposed for transfer shall remain in effect and the prior operator of the well remains responsible for compliance with all laws and Commission rules covering the transferred well until the Commission approves the transfer.

(3) A transfer of a well or lease from one entity to another entity under common ownership is a transfer for the purposes of this section.

[ (4) An operator who has accepted a transfer of operatorship of any well or lease on or after September 1, 2001, with Commission approval based on filing of an individual or blanket performance bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit is deemed to have elected to file one of these forms of financial security and shall file or have on file one of these forms of financial security for each successive year during which it remains the designated operator of any such well or lease.]

(k) [ (n) ] Reimbursement liability. Filing any form of financial security does not extinguish a person's liability for reimbursement for the expenditure of state oilfield clean-up funds pursuant to the Texas Natural Resources Code, §89.083 and §91.113.

(l) [ (o) ] Financial security for commercial facilities. The provisions of this subsection shall apply to the holder of any permit for a commercial facility.

(1) Application.

(A) New permits. Any application for a new or amended commercial facility permit filed after the original effective date of this subsection shall include:

(i) a written estimate of the maximum dollar amount necessary to close the facility prepared in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (4) of this subsection that shows all assumptions and calculations used to develop the estimate;

(ii) a copy of the form of the bond or letter of credit that will be filed with the Commission; and

(iii) information concerning the issuer of the bond or letter of credit as required under paragraph (5) of this subsection including the issuer's name and address and evidence of authority to issue bonds or letters of credit in Texas.

(B) Existing permits. Within 180 days of the original effective date of this subsection, the holder of any commercial facility permit issued on or before the original effective date of this subsection shall file with the Commission the information specified in subparagraph (A)(i)-(iii) of this paragraph.

(2) Notice and hearing.

(A) New permits. For commercial facility permits issued after the original effective date of this subsection, the provisions of §3.8 or §3.57 of this title (relating to Water Protection; and Reclaiming Tank Bottoms, Other Hydrocarbon Wastes, and Other Waste Materials), as applicable, regarding notice and opportunity for hearing, shall apply to review and approval of financial security proposed to be filed to meet the requirements of this subsection.

(B) Existing permits. Notice of filing of information required under paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection shall not be required. In the event approval of the financial security proposed to be filed for a commercial facility operating under a permit in effect as of the original effective date of this subsection is denied administratively, the applicant shall have the right to a hearing upon written request. After hearing, the examiner shall recommend a final action by the Commission.

(3) Filing of instrument.

(A) New permits. A commercial facility permitted after the original effective date of this subsection may not receive oil field fluids or oil and gas waste until a bond or letter of credit in an amount approved by the Commission or its delegate under this subsection and meeting the requirements of this subsection as to form and issuer has been filed with the Commission.

(B) Existing permits. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, after one year from the original effective date of this section, a commercial facility permitted on or before the original effective date of this subsection may not continue to receive oil field fluids or oil and gas waste unless a bond or letter of credit in an amount approved by the Commission or its delegate under this subsection and meeting the requirements of this subsection as to form and issuer has been filed with and approved by the Commission or its delegate.

(C) Extensions for existing permits. On written request and for good cause shown, the Commission or its delegate may authorize a commercial facility permitted before the original effective date of this subsection to continue to receive oil field fluids or oil and gas waste after one year after the original effective date of this section even though financial security required under this subsection has not been filed. In the event the Commission or its delegate has not taken final action to approve or disapprove the amount of financial security proposed to be filed by the owner or operator under this subsection one year after the original effective date of the section, the period for filing financial security under this subsection is automatically extended to a date 45 days after such final Commission action.

(4) Amount.

(A) Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) or (C) of this paragraph, the amount of financial security required to be filed under this subsection shall be an amount based on a written estimate approved by the Commission or its delegate as being equal to or greater than the maximum amount necessary to close the commercial facility, exclusive of plugging costs for any well or wells at the facility, at any time during the permit term in accordance with all applicable state laws, Commission rules and orders, and the permit, but shall in no event be less than $10,000.

(B) The owner or operator of one or more commercial facilities may reduce the amount of financial security required under this subsection for one such facility by the amount, if any, it filed as financial security [ assurance ] under subsection (g)(6) [ (j)(3) ] of this section. The full amount of financial security required under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph shall be required for the remaining commercial facilities.

(C) Except for the facilities specifically exempted under subparagraph (D) of this paragraph, a qualified professional engineer licensed by the State of Texas shall prepare or supervise the preparation of a written estimate of the maximum amount necessary to close the commercial facility as provided in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph. The owner or operator of a commercial facility shall submit the written estimate under seal of a qualified licensed professional engineer to the Commission as required under paragraph (1) of this subsection.

(D) A facility permitted under §3.57 of this title (relating to Reclaiming Tank Bottoms, Other Hydrocarbon Wastes, and Other Waste Materials) that does not utilize on-site waste storage or disposal that requires a permit under §3.8 of this title (relating to Water Protection) is exempt from subparagraph (C) of this paragraph.

(E) Notwithstanding the fact that the maximum amount necessary to close the commercial facility as determined under this paragraph is exclusive of plugging costs, the proceeds of financial security filed under this subsection may be used by the Commission to pay the costs of plugging any well or wells at the facility if the financial security for plugging costs filed with the Commission is insufficient to pay for the plugging of such well or wells.

(5) Issuer and form.

(A) Bond. The issuer of any commercial facility bond filed in satisfaction of the requirements of this subsection shall be a corporate surety authorized to do business in Texas. The form of bond filed under this subsection shall provide that the bond be renewed and continued in effect until the conditions of the bond have been met or its release is authorized by the Commission or its delegate.

(B) Letter of credit. Any letter of credit filed in satisfaction of the requirements of this subsection shall be issued by and drawn on a bank authorized under state or federal law to operate in Texas. The letter of credit shall be an irrevocable, standby letter of credit subject to the requirements of Texas Business and Commerce Code, §§5.101-5.118. The letter of credit shall provide that it will be renewed and continued in effect until the conditions of the letter of credit have been met or its release is authorized by the Commission or its delegate.

(m) [ (p) ] Effect of outstanding violations.

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the Commission shall not accept an organization report or an application for a permit or approve a certificate of compliance for an oil lease or gas well submitted by an organization if:

(A) the organization has outstanding violations; or

(B) an officer or owner [ director ] of the organization , as defined in subsection (a) of this section, was, within seven years preceding the filing of the report, application, or certificate, an officer or owner [ director ] of an organization and during that period, the organization committed a violation that remains an outstanding violation.

(2) The Commission shall accept a report or application or approve a certificate filed by an organization covered by paragraph (1) of this subsection if:

(A) the conditions that constituted the violation have been corrected or are being corrected in accordance with a schedule agreed to by the organization and the Commission;

(B) all administrative, civil, and criminal penalties, and all plugging and cleanup costs incurred by the state relating to those conditions have been paid or are being paid in accordance with a schedule agreed to by the organization and the Commission; and

(C) the report, application or certificate is in compliance with all other requirements of law and Commission rules.

(3) All fees tendered in connection with a report or application that is rejected under this subsection are nonrefundable.

§3.86.Horizontal Drainhole Wells.

(a) - (e) (No change.)

(f) Drilling applications and required reports.

(1) Application. Any intent to develop a new or existing well with horizontal drainholes must be indicated on the application to drill. An application for a permit to drill a horizontal drainhole shall include the fees required by Statewide Rule 78, §3.78 of this title (relating to Fees and Financial Security Requirements [ Fees, Performance Bonds, and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required To Be Filed ]), and shall be certified by a person acquainted with the facts, stating that all information in the application is true and complete to the best of that person's knowledge.

(2) Drilling unit plat. The application to drill a horizontal drainhole shall be accompanied by a plat.

(A) In addition to the plat requirements provided for in §3.5 of this title (relating to Application to Drill, Deepen, Reenter, or Plug Back [ Recomplete, or Reenter ]) (Statewide Rule 5), the plat shall include:

(i) - (vi) (No change.)

(B) (No change.)

(3) - (4) (No change.)

(g) (No change.)

§3.96.Underground Storage of Gas in Productive or Depleted Reservoirs.

(a) - (b) (No change.)

(c) Application. An application to operate a gas storage project shall be filed with the commission by the owner or operator or proposed owner or operator. The application shall include the following:

(1) - (3) (No change.)

(4) water protection letter--a letter from the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality or its successor agencies [ Natural Resource Conservation Commission ] stating the depth to which fresh water strata occur in the project area;

(5) (No change.)

(6) fees--the fees required under §3.78 of this title (relating to Fees and Financial Security Requirements [ Fees, Performance Bonds, and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required To Be Filed ]) for each gas storage well in the storage project that will be used for injection.

(d) - (e) (No change.)

(f) Notice and hearing.

(1) - (2) (No change.)

(3) Notice by publication. The applicant shall make diligent efforts to ascertain the name and address of each person identified under paragraph (1)(A)-(D) of this subsection. The exercise of diligent efforts to ascertain the names and addresses of such persons shall require an examination of county records where the facility is located and an investigation of any other information of which the applicant has actual knowledge. If, after diligent efforts, the applicant has been unable to ascertain the name and address of one or more persons required to be notified under paragraph (1)(A)-(D) of this subsection, the notice requirements for those persons are satisfied by the publication of the notice of application as required in paragraph (2) of [ f ] this subsection. The applicant must submit an affidavit to the commission specifying the efforts that were taken to identify each person whose name and/or address could not be ascertained.

(4) - (5) (No change.)

(g) - (p) (No change.)

(q) Penalties.

(1) (No change.)

(2) Certificate of compliance. The certificate of compliance for any oil, gas, or geothermal resource well may be revoked in the manner provided in §3.73 [ §3.68 ] of this title (relating to Pipeline Connection; Cancellation of Certificate of Compliance; Severance [ Pipeline Connection and Severance ]) for violation of this section.

(r) Applicability of other commission rules.

(1) General. The operator of a gas storage project must comply with the requirements of Chapters 7 and 8 of this title (relating to Gas Services Division, and Pipeline Safety Regulations) [ the Transportation/Gas Utilities Division ] for both pipelines and associated facilities, and other applicable commission rules and orders.

(2) (No change.)

This agency hereby certifies that the proposal has been reviewed by legal counsel and found to be within the agency's legal authority to adopt.

Filed with the Office of the Secretary of State on June 8, 2004.

TRD-200403749

Mary Ross McDonald

Managing Director

Railroad Commission of Texas

Earliest possible date of adoption: July 25, 2004

For further information, please call: (512) 475-1295


Part 2. PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF TEXAS

Chapter 25. SUBSTANTIVE RULES APPLICABLE TO ELECTRIC SERVICE PROVIDERS

Subchapter O. UNBUNDLING AND MARKET POWER

5. COMPETITION IN NON-ERCOT AREAS

16 TAC §25.421

The Public Utility Commission of Texas (commission) proposes new §25.421, relating to the transition to competition for an area outside of the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) region. The proposed new rule addresses El Paso Electric Company's (EPE) readiness to offer retail competition at the expiration of its rate freeze in August 2005 and defines the process and the sequence of events for the introduction of retail competition in the portions of Texas served by EPE. In this rule, if adopted as proposed, the commission would determine, pursuant to the Public Utility Regulatory Act, Texas Utilities Code Annotated §39.103 (Vernon 1998, Supplement 2004) (PURA), that the power region in which EPE is located is unable to offer fair competition and reliable service to all retail customer classes in Texas; therefore, customer choice will not commence in this area upon the expiration of EPE's rate freeze in August 2005. The proposed rule also provides that EPE's rates would be regulated under traditional cost-of-service regulation until the date on which the commission authorizes EPE to implement full customer choice. Finally, the proposed rule specifies that EPE would be subject to the energy efficiency and renewable energy requirements set forth in PURA §39.904-.905, beginning in 2006. Project Number 28971 is assigned to this proceeding.

The commission's proposal to determine that the power region in which EPE is located is unable to offer fair competition and reliable service to all retail customer classes in Texas is based on its experience in introducing retail competition in the ERCOT region, its attempts to introduce retail competition in other regions in Texas, and the characteristics of the El Paso region. The commission's successful efforts to establish retail competition in ERCOT began after the passage of Senate Bill 7 in 1999. In order to transition to retail competition in accordance with the statutory timelines of PURA, the commission and the market participants engaged in various proceedings to restructure the existing electric utilities, develop protocols for the market, and establish ERCOT as an independent regional transmission operator. These steps were completed before the commission opened a pilot project in ERCOT and determined that the market was ready for retail competition. These necessary preliminary steps have not been taken in EPE's territory because EPE was exempted from participation in such processes prior to the expiration of its rate freeze and because the establishment of a regional transmission organization is subject to voluntary action by other utilities in the Southwestern United States and regulatory approval of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Because of the lack of proper preparation, the commission believes that it is not feasible to open a pilot project immediately upon the expiration of EPE's rate freeze. Instead, the commission proposes to require that the necessary preliminary steps be taken before opening the pilot or proceeding to subsequent steps on the path to retail competition.

The commission's proposed determination that the EPE region is not able to offer fair competition and reliable service to all retail customer classes in Texas is supported by the commission's experience in attempting to establish retail competition in other areas of Texas outside the ERCOT service area. The commission conducted pilot programs for retail competition in the non-ERCOT service areas of Entergy Gulf States, Southwestern Public Service Company (SPS), and Southwestern Electric Power Company (SWEPCO). In two of these areas, no retail electric providers (REPs) offered service during the pilot projects, and no customers switched their service from the utility to a REP. As a result, the commission delayed the beginning of retail competition in the Entergy and SWEPCO areas, and the legislature enacted a law to delay competition in the SPS area. Recently, a single REP served a small number of commercial customers under the Entergy pilot project, but it has discontinued its service to these customers.

One of the key elements of the legislation that calls for the introduction of retail competition in Texas is an independent organization to provide transmission service, ensure reliability, and settle wholesale accounts. In general, independent organizations have not developed in the non- ERCOT areas of Texas, and today there is no independent organization in the Entergy or El Paso areas. (The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has recently conditionally approved the Southwest Power Pool as a regional transmission organization that could meet the criteria for an independent organization in the SWEPCO and SPS service territories.)

Other factors that lead the commission to propose a determination that the power region in which EPE is located is unable to offer fair competition and reliable service to all retail customer classes in Texas are the characteristics of the El Paso region. These characteristics include the fact that the area represents a small market that is isolated geographically from other large markets in the western electric system, and that the local generation supply is dominated by a single company, EPE. These factors should be addressed before retail competition begins in the El Paso region. The commission is seeking comments on whether the proposed determination should be adopted, and urges interested persons to provide comments on the prospects for providing reliable, reasonable-cost service, if retail competition were to be instituted in the region.

The new section, if adopted, will establish an orderly transition to full customer choice in EPE's service area. The sequence set forth in this rule would be based upon completing the listed items in each stage before the next stage is initiated. A pilot project would begin after a regional transmission organization is established for the region and retail market protocols are developed to facilitate retail competition. Full retail competition would begin after a number of other actions are completed, as contemplated by Senate Bill 7, Act of May 27, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., Ch. 405, §39, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 2558.

Jess Totten, Director, Electric Division has determined that for each year of the first five-year period the proposed section is in effect there will be no fiscal implications for state or local government as a result of enforcing or administering the section.

Mr. Totten has determined that for each year of the first five years the proposed section is in effect the public benefit anticipated as a result of enforcing the section will be increased certainty with respect to utility rates and service and the transition to competition in EPE's service area. There will be no adverse economic effect on small businesses or micro-businesses as a result of enforcing this section. There is no anticipated economic cost to persons who are required to comply with the section as proposed. The introduction of retail competition requires a regulated utility to undertake a number of organizational changes and regulatory activities that may have an economic cost. The proposed rule would sequence these activities in a way that is logical and that should help avoid unnecessary costs. The proposed rule would not impose additional costs on the regulated utility.

Mr. Totten has also determined that for each year of the first five years the proposed section is in effect there should be no effect on a local economy, and therefore no local employment impact statement is required under Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Texas Government Code §2001.022.

The commission staff will conduct a public hearing on this rulemaking, if requested pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, Texas Government Code §2001.029, at the commission's offices located in the William B. Travis Building, 1701 North Congress Avenue, Austin, Texas 78701 on Tuesday, August 24, 2004, at 10:00 a.m. The request for a public hearing must be received within 31 days after publication of this proposed rule.

Comments on the proposed new section (16 copies) may be submitted to the Filing Clerk, Public Utility Commission of Texas, 1701 North Congress Avenue, P.O. Box 13326, Austin, Texas 78711-3326, within 31 days after publication. Reply comments may be submitted within 45 days after publication. Comments should be organized in a manner consistent with the organization of the proposed rule. The commission invites specific comments regarding the costs associated with, and benefits that will be gained by, implementation of the proposed section. The commission will consider the costs and benefits in deciding whether to adopt the section. All comments should refer to Project Number 28971.

When commenting on specific subsections of the proposed rule, parties are encouraged to describe "best practice" examples of regulatory policies, and their rationale, that have been proposed or implemented successfully in other states already undergoing electric industry restructuring, if the parties believe that Texas would benefit from application of the same policies. The commission is interested in receiving only "leading edge" examples that are specifically related and directly applicable to the Texas statute, rather than broad citations to other state restructuring efforts.

This new section is proposed under the Public Utility Regulatory Act, Texas Utilities Code Annotated §14.002, which provides the Public Utility Commission with the authority to make and enforce rules reasonably required in the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction; and specifically, PURA §39.051, which requires an electric utility to separate its business functions prior to the introduction of retail competition; PURA §39.102, which specifies that at the expiration of EPE's system wide rate freeze, the utility shall be subject to PURA Chapter 39, relating to restructuring of the electric utility industry; PURA §39.103, which grants the commission authority to delay competition if a power region cannot offer fair competition and reliable service to all retail customer classes; PURA §39.104, which addresses the retail competition pilot projects; PURA §39.152 and §39.154, which grant the commission authority to certify a power region and to evaluate market power; PURA §39.201, which addresses unbundled cost-of-service rates; PURA §39.202, which establishes the price-to-beat obligation for affiliated retail electric providers prescribe; and PURA §39.904 and §39.905, which address the state goals for renewable energy development and energy efficiency.

Cross Reference to Statutes: Public Utility Regulatory Act §§14.002, 39.051, 39.102, 39.103, 39.104, 39.152, 39.153, 39.154, 39.201, 39.202, 39.904 and 39.905.

§25.421.Transition to Competition for Certain Area Outside the Electric Reliability Council of Texas Region.

(a) Purpose. The purpose of this section is to address the process and the sequence of events for the introduction of retail competition in the portions of Texas served by El Paso Electric Company (EPE).

(b) Application. This section shall apply to an electric utility that is subject to Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) §39.102(c), namely EPE.

(c) Readiness for retail competition. The commission determines that the power region in which EPE is located will be unable to offer fair competition and reliable service to all retail customer classes in Texas upon the expiration of its system-wide rate freeze period in August 2005. Therefore, pursuant to PURA §39.103, the introduction of retail competition for the portions of the power region in Texas is delayed until this region can offer fair competition and reliable service to all retail customer classes.

(d) Cost-of-service regulation. Until the date on which EPE is authorized by the commission to implement retail competition pursuant to this section, its rates are subject to regulation under Chapter 36 of PURA.

(e) Transition to competition. The sequence of events set forth in paragraphs (1) through (5) of this subsection shall be followed to introduce retail competition in EPE's service territory. All the listed items in each stage must be completed before the next stage is initiated. Unless stated otherwise in the rule, each of the activities will be conducted by the commission in conjunction with EPE and other interested parties. Full retail competition will not begin in EPE's service territory until completion of the fifth stage.

(1) The first stage consists of the following activities:

(A) Develop and obtain approval of a regional transmission organization for the EPE region by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and commence independent operation of transmission network under the approved regional transmission organization.

(B) Develop retail market protocols to facilitate retail competition.

(C) Complete an expedited proceeding to develop non-bypassable delivery rates for the customer choice pilot project to be implemented under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection.

(2) The second stage consists of the following activities:

(A) Initiate the customer choice pilot project pursuant to PURA §39.104 and §25.431 of this title (relating to Retail Competition Pilot Projects).

(B) Develop a balancing energy market, market for ancillary services, and market-based congestion management system for the wholesale market in the region in which the regional transmission organization operates.

(C) Implement a seams agreement with adjacent power regions to reduce barriers to entry and facilitate competition.

(3) The third stage consists of the following activities:

(A) EPE shall:

(i) Prepare and file with the commission an application for business separation pursuant to PURA §39.051 and §25.342 of this title (relating to Electric Business Separation);

(ii) Prepare and file with the commission an application for unbundled transmission and distribution rates pursuant to PURA §39.201 and §25.344 of this title (relating to Cost Separation Proceedings);

(iii) Prepare and file with the commission an application for certification of a qualified power region pursuant to PURA §39.152; and

(iv) Prepare and file with the commission an application for price-to-beat rates pursuant to PURA §39.202 and §25.41 of this title (relating to Price to Beat).

(B) The activities to be completed by the commission in the third stage are to:

(i) Approve a business separation plan;

(ii) Set unbundled transmission and distribution rates;

(iii) Certify a qualified power region, which includes conducting a formal evaluation of wholesale market power in the region, pursuant to PURA §39.152;

(iv) Set price-to-beat rates for EPE; and

(v) Determine which competitive energy services must be separated from regulated utility activities pursuant to PURA §39.051 and §25.343 of this title (relating to Competitive Energy Services).

(C) The activities to be completed by the regional transmission organization, the statewide registration agent and market participants in the third stage are testing of retail and wholesale systems, including those systems necessary for switching customers to the retail electric provider of their choice and for settlement of wholesale market transactions.

(4) The fourth stage consists of the following activities:

(A) The commission shall evaluate the results of the pilot project pursuant to §25.431 of this title.

(B) EPE shall initiate capacity auction pursuant to PURA §39.153 and §25.381 of this title (relating to Capacity Auctions) at a time to be determined by the commission.

(C) EPE shall separate competitive energy services from its regulated utility activities, in accordance with the commission order approving the separation of competitive energy services.

(D) EPE shall complete the business separation and unbundling, in accordance with the commission order approving the unbundling.

(5) The fifth stage consists of the commission evaluating whether the power region can offer fair competition and reliable service to all retail customer classes. If the commission concludes that the power region can offer fair competition and reliable service to all retail customer classes, it shall issue an order initiating retail competition.

(f) Applicability of energy efficiency and renewable energy requirements. No later than January 1, 2006, EPE shall be subject to the energy efficiency requirements under PURA §39.905 and §25.181 of this title (relating to Energy Efficiency Goal) and the renewable energy credit requirements under PURA §39.904 and §25.173 of this title (relating to Goal for Renewable Energy).

(1) EPE shall begin administering the energy efficiency programs prescribed in §25.181 of this title no later than January 1, 2006. EPE shall meet, at a minimum, 5.0% of its growth in demand through energy efficiency savings resulting from these programs by January 1, 2007 and 10% of its growth in demand by January 1, 2008, and each year thereafter.

(2) EPE shall obtain, at a minimum, renewable energy credits in an amount sufficient to meet the requirements for the compliance period beginning January 1, 2006, and for each compliance period thereafter.

(g) Applicability of other rules. This section governs the implementation of PURA Chapter 39 requirements as applied to EPE. If there is an inconsistency or conflict between this section and other rules in this Chapter (relating to Substantive Rules Applicable to Electric Service Providers), the provisions of this section shall control.

(h) Good cause. Upon a finding of good cause, as determined by the commission, the sequence for retail competition set forth in subsection (e) of this section may be modified by commission order.

This agency hereby certifies that the proposal has been reviewed by legal counsel and found to be within the agency's legal authority to adopt.

Filed with the Office of the Secretary of State on June 10, 2004.

TRD-200403829

Adriana Gonzales

Rules Coordinator

Public Utility Commission of Texas

Earliest possible date of adoption: July 25, 2004

For further information, please call: (512) 936-7223


Subchapter S. WHOLESALE MARKETS

16 TAC §25.502

The Public Utility Commission of Texas (commission) proposes new §25.502, relating to Pricing Safeguards in Markets Operated by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). The rule will establish mitigation procedures to prevent market abuse when prices cannot be determined by the normal forces of competition, establish disclosure requirements for certain energy and capacity offers by suppliers, establish limits on congestion revenue right (CRR) holdings, and establish an ERCOT Independent Market Monitor. Project Number 27917 is assigned to this proceeding.

Many of the issues that this rule addresses are also discussed in the Market Mitigation White Paper approved by the ERCOT Board of Directors on May 18, 2004. This white paper, one of 24 pertaining to various aspects of the new ERCOT wholesale market design required under §25.501, is the result of deliberations by ERCOT stakeholders participating in the Texas Nodal Team (TNT) process. Commission Staff has used the white paper as a starting point for this rule. Nevertheless, there are differences between the proposed rule and the white paper that reflect serious concerns on the part of Staff. The commission invites comment on these differences. Comments should address the substance of how a given problem should be addressed and should avoid relying solely on the fact that the white paper reflects compromises made by stakeholders.

Issue 1: System-Wide Price Safeguards

Subsection (i) is intended to place a reasonable constraint on prices when the market is not competitive system-wide and prices cannot be determined by the normal forces of competition. In particular, it would preclude a pivotal supplier or "hockey stick offer" from setting any clearing price. "Hockey stick pricing" is when a supplier prices most of its offer competitively, but prices a small, economically expendable portion exorbitantly high. The basic mechanism included in subsection (h), referred to as the Competitive Solution Method (CSM), was developed by Staff and first proposed in Docket Number 24770, Report of the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) to the PUCT regarding Implementation of the ERCOT Protocols . In that docket, the commission approved a limited form of CSM for quick implementation, and decided to defer further consideration of CSM to a rulemaking, such as this one, dealing more broadly with market failure mitigation. See Docket Number 24770, Order (August 22, 2003), pages 26-27. While CSM is designed to be automatic, the ERCOT white paper addresses hockey stick pricing by relying on the independent market monitor to identify and remove hockey stick offers on an ad hoc basis prior to market clearing. Another difference is that CSM automatically mitigates the influence of suppliers who are pivotal on a system-wide basis, while the ERCOT white paper does not. Please compare the automatic mitigation contained in the rule to the ad hoc mitigation in the white paper as well as practices in other markets (for example, New York's Automatic Mitigation Procedure), and explain why one is preferable over the others.

Issue 2: Offers Priced Above System-wide Cap

The system-wide mitigation approved by the commission in Docket Number 24770 allows mitigated offers to be paid at their offer price if selected, but prevents them from setting any market clearing price. By contrast, the proposed rule would preserve such treatment only for loads acting as resources, and would pay all other offers at the greater of the system-wide offer cap or their verifiable costs. An alternative approach would be to adopt the offer cap contained in the TNT Market Mitigation White Paper, which is intended to address local market power only. The TNT approach for mitigating local market power would cap offers at the greater of verifiable costs plus an adder based on the unit's historical capacity factor, or a general fixed heat rate equivalent. If the system-wide offer cap in subsection (i) is ultimately adopted by the commission, what is the best way to treat offers that are priced above that cap?

Issue 3: Congestion Revenue Rights

Market participants that own both resources and CRRs under certain circumstances can use the combination to enhance profits associated with causing congestion. The white paper directs the market monitor to review the interaction between ownership of CRRs and generation and take the appropriate remedial action, but imposes no pre-determined ownership limits. Subsection (k) of the proposed rule presents a specific, pre-determined approach to CRR holdings consistent with the general guidelines mentioned in the white paper, except that it establishes certain limitations on CRR holdings. Please compare the specific, pre-determined approach to CRR holdings in the rule to the ad hoc approach in the white paper, and explain why one is preferable over the other.

Issue 4: Disclosure of Resources with High Offer Prices

Under the current market, ERCOT posts a list of all market participants who submit offers priced above $300 per megawatt-hour (MWh) for balancing energy service and $300 per megawatt per hour (MW/h) in the case of ancillary capacity services. The list is posted the following operating day. Subsection (d) of the rule continues this disclosure in the new market. In addition, any offer above $300 that actually causes a price to clear above $300 would also be identified as a price setter. Is extending the current disclosure practice an appropriate deterrent to hockey stick pricing?

Issue 5: Safe Harbor

Subsection (j) would provide market participants with a limited safe harbor against enforcement actions dealing with certain kinds of market power abuse. Please comment on the appropriateness and effectiveness of such a safe harbor.

Issue 6: Disgorgement of Windfall

Subsection (f) establishes a means by which the commission can correct any misallocation of costs or payments caused by flaws in ERCOT procedures. Please comment on the appropriateness of this subsection.

Issue 7: Reliability Must Run (RMR) Resources

Subsection (g) is intended to ensure that a generation resource that ERCOT has determined is required for reliability remains in operation. In addition, it is intended to provide an orderly process to resolve a dispute between the supplier and ERCOT that prevent the signing of an RMR agreement. Finally, it is intended to ensure that the supplier receives reasonable compensation for providing RMR service. This issue was discussed in ERCOT's RMR Task Force and Protocol Revision Subcommittee in the context of Protocol Revision Request 507, but no consensus was achieved. A generation resource that ERCOT has determined is required for reliability has market power, because ERCOT must take the steps that are necessary to ensure that the generation resource remains in operation. This situation gives the generation resource owner bargaining power to demand excessive compensation from ERCOT to provide RMR service. Consequently, price protections are needed. The commission is addressing this issue at this time because ensuring that reliability is maintained is essential; addressing the issue involves the creation of wholesale price protections, which is the primary subject of this rule; the proposed subsection involves action taken by the commission; and there is considerable disagreement among Staff and a number of stakeholders concerning resolution of the issue. Please comment on the appropriateness of this subsection.

In addition to the provisions mentioned in the foregoing questions, subsection (g) deals with mitigating local market power. In the TNT discussions, stakeholders studied a methodology to distinguish competitive and non-competitive constraints. Local market power would be mitigated in part by simulating the power flow of the system without enforcing non-competitive constraints, and using the results of the simulation to determine reference prices. Many stakeholders indicated that they wanted to see the formula for measuring local competitiveness applied to a large sample of ERCOT transmission elements. Due its computational intensity, this analysis was not completed prior to the time TNT took a final vote on its market mitigation white paper. Stakeholders directed a task force to continue the analysis, and subsection (g) allows for the completion of this analysis. The subsection sets forth principles for guiding the development of local market power mitigation, and requires that any methodology must be explicitly approved by the commission.

Subsection (h) establishes an Independent Market Monitor (IMM) who would be accountable to the independent members of the ERCOT Board of Directors. The subsection describes how the IMM would coordinate activities with the commission's Market Oversight and Legal and Enforcement Divisions.

When commenting on specific subsections of the proposed rule, parties are encouraged to describe "best practice" examples of regulatory policies, and their rationale, that have been proposed or implemented successfully in other states already undergoing electric industry restructuring, if the parties believe that Texas would benefit from application of the same policies. The commission is only interested in receiving "leading edge" examples which are specifically related and directly applicable to the Texas statute, rather than broad citations to other state restructuring efforts.

Dr. David Hurlbut, Senior Economist in the commission's Market Oversight Division (MOD), has analyzed the effects of the rule. Dr. Hurlbut has determined that the effects of the rule will largely begin with the start of the new ERCOT wholesale market design, which §25.501 requires ERCOT to implement by October 1, 2006. For the first years following that date and beyond, the public benefit expected as a result of adoption of the rule will be to reduce inefficient and unreasonable wealth transfers from electricity customers to electricity suppliers. The inefficiencies addressed by this rule arise when wholesale prices in markets operated by ERCOT in the ERCOT power region are not determined by the normal forces of competition, due to reasons such as market power, limited supply margins, and defects in ERCOT procedures, combined with the highly inelastic demand in these markets (i.e., when there is market failure).

The consequences of market failure - and, conversely, the public benefit of mitigating market failure - are difficult to quantify with accuracy, but history can offer some guidance. In late February 2003, an extreme weather event in the ERCOT power region caused demand for electricity and natural gas to rise suddenly, while at the same time natural gas scarcity reduced the supply of electric generation available to meet the inelastic demand. Prices naturally rise under such conditions, but the presence of a one-megawatt "hockey stick" balancing energy offer caused balancing energy prices to clear $500 to $700 per megawatt-hour higher than where they would have cleared had that one megawatt not been present. In its reports on the February 2003 extreme weather event, the commission's MOD estimated that the hockey stick offer added $17 million to the cost of balancing energy, and another $20 million to the cost of ancillary service capacity. (Additional costs such as increased credit requirements for retail electric providers were not quantified.) Clearing prices set by hockey stick offers produce unreasonable clearing prices. Consequently, a plausible minimum estimate of the expected benefit accruing from subsection (h) of the rule is at least $37 million whenever an extreme weather event or some other emergency compromises system reliability and requires the deployment of all available resources.

Another incident occurred in 2002, when a pivotal supplier was able to set the clearing price for Non-Spinning Reserve Service at $999 per megawatt per hour for a 12-hour period on April 30. Dr. Hurlbut estimates that CSM would have mitigated the price to around $225 per megawatt - still higher than the $70 per megawatt ERCOT was paying for spinning reserves at that same time, but reasonable relative to how non-pivotal suppliers were pricing their offers. The difference between the actual clearing price of $999 per megawatt and the $225 per megawatt that would have resulted under CSM equates to more than $6 million for that one-day incident.

Consequently, a plausible firm estimate of the benefits of applying CSM as described in subsection (h) is between $6 million and $37 million per year. This is a conservative estimate, using the actual direct costs associated with historical events of 2002 and 2003, the first two full years that ERCOT operated as a single control area. It assumes only one extraordinary event occurring per year, and does not take into account any indirect costs. In the extreme, however, the consequences of having no working price safeguards could reach into the billions, as demonstrated by the California electricity crisis of 2000.

The costs of implementing the system-wide offer cap are very small relative to the potential benefits. In Docket Number 24770, ERCOT estimated that the implementation costs for the current balancing energy market would be around $100,000. The implementation cost in the new nodal market (which will require new support software for most market operations) should be less than that amount, because it is generally less expensive to including functionality into software at the time the system is designed than it is to add the functionality later.

Another source of public benefit is the mitigation of local market power provided for by subsection (g). One of the expected benefits of the nodal market design required by §25.501 is reduced congestion management costs. This benefit arises in part from the efficiency gains caused by dispatching the most economical resources based on competitive offer prices. System conditions may be such that a resource does not have to be priced competitively in order to be selected, however. Transmission constraints may mean that one supplier is pivotal (i.e., the supplier is so large that without it, remaining supply would not be enough to meet demand) with respect to delivering electricity to a particular location. Without local market power mitigation, pivotal suppliers could routinely be selected at offer prices at the $1,000 MWh or MW/h offer cap that the commission previously established in Docket Numbers 23220 and 24770. A plausible minimum estimate of the public benefit of mitigating local market power is about $40 million per year; this is the amount of additional energy payments (specifically, incremental out- of-merit energy payments) generators could have received to resolve local congestion in 2003 had they been able, as a result of local market power, to double the prices on which their congestion payments were based. Such localized price increases would be possible in a nodal or zonal market without local market power mitigation.

The cost of managing local congestion under the current zonal ERCOT market design was $174 million in 2002 and $246 million in 2003. Nodal pricing under ideal conditions will reduce the social cost of managing local congestion far below the levels experienced in 2002 and 2003; the magnitude of the potential savings in ERCOT is difficult to estimate at this time, but it is one question included in the cost-benefit analysis currently being conducted as directed by §25.501. Regardless of the potential savings under ideal conditions, however, local market power can negate some if not all of any efficiency gain.

The benefits of subsection (d) mirror those of subsections (h) and (i), to the extent that transparency provides a psychological deterrent to the same harm that would be mitigated by subsections (h) and (i). Subsection (f) facilitates the commission's ability to correct any misallocation of revenue due to flaws in ERCOT procedures.

With respect to subsection (e), pertaining to control of resources, the primary benefit will be to facilitate accurate implementation of subsections (h) and (i) as well as any other ERCOT protocol pertaining to resource control. Staff expects no significant cost for compliance with this subsection, as the burden is placed on entities already responsible for providing ERCOT with information on the resources they represent.

With respect to subsection (g), pertaining to reliability must-run (RMR) resources, the public benefit will be consistent reliability of the electricity grid. RMR resources, which otherwise would be shut down permanently, are retained by ERCOT under special contracts to address specific contingency situations (e.g., prevention of overload or voltage instability in the event of a line outage that would result in local blackouts in the absence of the RMR resources). Subsection (g) would simultaneously ensure consistent reliability and ensure that customers would not over-pay for such reliability.

For the new nodal market, §25.501(j) states: "ERCOT shall apply pricing safeguards to protect against market failure, including market power abuse, consistent with direction provided by the commission." In addition, in proposing §25.501, the commission estimated the public costs of that rule, including the cost resulting from §25.501(j). Section 25.502 constitutes direction provided by the commission as contemplated by §25.501(j). Consequently, Dr. Hurlbut has determined that §25.502 will not impose significant new incremental economic costs on persons required to comply with the rule.

Dr. Hurlbut has determined that the economic effects on small businesses or micro- businesses as a result of the rule will not be proportionately larger than impacts to the largest businesses in any systematic way, using cost for each $100 of sales of electricity as the standard. Some retail electric providers (REPs) and power generation companies (PGCs) in ERCOT may be micro-businesses or small businesses. REPs will benefit from the lower cost of wholesale electricity resulting from the rule, while PGCs will not benefit from the rule because they will not obtain profits from market failure that is mitigated by the rule.

ERCOT's costs of implementing the rule (which as discussed previously are in fact costs associated with implementing §25.501) will be passed on to market participants, who will likely be able to pass the costs along to their customers, because market participants will be affected by ERCOT's cost increase in a similar way. In addition, reducing the effect of the rule on small businesses or micro-businesses would not be legal and feasible, because it would inappropriate to allow PGCs that are small businesses or micro-businesses to keep profits from market failure that is mitigated by the rule.

Dr. Hurlbut has determined that the rule will not have a direct effect on a local economy, including for each of the first five years that the rule will be in effect. However, the rule may have indirect effects. The indirect effects will be positive, because the rule will indirectly lower the cost of retail electric service throughout the ERCOT power region.

Dr. Hurlbut states that, generally, for the state and for local governments for each of the first five years that the rule will be in effect: there is no additional estimated direct cost expected as a result of enforcing or administering the rule; there is no estimated direct loss or increase in revenue as a result of enforcing or administering the rule; and enforcing or administering the rule does not have foreseeable direct implications relating to cost or revenues. Administering this proposed rule is expected to reduce the staff time required by the commission to pursue enforcement actions, as many opportunities for abuse and consequences of market failure will be mitigated automatically. The effect of the rule on the state will be that the commission will administer and enforce the rule using existing resources. There will be no direct effects of the rule on local governments, other than as market participants.

Initial comments on the rule (16 copies) may be submitted to the Filing Clerk, Public Utility Commission of Texas, 1701 North Congress Avenue, P.O. Box 13326, Austin, Texas 78711- 3326, within 30 days after publication. Reply comments may be submitted within 45 days after publication. Comments should be organized in a manner consistent with the organization of the rule. The commission invites specific comments regarding the costs associated with, and benefits that will be gained by, implementation of the rule. The commission will consider the costs and benefits in deciding whether to adopt the rule. All comments should refer to Project Number 27917.

Requests for a public hearing on this rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act, Texas Government Code §2001.029 should be submitted by the deadline for initial comments. If requested, the commission staff will conduct a public hearing at the commission's offices, located in the William B. Travis Building, 1701 North Congress Avenue, Austin, Texas 78701. The tentative date for a hearing, if requested, is Monday, August 2, 2004 at 9:30 p.m.

This rule is proposed under the Public Utility Regulatory Act, Texas Utilities Code Annotated §14.002 (Vernon 1998, Supplement 2004) (PURA), which provides the commission with the authority to adopt and enforce rules reasonably required in the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction; §35.004(e), which requires that the commission ensure that ancillary services necessary to facilitate the transmission of electric energy are available at reasonable prices with terms and conditions that are not unreasonably preferential, prejudicial, discriminatory, predatory, or anticompetitive; §39.001(d), which requires the commission to order competitive rather than regulatory methods to achieve the goals of PURA Chapter 39 to the greatest extent feasible; §39.151(a)(1), which requires that ERCOT ensure access to the transmission and distribution systems for all buyers and sellers of electricity on nondiscriminatory terms; §39.151(a)(2), which requires that ERCOT ensure the reliability and adequacy of the regional electrical network; §39.151(a)(4), which requires that ERCOT ensure that electricity production and delivery are accurately accounted for among generators and wholesale buyers in the ERCOT power region; §39.151(c), under which the commission certified ERCOT to perform the functions prescribed by §39.151 for the ERCOT power region; §39.151(d), which requires ERCOT to establish and enforce procedures, consistent with PURA and the commission's rules, relating to the reliability of the regional electrical network and accounting for the production and delivery of electricity among generators and all other market participants, and which makes these ERCOT procedures subject to commission oversight and review; §39.151(i), which permits the commission to delegate authority to ERCOT to enforce operating standards within the ERCOT regional electrical network and to establish and oversee transaction settlement procedures, and which permits the commission to establish the terms and conditions for ERCOT's authority to oversee utility dispatch functions after the introduction of customer choice; and §39.151(j), which requires a retail electric provider, municipally owned utility, electric cooperative, power marketer, transmission and distribution utility, or power generation company to observe all scheduling, operating, planning, reliability, and settlement policies, rules, guidelines, and procedures established by ERCOT.

Cross Reference to Statutes: PURA §§14.002, 35.004(e), 39.001(d), and 39.151.

§25.502.Pricing Safeguards in Markets Operated by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas.

(a) Purpose. The purpose of this section is to protect the public from harm when wholesale electricity prices in markets operated by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) in the ERCOT power region are not determined by the normal forces of competition.

(b) Applicability. This section applies to any entity that buys or sells energy, capacity, or any other wholesale electric service in a market operated by ERCOT in the ERCOT power region; any agent that represents such an entity in such activities; and ERCOT. Entities shall not circumvent the applicability of this section's requirements through agreements or other forms of cooperation.

(c) Definitions. The following terms, when used in this section, shall have the following meanings, unless the context indicates otherwise.

(1) Competitive constraint--A transmission element on which no supplier possesses local market power with respect to the price of electricity. Prices on a competitive constraint are moderated by the normal forces of competition between multiple, unaffiliated resources.

(2) Competitive offers--Offers submitted by suppliers who are not pivotal or by a pivotal supplier whose offers account for less than 5.0% of the total offers.

(3) 95th percentile price--The price at which 95% of the total competitive offer quantity would be paid at or above its offer price.

(4) Noncompetitive constraint--A transmission element on which a supplier possesses local market power with respect to the price of electricity. Prices on a noncompetitive constraint are not moderated by the normal forces of competition between multiple, unaffiliated resources.

(5) Pivotal supplier--A supplier and its affiliates from which ERCOT must purchase at least a part of its offer in order to meet the demand for the service.

(d) Disclosure of offer prices. No later than 8:00 a.m. on the market day following each market day, ERCOT shall publish on its market information system

(1) the identities of all resources and virtual offers for which the energy offer price was $300 per megawatt-hour (MWh) or higher, or the capacity offer price was $300 per megawatt per hour (MW/h) or higher, and the corresponding market intervals;

(2) the identity of a resource or virtual offer that sets a price for energy above $300/MWh (along with the corresponding market interval and the corresponding nodes) and the identity of any resource or virtual offer that sets a price for capacity above $300/MW/h (along with the corresponding market interval); and

(3) The identity of any resource that is paid more than the system-wide offer cap described in subsection (i)(2) of this section, in accordance with subsection (i)(3) of this section.

(e) Control of resources. An entity responsible for scheduling resources with ERCOT shall inform ERCOT as to who controls each resource it schedules, and provide proof that is sufficient for ERCOT to verify control. In addition, an entity responsible for scheduling resources with ERCOT shall notify ERCOT of any change in control of a resource that it schedules no later than 14 days prior to the date that the change in control takes effect. For purposes of this section, "control" means ultimate decision-making authority over how a resource is scheduled, either by virtue of ownership or agreement. A controlling entity has a substantial financial stake in the resource's profitable operation. Any resource or specified portion of a resource shall be considered to have only one controlling entity. Resources under common control shall be considered affiliated.

(f) Refund or surcharge due to flaw in procedures. If the commission determines that a payment, or lack of payment, made by ERCOT in a wholesale electric service market operated by ERCOT was a result of a flaw in ERCOT's procedures, either directly or indirectly as a consequence of its effect on market participant behavior, the commission shall require ERCOT to refund or surcharge the under or over collected payments. The deadline to initiate a proceeding under this subsection is one year from the market day giving rise to the payment or lack of payment at issue.

(g) Reliability must run resources. Except for the occurrence of a forced outage, a supplier must notify ERCOT in writing no later than 90 days prior to the date on which it intends to cease or suspend operation of a generation resource for a period of greater than 180 days. In addition, a supplier shall not transfer a generation resource to an entity that does not have a resource entity agreement with ERCOT, unless ERCOT has determined that the generation resource is not required for ERCOT reliability. A supplier shall not terminate its resource entity agreement with ERCOT if ERCOT has determined that its generation resource is required for ERCOT reliability. If, after 90 days following ERCOT's receipt of the supplier's notice, ERCOT and the supplier have not finalized a reliability must run (RMR) agreement for a generation resource that ERCOT has determined is required for ERCOT reliability, then the supplier may file a complaint with the commission against ERCOT, pursuant to §22.251 of this title (relating to Review of Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) conduct). Pursuant to §22.251(d), absent a showing of good cause to the commission to justify a later deadline, the supplier's deadline to file the complaint is 35 days after the 90th day following ERCOT's receipt of the notice. If the supplier files such a complaint, the compensation ordered by the commission shall be effective the 91st day after ERCOT's receipt of the notice. If the supplier does not file a complaint with the commission, the supplier shall be deemed to have accepted ERCOT's most recent offer as of the 115th day after ERCOT's receipt of the notice. Until ERCOT and the supplier finalize an RMR agreement or, as a result of a complaint described herein the commission orders the supplier to provide RMR service, the supplier shall maintain the generation resource so that it is available for out of merit order dispatch instruction by ERCOT.

(h) Local market power. ERCOT, through its stakeholder process, shall develop and submit for commission approval procedures to mitigate the effects of local market power caused by congestion.

(1) The procedures shall specify a method by which noncompetitive constraints may be distinguished from competitive constraints.

(2) Competitive constraints and noncompetitive constraints shall be designated annually prior to the corresponding auction of annual congestion revenue rights (CRRs). A constraint may be redesignated on an interim basis, but the criteria for interim designation as a competitive constraint shall be more stringent than the criteria for annual designation as a competitive constraint.

(3) The procedures for mitigating local market power shall ensure that a noncompetitive constraint will not be treated as a competitive constraint.

(4) The procedures for mitigating local market power shall be submitted to the commission for approval by November 1, 2004. In addition, any future amendments to the procedures must be approved by the commission.

(i) System-wide competitiveness.

(1) An ERCOT system-wide offer cap shall be applied to the real-time energy market or an ancillary service capacity market operated by ERCOT if the market fails the two-part Competitive Sufficiency Test described in this paragraph. The test shall be applied each market interval, and the cap shall be applied only during the market intervals that fail the test. This procedure shall also be applied to any ERCOT-operated day-ahead energy market in which congestion costs are settled.

(A) Quantity test. A market fails the Competitive Sufficiency Test if the supply margin falls below the thresholds specified in this paragraph. "Supply margin" is the difference between the total quantity offered and the total quantity required, divided by the total quantity required.

(i) For the real-time energy market, the threshold shall be 1.0%, using all resources available for security-constrained economic dispatch and all demand on the system.

(ii) For all other ERCOT-operated markets, the threshold shall be 5.0%, using the energy or capacity offered into that market and the total quantity required in that market.

(B) Pivotal supplier test. A market fails the Competitive Sufficiency Test if any supplier is pivotal. A supplier is pivotal if removing all of its offers and those of its affiliates would cause total supply to be less than total requirements.

(2) The system-wide offer cap shall be the lower of (1) $1,000/MWh or $1,000/MW/h, as applicable; or (2) the 95th percentile price of all Competitive Offers plus an adder that is large enough to permit competitive supply pricing and small enough to mitigate non-competitive supply pricing. The adder shall be the greater of:

(A) $100; or

(B) 50% of the 95th percentile price.

(3) A supply offer shall not exceed $1,000/MWh or $1,000/MW/h. If a supply offer does exceed $1,000/MWh or $1,000/MW/h, it shall be set by ERCOT to $1,000/MWh or $1,000/MW/h, as applicable. A supply offer from a load acting as a resource that is above the system-wide offer cap and that is procured shall be paid its offer price, but shall not set any clearing price and shall not be paid more than $1,000/MWh or $1,000/MW/h, as applicable. Any supply offer other than one from a load acting as a resource that is above the system-wide offer cap and that is procured shall have the option to be paid its verifiable costs instead of the system-wide offer cap, but shall not set any clearing price and shall not be paid more than $1,000/MWh or $1,000/MW/h, as applicable. ERCOT's cost for supply procured above the system-wide offer cap shall be allocated to the buyers of the service in proportion to the quantities that they purchased.

(4) Commission staff, in cooperation with the ERCOT Independent Market Monitor, shall review the specific parameters in this subsection on an ongoing basis to determine whether they should be amended.

(j) Interrelationship between subsections (h) and (i) of this section and their effect on market power abuse remedy.

(1) To the extent that both subsections (h) and (i) produce price protections for a particular market interval, the lowest prices produced by those subsections shall apply.

(2) If the commission finds that market power abuse, by an entity that did not have persistent market power, occurred due solely to offer prices subject to subsections (h) and (i) and finds that subsections (h) and (i) worked as intended, the commission's remedy for the market power abuse shall be limited to the price protections afforded by subsections (h) and (i).

(3) If the commission finds that market power abuse, by an entity that did not have persistent market power, occurred due solely to offer prices subject to subsections (h) and (i) and finds that subsections (h) and (i) did not work as intended, the commission's remedy for the market power abuse shall be no more than payment by the market power abuser of an amount equal to the difference in what it was paid and what it would have been paid had subsections (h) and (i) worked as intended. In addition, and regardless of whether the market power abuse was committed by an entity with persistent market power, all other suppliers in the affected ERCOT- operated market that benefited from the market power abuse shall pay no more than an amount equal to the difference in what they were paid and what they would have been paid had subsections (h) and (i) worked as intended.

(k) Congestion revenue rights.

(1) ERCOT shall publish on its market information system the owners and beneficiaries of CRRs along with the corresponding CRRs. Owners of CRRs shall notify ERCOT of any change in ownership or beneficiaries no later than seven days after the effective date of the change, and ERCOT shall publish these changes on its market information system no later than two market days after receipt of the notice. In addition, owners of CRRs shall, no later than seven days of receipt of a request, provide proof that is sufficient for ERCOT or the commission's staff to verify ownership and beneficiary status.

(2) A supplier and its affiliates that control effective local resource capacity on the importing side of a constraint shall not own or be a beneficiary of CRRs pertaining to that constraint in excess of their local load minus their effective local resource capacity. "Effective local resource capacity" is the sum of each resource's capacity multiplied by its shift factor relative to the constraint. "Local load" is all loads that can be served by energy that flows through the constraint. Any entity and its affiliates that own CRRs amounting to more than 25% of the constraint capacity shall provide ERCOT with sufficient information to confirm compliance with this subsection no later than seven days after exceeding this percentage.

(3) For purposes of settling and derating CRRs, ERCOT shall treat each point-to-point option and each point-to-point obligation as portfolios of positive and negative power flows on all directional network elements created by the injection at the specified source point and the withdrawal at the specified sink point, in the quantity represented by the CRR.

(4) A transmission constraint for which the aggregate flowgate capacity contained in the outstanding CRRs exceeds the actual transmission capacity shall have its available transmission capacity allocated pro-rata among the affected CRRs for purposes of clearing and settlement. CRR holders shall be paid for the oversold capacity based on the lesser of the relevant shadow price of the impacted constraint or the greatest shadow price of the constraint in all previous CRR auctions that included the relevant time interval.

(l) ERCOT Independent Market Monitor. ERCOT shall have an Independent Market Monitor (IMM) by April 1, 2006. The IMM's operations shall be fully staffed and equipped by the time ERCOT implements §25.501 of this title (relating to Wholesale Market Design for the Electric Reliability Council of Texas).

(1) The IMM shall report to the Independent Market Monitoring Committee (IMMC) of the Board of Directors, which shall comprise the independent members of the Board of Directors, and the director of the commission's Market Oversight Division (MOD) as an ex officio nonvoting member. The IMMC shall have sole authority to hire, discipline, or fire the IMM.

(2) The IMM shall have a staff comprising either ERCOT employees or contract consultants funded by ERCOT.

(3) The IMM shall work with MOD and other Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) staff to ensure appropriate integration of IMM and PUCT oversight of the ERCOT wholesale market. No duty given to the IMM shall in any way affect PUCT staff's ability to conduct investigations or enforcement actions. The IMM shall develop public documents that briefly describe IMM functions, procedures, and processes.

(4) IMM wholesale market oversight duties shall include:

(A) All activities that are required of the IMM by the ERCOT Protocols;

(B) Monitoring, information gathering, and data analysis ordered by the ERCOT Board;

(C) Regularly monitoring any market screens and indices provided to the IMM by MOD, developed at the direction of the board, or created by the IMM in order to carry out his or her duties;

(D) Monitoring compliance with ERCOT operator instructions, tracking qualified scheduling entity (QSE) and other performance measures, documenting possible Protocol violations, and generally monitoring daily ERCOT operations and market activities;

(E) Reviewing ERCOT actions, practices, and procedures that have an impact on a market, including but not limited to whether ERCOT actions, practices, and procedures are consistent with the Protocols; and

(F) Reviewing actions on the part of a transmission service provider that has an impact on a market, including but not limited to, verification of transmission limits, and analysis of requests for outages of lines, transformers, and busses. When significant changes in nodal prices are observed, the IMM shall review them to determine the causes.

(5) The IMM shall provide MOD with information related to unusual offers or bids, unusual operational behaviors, or other questionable activities that have been detected, and shall inform MOD before contacting market participants to investigate the issue. The IMM, in cooperation with MOD, shall develop procedures to ensure prompt communication with MOD and timely resolution of issues.

(6) The IMM shall discuss with PUCT staff and ERCOT legal staff all identified instances of harmful behavior that cannot be resolved with the market participant informally or through ERCOT's dispute resolution processes; all repeated instances of ERCOT non-compliance; and protocol violations repeated within a six-month period. If necessary, either PUCT staff or ERCOT shall pursue an enforcement action.

(7) The IMM shall publish a "State of the Market Report" assessing the competitiveness of the ERCOT-operated markets and suggesting changes to commission rules or ERCOT procedures to improve market operation. This report shall include an assessment of the effectiveness of ERCOT transmission planning and expansion and the effectiveness and efficiency of ERCOT congestion management.

(m) Development and implementation. ERCOT shall develop and implement the requirements of this section in conjunction with its development and implementation of the requirements of §25.501 of this title, and shall therefore fully implement the requirements of this section by October 1, 2006.

This agency hereby certifies that the proposal has been reviewed by legal counsel and found to be within the agency's legal authority to adopt.

Filed with the Office of the Secretary of State on June 10, 2004.

TRD-200403830

Adriana Gonzales

Rules Coordinator

Public Utility Commission of Texas

Earliest possible date of adoption: July 25, 2004

For further information, please call: (512) 936-7223


Part 8. TEXAS RACING COMMISSION

Chapter 303. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Subchapter D. TEXAS BRED INCENTIVE PROGRAMS

2. PROGRAM FOR HORSES

16 TAC §303.93

The Texas Racing Commission proposes an amendment to §303.93, relating to quarter horse rules. The proposed amendment clarifies the rule language regarding the accreditation requirements for multiple foals conceived in a single breeding. The proposal was presented to the Commission as a petition for rulemaking by the Texas Quarter Horse Association.

Paula C. Flowerday, Executive Secretary for the Texas Racing Commission, has determined that for the first five-year period the proposed amendment is in effect there will be no fiscal implications for state or local government.

Ms. Flowerday has also determined that for each of the first five years the proposed amendment is in effect the anticipated public benefit will be to provide greater clarification of the accreditation requirements for multiple quarter horse foals conceived in a single breeding. There is no economic cost to an individual or small or micro business required to comply with the proposal. The proposal's effect on the horse breeding industry will be to add certainty as to which quarter horse foals may be accredited as Texas-bred and therefore, which breeders may be entitled to incentive awards. The proposal has a no effect on the state's agricultural, horse training, greyhound breeding, or greyhound training industries.

Written comments must be submitted within 30 days after publication of the proposed amendment in the Texas Register to Nicole Galwardi, General Counsel for the Texas Racing Commission, P.O. Box 12080, Austin, Texas 78711-2080, fax (512) 833-6907.

The amendment is proposed under the Texas Civil Statutes, Article 179e, §3.02 which authorizes the Commission to make rules relating exclusively to horse and greyhound racing; and §6.08 which authorizes the Commission to adopt rules relating to the accounting, audit, and distribution of Texas Bred Incentive program funds.

The proposed amendment implements Texas Civil Statutes, Article 179e.

§303.93.Quarter Horse Rules.

(a) - (b) (No change.)

(c) Accreditation requirements for multiple foals.

(1) (No change.)

(2) If the multiple foals are the result of a transferred embryo or oocyte process conceived in a single breeding , all foals sired by an ATB stallion are eligible for accreditation. If [ any of ] the foals were sired by a non-ATB stallion :

(A) [ , ] only one of the foals sired by a non-ATB stallion may be accredited ; and

(B) the [ . The ] owner of the ATB broodmare at the time of conception [ the first foal sired by a non-ATB stallion is born ] must select which foal is to be accredited , must notify the TQHA of the selection, and is considered the breeder for purposes of breeder awards.

(3) (No change.)

(d)- (f) (No change.)

This agency hereby certifies that the proposal has been reviewed by legal counsel and found to be within the agency's legal authority to adopt.

Filed with the Office of the Secretary of State on June 10, 2004.

TRD-200403843

Nicole Galwardi

General Counsel

Texas Racing Commission

Earliest possible date of adoption: July 25, 2004

For further information, please call: (512) 490-4009