Part 1.
RAILROAD COMMISSION OF TEXAS
Chapter 3.
OIL AND GAS DIVISION
16 TAC §§3.5, 3.8, 3.14, 3.32, 3.37, 3.38, 3.57, 3.73, 3.78, 3.86, 3.96
The Railroad Commission of Texas withdraws the proposed amendments
to §3.78, relating to Fees, Performance Bonds and Alternate Forms of
Financial Security Required To Be Filed, published in the March 26, 2004,
issue of the
Texas Register
(29 TexReg 3017),
and proposes amendments to §3.14, relating to Plugging, and most of the
same and additional amendments to §3.78, with a new title of "Fees and
Financial Security Requirements." The Commission also proposes amendments
to §§3.5 (Application to Drill, Deepen, Reenter, or Plug Back),
3.8 (Water Protection), 3.32 (Gas Well Gas and Casinghead Gas Shall Be Utilized
for Legal Purposes), 3.37 (Statewide Spacing Rule), 3.38 (Well Densities),
3.57 (Reclaiming Tank Bottoms, Other Hydrocarbon Wastes, and Other Waste Materials),
3.73 (Pipeline Connection; Cancellation of Certificate of Compliance; Severance),
3.86 (Horizontal Drainhole Wells), and 3.96 (Underground Storage of Gas In
Productive or Depleted Reservoirs) for the purposes of correcting references
to the title of §3.78 as it is proposed to be amended, correcting references
to other Commission rules or forms, correcting the name of the Texas Commission
on Environmental Quality, and making other technical changes.
The Commission withdraws the proposed amendments to §3.78, concerning
financial security requirements for operators of bay and offshore wells, which
were published March 26, 2004, in order to propose additional amendments to §3.78.
The original proposed amendments were published with a 60-day comment period,
and the Commission received one comment, filed by Texas Oil and Gas Association
(TxOGA). The Commission must propose additional amendments to §3.78 and §3.14
to implement universal bonding under Texas Natural Resources Code, §§91.103,
91.104, 91.1041, 91.1042, 91.107, and 91.109, which become effective September
1, 2004, pursuant to Senate Bill 310, 77th Legislature (2001). To make all
the necessary amendments effective on or about September 1, 2004, the Commission
re-proposes amendments to §3.78 concerning financial security for operators
of bay and offshore wells, with clarifying changes from the amendments which
were published March 26, 2004, and proposes additional amendments to §3.14
and §3.78 to implement universal bonding.
The comments filed by TxOGA regarding the withdrawn amendments to §3.78
will be considered in connection with this rulemaking. TxOGA suggested that
the proposed additional financial security requirement applicable to inactive
wells that formerly produced oil or gas and injection and disposal wells in
bays and offshore be made to apply only to
inactive
bay and offshore injection and disposal wells. The Commission has
declined to propose this change because the Commission has determined that
proposed entry level financial security for bay and offshore wells generally
is insufficient to cover estimated plugging liability for injection and disposal
wells, active or inactive, in bays and offshore.
In addition, Commission records disclose that currently there are only
21 bay wells used as injection or disposal wells by 17 operators. Of these
operators, only 14 would be required to file additional financial security
above the required entry level financial security for bay wells under the
amendments to §3.78 now proposed. These proposed amendments permit operators
of bay and offshore injection and disposal wells to challenge presumed estimated
plugging liability associated with these wells at a hearing called for this
purpose. The changes proposed by TxOGA are not deemed advisable or necessary
in these circumstances.
The Commission proposes amendments to §3.14(a)(1) to redefine "unbonded
operator" and to §3.14(b)(2)(A) to provide for extensions of the deadline
for plugging inactive wells operated by an unbonded operator during the interim
period between September 1, 2004, and the first date for annual renewal of
the operator's organization report after September 1, 2004. The proposed amendments
to §3.14 also delete paragraph (3) of subsection (b) relating to financial
security requirements for transferees of wells and leases. Other proposed
amendments to §3.14 correct the title of §3.78 as proposed to be
amended, the title of §3.14(b) and a reference in §3.14(a)(2) to
another Commission rule, and are non-substantive in nature.
The proposed amendments to §3.14(a)(1) and §3.14(b)(2)(A) are
necessary because although pursuant to Texas Natural Resources Code, §§91.103
and 91.104 universal bonding is effective September 1, 2004, an operator that
files a nonrefundable annual fee as financial security prior to September
1, 2004, will not be required to file a performance bond, letter of credit,
or cash deposit as financial security until the first date for annual renewal
of the operator's organization report after September 1, 2004. An operator
that has filed a performance bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit as financial
security is considered to have automatically applied for a plugging extension
for inactive wells, but proposed §3.14(b)(2)(A) is necessary to provide
for obtaining of plugging extensions by an unbonded operator during the interim
period between September 1, 2004, and the date on which the operator is required
to file a performance bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit as financial
security. The fee associated with an application by an unbonded operator for
a plugging extension referenced in current §3.14(b)(2)(A)(iv) is proposed
to be eliminated as required by Texas Natural Resources Code, §85.2021,
as amended effective September 1, 2004. The amendment deleting §3.14(b)(3)
is proposed because that provision is duplicated in §3.78.
The Commission proposes the amendments to §3.78, pertaining to financial
security for operators of bay and offshore wells, pursuant to the provisions
of Texas Natural Resources Code, §91.1041 and §91.1042, which require
the Commission to adopt rules setting a reasonable amount of financial security
for each bay or offshore well above the base amount of financial security
required to be submitted by each operator.
The proposed amendments to §3.78 amend the definition of "bay well,"
add a definition of "Director," and add wording in proposed new subsection
(g) concerning the amount of bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit required
of operators of bay and offshore wells. The proposed amendments will strengthen
and promote the efficient use of the state's Oil Field Clean Up Fund ("OFCUF").
Broadened financial security requirements will ensure that operators of bay
and offshore wells possess sufficient financial security to fund clean-up
and plugging operations. The proposed expanded financial security requirements
will allow the Commission to use more effectively the resources of the OFCUF.
Based on state-funded plugging operations managed by the Commission for
bay wells from 2000 through 2003, Commission staff has determined that the
minimum average cost to plug an abandoned bay well is approximately $60,000.
This estimate reflects the use of specialized equipment, mobilization costs,
and access issues created by the location of bay wells. Based on state-funded
plugging operations managed by the Commission for offshore wells in 2003 and
information provided by industry regarding actual plugging costs, Commission
staff has determined that the minimum average cost to plug an abandoned offshore
well is approximately $100,000. As with bay wells, the estimated minimum cost
to plug an abandoned offshore well reflects the use of specialized equipment,
mobilization costs, and access issues created by the location of offshore
wells. Based on this information, the Commission presumes for the purpose
of the proposed additional financial security requirements for bay and offshore
wells that the minimum average cost to plug a bay well is $60,000 and the
minimum average cost to plug an offshore well is $100,000. The proposed amendments
revise the definition of "bay well" in subsection (a)(5) to specifically reflect
the additional plugging costs associated with the use of specialized equipment,
mobilization costs, and access issues created by the location of bay wells.
Commission records show that as of May 15, 2004, 135 operators operated
730 bay wells and 302 offshore wells. For 93 of the 135 operators, the current
provisions of §3.78 require the posting of $50,000 or less in financial
security. When compared to the Commission staff determinations of the minimum
average costs to plug abandoned bay and offshore wells, the estimated cost
to plug a single well exceeds the total amount of financial security currently
required for the majority of bay and offshore well operators. Additionally,
Commission records show that 26 of the 135 operators do not have active organization
reports on file with the Commission and 22 opted to pay a nonrefundable annual
fee as financial security. These 26 delinquent operators are responsible for
65 abandoned bay wells and 20 abandoned offshore wells with a total estimated
minimum plugging cost of $5,900,000. Review of Commission records also indicates
that 8 of the 26 delinquent operators acquired inactive bay or offshore wells
that were never restored to production. The abandonment of these wells without
adequate financial security to pay for plugging costs illustrates the most
compelling rationale for the proposed amendments expanding the financial security
requirements for bay and offshore wells.
The proposed financial security requirements for operators of bay and offshore
wells were developed by Commission staff following suggestions received from
industry at the public meeting held on March 8, 2003, in Houston, Texas. Additionally,
Commission staff solicited comments from interested persons from November
2003 through January 2004 by posting a draft of the proposed amendments on
the Commission's website. Commission staff also mailed copies of the proposed
amendments to each operator of bay and offshore wells. The Commission received
written comments from 14 operators and one organization, TxOGA, during the
informal comment period. The majority of the comments received from operators
suggested that the Commission had not properly characterized specific wells
as bay wells because the wells' surface locations are on land. The Commission
has reviewed and revised its classification process for bay wells to address
this issue, but because the classification process is not part of §3.78,
or any other rule proposed to be amended, there is no need to amend the rule
proposal on the basis of these comments.
TxOGA presented one of the few substantive comments, noting general support
for the proposed amendments, but suggesting that the Commission evaluate the
impact of the proposal on the surety bond market. Commission staff performed
an analysis of the impact on the surety marketplace by comparing Commission
records identifying the surety companies which have issued surety bonds accepted
by the Commission in the past 12 months against the United States Department
of the Treasury Listing of Approved Sureties (Department Circular 570: 2003
Revision). The Department of Treasury Listing includes the underwriting limitation
for bonds issued by the identified companies, and also notes that a surety
company can issue bonds in excess of its underwriting limitation as long as
the excess amount is protected by reinsurance, coinsurance, or other specified
methods. Comparison of the Commission list with the most recently published
underwriting limitations in the Department of Treasury circular indicates
that the cumulative potential underwriting limitation, without consideration
of reinsurance, is $4,500,000,000.
The proposed amendments, when applied to the current operators of all currently
recognized bay and offshore wells, will require the posting of financial security
with a maximum cumulative total of $37,440,000. Under the proposed amendments,
the actual cumulative total of additional financial security may be offset
by potential reductions in both the entry level financial security and any
inactive well financial security required to be filed. When the minimum average
costs to plug abandoned bay and offshore wells are applied to the current
population of bay and offshore wells, the total estimated minimum cost to
plug all bay and offshore wells is $75,740,000. Based on this analysis, the
Commission concludes that the additional financial security requirements under
the proposed amendments will not result in a significant impact on the surety
market. The Commission finds that the amounts of additional financial security
required for bay and offshore wells by these proposed amendments will ensure
that operators of bay and offshore wells possess sufficient financial security
to fund any necessary clean-up and plugging operations.
The additional financial security requirements for operators of bay and
offshore wells in the proposed amendments to current subsection (j), now subsection
(g) of §3.78, comprise three parts: (1) an entry level financial security
requirement applicable to all operators; (2) an inactive well financial security
requirement applicable to inactive wells and injection and disposal wells
on a well-by-well basis; and (3) a potential administrative reduction to the
inactive well financial security requirement based on the demonstrated net
worth of the company.
The entry level financial security requirement recognizes the statutory
mandate that all operators of bay and offshore wells post additional financial
security to reflect the additional cost of bay and offshore plugging operations.
The proposal requires that all bay well operators post entry level financial
security of $60,000, the estimated cost to plug a single bay well, as security
for their bay well operations. Offshore operators, or operators of both bay
and offshore wells, are required to post entry level financial security of
$100,000, the estimated cost to plug a single offshore well, as security for
their offshore well operations. The proposal also allows an operator to apply
for an administrative reduction of the entry level financial security requirement
on a dollar-for-dollar basis up to the total entry level amount. To obtain
this administrative reduction, an operator must provide documentation that
it has posted financial assurance with other governmental entities and that
the Commission either can be assigned the proceeds or can independently call
on the financial assurance posted with the other governmental entity.
The inactive well financial security requirement recognizes the increased
likelihood that the Commission will be required to expend state-managed funds
to plug a well if the well has been inactive for more than 12 months. To address
this increased likelihood, the proposal requires the posting of $60,000 per
well for every inactive bay well beyond the first inactive bay well and $100,000
per well for every inactive offshore well beyond the first inactive offshore
well. This requirement also applies to bay and offshore wells used for injection
or disposal, which are considered to have estimated plugging liability exceeding
the entry level financial security for bay and offshore wells generally. The
presumed estimated plugging liability associated with these wells may be challenged
at a hearing at which an applicant must show clear and convincing evidence
that the presumed plugging liability should not apply to a specific well or
wells.
The proposed amendments to §3.78 relating to financial security for
operators of bay and offshore wells also allow for an administrative reduction
from the additional financial security required for inactive bay and offshore
wells of up to 25% of the operator's net worth where: (1) the operator has
five wells or fewer, or at least half of the operator's wells are actively
producing; (2) the operator provides a certification from an independent auditor
confirming the operator's net worth based on the operator's financial statement
from the most recently completed fiscal year; and (3) none of the operator's
wells or operations have been found to be in violation of Commission rules
resulting in pollution or any hazard to the health or safety of the public
in the last 12 months.
The potential administrative reduction is patterned on guidelines adopted
by the United States Department of the Interior Minerals Management Service
in its rules published in 30 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 256. Under
the Commission's proposal, an operator would be eligible for a reduction of
any additional financial security required for inactive bay and offshore wells
by subtracting the estimated active well plugging liability from 25% of its
net worth as certified by an independent auditor that has employed generally
accepted accounting principles to confirm the operator's stated net worth
based on the most recently completed fiscal year. The certification standard
is the same standard currently used by the Commission in its rules for evaluating
self bonding for businesses engaged in surface coal mining (§12.309(j),
relating to Terms and Conditions of the Bond). The remainder would be applied
to reduce the additional financial security required for inactive bay and
offshore wells. The reduction formula can be expressed as:
.25(net worth) - (active well liability) = (amount of possible reduction)
.
The following example illustrates the application of the formula.
Operator A currently operates 15 offshore wells, six of which are inactive.
The financial security under the proposed amendment would be the $100,000
entry level amount plus $500,000 for the inactive wells. To obtain a reduction
in the $500,000 inactive well amount, the operator provides appropriate certification
that the net worth of the company is $5,000,000. Applying the formula, 25%
of the operator's net worth, or $1,250,000, would be measured against the
total active well liability of $900,000, (9 x $100,000 per well). The difference
of $350,000 would allow the operator to be eligible for a reduction of $350,000
against the $500,000 inactive well financial security requirement. In this
example, the total financial security required from the operator for bay and
offshore operations would be $250,000, (the $100,000 entry level requirement
plus the $150,000 reduced inactive well financial security requirement) instead
of $600,000. The example is expressed mathematically as follows:
.25(5,000,000 net worth) - 900,000 total active well liability = 350,000
reduction
500,000 inactive well financial security requirement - 350,000 reduction
= 150,000 reduced financial security requirement
150,000 inactive well financial security + 100,000 entry level financial
security
= 250,000 total financial security
Under the same example, if the operator's certified net worth totaled $5,600,000
or greater, the formula would have reduced the $500,000 inactive well financial
security requirement to zero, leaving only the $100,000 entry level requirement:
.25(5,600,000) - 900,000 = 500,000
In this same example, if the operator's certified net worth totaled $3,600,000
or less, there would be no basis for an administrative reduction of the inactive
well financial security requirement, and the operator would be required to
post the full $500,000 inactive well financial security requirement:
.25(3,600,000) - 900,000 = 0
If the Commission denies a request for an administrative reduction of the
inactive well financial security requirement, the operator may request a hearing
to consider additional evidence on the request. It is anticipated that allowing
an administrative reduction of the inactive well financial security requirement
will provide an equivalent guaranty that an operator possesses sufficient
assets to fund any necessary clean-up or plugging expenses associated with
the inactive bay and offshore wells or injection and disposal wells in bays
and offshore, while limiting the impact of the inactive well financial security
requirement on the working capital of operators and the surety bond market.
In addition to the proposed amendments to §3.78 that relate to financial
security of operators of bay and offshore wells, the Commission proposes other
amendments to §3.78 to implement universal bonding requirements for all
non-exempt operators mandated by Texas Natural Resources Code, §§91.103,
91.104, 91.1041, 91.1042, 91.107, and 91.109, that become effective September
1, 2004, pursuant to Senate Bill 310, 77th Legislature (2001).
The Commission proposes an amendment to the title of §3.78 to delete
a reference to alternate forms of financial security and to clarify the scope
of §3.78. Amendments are proposed to §3.78 to delete various provisions
that refer or relate to alternate forms of financial security. The proposed
universal bonding amendments to §3.78 amend subsection (d) to clarify
that this subsection does not apply to operators that are exempt from financial
security requirements and add new paragraph (4) to subsection (d) to provide
that an operator that has a current and active organization report and filed
a nonrefundable annual fee as its financial security prior to September 1,
2004, may continue to perform operations subject to the Commission's jurisdiction
with such financial security until the first date after September 1, 2004,
for annual renewal of the operator's organization report, at which time the
operator must file financial security as required by proposed §3.78(g).
Current §3.78(i) is deleted by the proposed amendments because it
is inconsistent with the Commission's implementation of House Bill 942, 78th
Legislature (2003). The Commission also proposes amendments to §3.78
to add new subsection (g) relating to the amount of bonds, letters of credit,
and cash deposits which operators are required to file as financial security.
These provisions are consistent with current subsection (j)(1) - (2), which
are proposed to be deleted, with the addition of other provisions relating
to the additional amount of financial security required of operators of bay
and offshore wells. Other proposed amendments to §3.78 make technical
corrections in current provisions of this section for purposes of clarification.
The proposed amendments to §3.78 relating to universal bonding are
necessary to implement Texas Natural Resources Code, §§91.103, 91.104,
91.1041, 91.1042, 91.107, and 91.109, that become effective September 1, 2004,
pursuant to Senate Bill 310, 77th Legislature (2001). Under these statutory
provisions, effective September 1, 2004, all operators that are not exempt
from financial security requirements must have an individual or blanket performance
bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit as financial security. Effective September
1, 2004, the filing of an alternate form of financial security to obtain or
renew an operator's organization report will no longer be permitted. On and
after September 1, 2004, operators will be required to comply with the new
universal bonding requirements as of the date of initial filing or renewal
of their organization report.
Historically, a substantial majority of orphaned wells that have been plugged
with Commission-managed funds from the OFCUF have been wells for which unbonded
operators were responsible. The proposed amendments to §3.14 and §3.78
relating to universal bonding will provide additional financial security that
inactive wells will be plugged and pollution cleaned up, with corresponding
benefits to the OFCUF and the environment.
The Commission also proposes amendments to §§3.5, 3.8, 3.32,
3.37, 3.38, 3.57, 3.73, 3.86, and 3.96 to correct the title of §3.78
as proposed to be amended, correct titles or numbers of other Commission rules,
delete references to Commission rules that no longer exist, correct the name
of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, and make other technical
changes. These proposed amendments do not make substantive changes, and are
necessary provide accuracy and consistency to the Commission's rules.
Leslie Savage, Planning and Administration, Oil and Gas Division, has determined
that for each year of the first five years the rules as proposed will be in
effect, the fiscal implications as a result of enforcing or administering
amended §§3.14 and 3.78 will be a cost to the state of $60,000 in
fiscal year 2004, $162,100 in fiscal year 2005, $73,274 in fiscal year 2006,
and $36,637 in each of fiscal years 2007, 2008, and 2009. These costs would
result from programming for bay/offshore/land wells and financial security
changes, changes to the financial security information packages, and changes
in processing of financial security instruments. In addition, elimination
of certain fees as revenue to the Oilfield Cleanup Fund (OFCUF) will result
in an annual loss of revenue to the OFCUF of approximately $1,924,791; however,
the rule amendments should reduce the well plugging liability to the OFCUF.
The fiscal year 2005 costs include costs for staff involved with document
revision and process analysis; computer programming (bay and offshore well
identification data base, changes to the P-4/P-5 system to calculate additional
financial security for transfers of bay and offshore wells, P-5 fact sheet
and P-4 transfer programs to consider bay/offshore well identifications);
and field staff to respond to complaints resulting from anticipated initial,
short-term increase in non-compliance and bay/offshore well classification
identification/verification. The fiscal years 2006 through 2009 costs include
those for inspection for noncompliance and enforcement.
The Commission began work this fiscal year (Fiscal Year 2004) with respect
to bay and offshore well identification. The Commission estimates that the
programming work necessary to implement and enforce these rule amendments
will be approximately $120,000 if contract programming is used. The cost will
be less if the Commission is able to use in-house programmers. For the purpose
of this estimate, costs incurred for programming each of fiscal years 2004
and 2005 are estimated at approximately $60,000. The Commission will absorb
maintenance costs during the remaining fiscal years 2007 through 2009.
The rule amendments eliminate the $1,000 P-5 fee option. For the period
from March 25, 2003, through March 25, 2004, the Commission processed 171
P-5s where the operator paid a $1,000 fee as financial security. At this time,
there are approximately 105 operators who filed the $1,000 P-5 fee. In addition,
the rule amendments also eliminate the W-1X extension fee revenue currently
going to the OFCUF. The Commission processed 310 W-1Xs at $300 each for a
total of $93,000. Furthermore, the amendments eliminate the Option 4 fee of
12.5% of bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit, of which $1,660,791 was
collected in the same period. Therefore, there will be a decrease of $1,924,791
in revenue to the OFCUF.
During the first two years of implementation, there will likely be an increase
in complaints and enforcement referrals as a result of the proposed amendments
as certain operators fail to meet their regulatory responsibility and discontinue
operations. The Commission estimates that inspections resulting from increased
complaints on non-compliant wells and inspections to verify classification
as bay/offshore/land based wells and resulting enforcement will require the
work equivalent to three Engineer Tech III positions in fiscal year 2005,
at a cost of approximately $97,700. The Commission estimates that the costs
will decrease to $48,850 (1.5 positions) in fiscal year 2006, and will be
approximately $36,637 in the remaining fiscal years 2007, 2008, and 2009.
The Commission anticipates that the operators of a certain portion of wells
that currently have W-1X extensions and file the $1,000 P-5 fee will not secure
the required bonds and will orphan these wells. Thus, the non-compliant well
count is expected to initially increase; however, the number of wells plugged
with state funds is not expected to increase as a result of the increase in
the number of non-compliant wells. It may, in fact, decrease. The number of
wells plugged with state funds is dictated by the revenues going into the
OFCUF. With the anticipated increase in non-compliance as a result of the
new requirements and operators choosing other compliance alternatives (organizational
bonds/letters of credit, plugging, return to production), there will be a
proportionate decrease in revenues.
Some of the additional wells that become non-compliant as a result of this
rulemaking may be evaluated for plugging with state funds. If the wells are
determined to be eligible for plugging they will be prioritized along with
other candidates for plugging in order to determine which wells are plugged
with the limited funds available.
There will be no effect on local government.
Texas Government Code, §2006.002, requires a state agency considering
adoption of a rule that would have an adverse economic effect on small businesses
or micro-businesses to reduce the effect if doing so is legal and feasible
considering the purpose of the statutes under which the rule is to be adopted.
Before adopting a rule that would have an adverse economic effect on small
businesses, a state agency must prepare a statement of the effect of the rule
on small businesses, which must include an analysis of the cost of compliance
with the rule for small businesses and a comparison of that cost with the
cost of compliance for the largest businesses affected by the rule, using
cost for each employee, cost for each hour of labor, or cost for each $100
of sales.
Ms. Savage has estimated that the cost of compliance with the proposed
amendments to §3.78 relating to financial security required of operators
of bay and offshore wells for the individual, small business, or micro-business
producer will be an additional business expense for the premium for the bond
obtained. Operators may also incur an additional business expense for the
certification of net worth by an independent auditor if the operator has inactive
or injection wells and seeks an administrative reduction of the inactive well
financial security requirement. Additionally, operators who request a hearing
may incur costs associated with preparing for and attending the hearing, including
but not limited to costs for hiring legal counsel and other experts, preparing
documents and other evidence, and traveling to Austin for the hearing.
Ms. Savage has also determined that under Texas Government Code, §2006.002(c)(2),
the additional financial security required under the proposed amendments relating
to operators of bay and offshore wells does not show a disproportionate economic
impact on small businesses or micro- businesses because the Commission finds
that the operators of bay and offshore wells are not likely to fall within
the definitions of these terms in Texas Government Code, §2006.001. This
determination is consistent with the findings published in the Federal Register
in the preamble to rules and regulations adopted by the United States Department
of the Interior Minerals Management Service related to surety bond provisions
for offshore leases in 30 Code of Federal Regulations Part 256 (See 62 Federal
Register 27953-27954). Exploration and development costs for bay and offshore
oil and gas leases often exceed several million dollars. In general, the entities
that engage in such exploration, development, and production activities would
not be considered small due to the technical expertise, financial resources,
and experience necessary to safely conduct such activities in an environmentally
responsible manner.
With respect to the impact on small businesses as defined under Texas Government
Code, §2006.002(c)(2), Texas Natural Resources Code, §§91.1041
and 91.1042 mandate that additional financial security be filed for each bay
and offshore well operated. The statutes do not distinguish between the size
of an organization and the number of bay and offshore wells the organization
operates, and the Commission has no authority to exempt small business or
micro-business operators of bay and offshore wells from the requirements of
Texas Natural Resources Code, §§91.1041 and 91.1042.
Because operators are not required to make filings with the Commission
reporting number of employees, labor costs, amount of sales, or gross receipts,
the Commission cannot definitively determine whether a particular operator
may be a small business or a micro-business. However, for the purpose of performing
the comparison mandated by Texas Government Code, §2006.002(c)(2), the
Commission has analyzed the estimated maximum impact of the proposed amendments
on two hypothetical bay and offshore well operators. One of the operators
would be characterized as a small business under Texas Government Code, §2006.001(2),
based on imputed annual sales revenue of less than $1 million. The other hypothetical
operator would be characterized as one of the largest businesses under Texas
Government Code, §2006.001(2), based on imputed annual sales revenue
of more than $1 million.
The hypothetical businesses are based on the number of active and inactive
bay and offshore wells and the total number of wells operated. The comparison
also calculates the cost of the additional financial security requirement
by using the annual fee of 12.5% of the minimum financial security required,
which an operator may opt to pay under current §3.78(d)(4), even though
the fees and premiums associated with letters of credit and surety bonds may
in fact be less costly than the 12.5% rate. Because the Commission does not
have annual gross receipts information from its operators, the Commission
used a substitute: for both hypothetical operators, the Commission calculated
an imputed annual sales revenue amount using 2003 production reported to the
Commission and the 2003 average domestic first purchase price of $27.45 per
barrel of crude oil or condensate and average wellhead price of $5.09 per
mcf of natural gas, as reported by the Energy Information Administration through
November 2003 for crude oil and through September 2003 for natural gas.
The hypothetical small business operator has one active bay well and therefore
would be required to file minimum additional financial security of $60,000
under the proposed amendments. As noted above, the Commission estimates the
cost of obtaining the additional financial security to be not more than 12.5%
of $60,000 or $7,500. This hypothetical operator reported production in 2003
of 14,088 barrels of crude oil and 43,533 mcf of natural gas from its wells
for an imputed sales revenue amount of $608,298.57. The estimated maximum
cost of compliance for this hypothetical small business operator would be
$1.23 for each $100 in imputed sales revenue.
The hypothetical largest business has 18 inactive offshore wells and 21
active offshore wells. This operator would be required to file additional
financial security of $1,800,000. In 2003, this operator reported production
of 56,051 barrels of crude oil and 2,461,809 mcf of natural gas, for total
imputed total sales revenue of $14,069,206. As noted above, the Commission
estimates the cost of obtaining the additional financial security to be 12.5%
of $1,800,000 or $225,000. The estimated maximum cost of compliance for this
hypothetical operator would be $1.59 for each $100 in imputed sales revenue.
The Commission recognizes that the hypothetical small business operator
used in this comparison might not strictly meet the definition of "small business"
in Texas Government Code, §2006.001(2). Because the Commission does not
have any information on operators' annual gross receipts, and because the
imputed sales revenue is calculated to be less than $1 million, the Commission
finds that this comparison substantially complies with the requirement of
Texas Government Code, §§2006.002 and 2001.024(a)(8). Further, in
an attempt to disclose the actual impact of the proposed amendments under
Texas Government Code, §2006.002(c)(2), the Commission has calculated
the estimated maximum potential additional financial assurance required for
every affected operator, as shown in Figure 1.
Figure: 16 TAC Chapter 3--Preamble
Additionally, operators of bay and offshore wells may be eligible for a
reduced financial security amount either administratively or after a hearing
if an administrative reduction is denied. Finally, under the proposed amendments,
operators can reduce the amount of additional financial security required
for inactive bay and offshore wells by restoring any shut-in wells to active
production.
Ms. Savage has also estimated the cost to individual, small, and micro-business
operators of compliance with the proposed amendments to §3.14 and §3.78
relating to universal bonding. This cost will consist of annual premiums for
individual or blanket performance bonds and any applicable bank fees for issuance
of letters of credit. Loss of use of capital filed as financial security in
the form of a cash deposit or pledged as collateral to obtain a performance
bond or letter of credit may also be a cost factor for individual, small,
and micro-business operators. Depending on the circumstances of a particular
operator, these costs of compliance may be offset, in whole or in part, by
savings realized as a result of elimination of nonrefundable annual fees as
forms of financial security and elimination of annual fees for obtaining plugging
extensions for inactive wells.
The Commission does not have access to definitive data regarding the amount
of annual premiums charged to operators subject to the Commission's jurisdiction
for the issuance of individual or blanket performance bonds or bank fees charged
to such operators for issuance of letters of credit. For the purpose of its
analysis of the cost of compliance with the proposed amendments to §3.78
relating to financial security requirements for operators of bay and offshore
wells, the Commission assumed an annual bond premium of not more than 12.5%.
The Commission estimates that a substantial majority of individual, small,
and micro-business well operators have fewer than 100 wells. An individual,
small business, or micro-business operator of 10 or fewer wells paying a bond
premium of 12.5% of the face amount of the required $25,000 blanket bond would
incur an annual bond cost of $3,125. A similar operator of more than 10 but
fewer than 100 wells paying a bond premium of 12.5% of the face amount of
the required $50,000 blanket bond would incur an annual bond cost of $6,250.
These are the same annual costs that are incurred by operators filing financial
security in the form of the nonrefundable annual fee provided by current §3.78(d)(4),
now proposed to be deleted, and also, such operators currently are required
to pay an annual fee of $300 per inactive well to obtain plugging extensions
pursuant to current §3.14(b)(2)(A)(iv) and §3.78(b)(6), which are
also proposed to be deleted.
Presently, individual, small business, and micro-business operators who
are eligible to file financial security in the form of the annual nonrefundable
fee provided by current §3.78(d)(3), now proposed to be deleted, incur
an annual cost of $1,000, but operators filing this form of financial security
currently are required to pay the annual $300 per inactive well fee to obtain
plugging extensions, a fee being eliminated by the proposed universal bonding
amendments to §3.14 and §3.78.
The Commission estimates that the 12.5% annual bond premium assumed by
the Commission for the purpose of estimating the cost of compliance with the
proposed amendments by individual, small business, and micro-business operators
is the maximum premium any such operator will be required to pay. The Commission
anticipates that the actual annual premium to these operators will be a lesser
amount. In the course of the 2003 rulemaking involving previous amendments
to §3.78, the Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, believed by the Commission
to be an association whose members are primarily individual, small business,
and micro-business operators, filed comments informing the Commission that
in an April 2003 survey of its members, only 5.8% of the respondents stated
that they were experiencing annual bond premiums of more than 3%. The Commission
also anticipates that bank fees incurred by individual, small business, and
micro- business operators to obtain issuance of letters of credit will be
substantially less than 12.5% of the face amount of the letters of credit.
While the Commission does not have access to data disclosing gross receipts,
number of employees, or hours of labor of operators subject to the Commission's
jurisdiction enabling it to make a definitive analysis of the precise economic
effect of the proposed universal bonding amendments on small and micro- businesses
of the type required by Texas Government Code, §2006.002, Ms. Savage
has nonetheless estimated the cost of compliance per employee and per $100
of sales for these operators. Production during 2003 of oil and gas by operators
that filed an alternate form of financial security and the 2003 average domestic
first purchase price of $27.45 per barrel of crude oil and average wellhead
price of $5.09 per mcf of natural gas, as reported by the Energy Information
Administration through November 2003 for crude oil and through September 2003
for natural gas have been used in these estimates.
Texas Government Code, §2006.001 defines "micro-business" as a legal
entity that, among other things, has not more than 20 employees, and a "small
business" as a legal entity that, among other things, has fewer than 100 employees
or less than $1 million in annual gross receipts. The Commission's estimates
assume that: (1) an operator filing an alternate form of financial security
and reporting 2003 production which, at 2003 prices, accounts for gross receipts
of less than $500,000, is a micro-business operator; (2) an operator filing
an alternate form of financial security and reporting 2003 production which,
at 2003 prices, accounts for gross receipts of at least $500,000 but less
than $1 million in annual gross receipts, is a small business operator.
From 2003 production records and records of the Commission's P-5/Financial
Assurance Unit, Ms. Savage has determined that the average "small business"
operator, as previously defined, that filed an alternate form of financial
security operated 12 wells and had production which, at 2003 prices, accounted
for $704,546 in gross receipts. On this basis, the Commission estimates that
the per $100 of sales cost to the "average" small business operator of compliance
with the proposed universal bonding amendments to §3.14 and §3.78
will be approximately: (1) $0.89, if a $50,000 blanket bond covering 12 wells
is filed and the annual bond premium is 12.5% of the bond amount; or (2) $0.21,
if a $50,000 blanket bond covering 12 wells is filed and the annual bond premium
is 3% of the bond amount.
From the same data, Ms. Savage has determined that the average micro-business
operator, as previously defined, that filed an alternate form of financial
security operated 12 wells and had 2003 production which, at 2003 prices,
accounted for approximately $80,155 in gross receipts. On this basis, the
Commission estimates that the per $100 of sales cost to the "average" micro-business
operator of compliance with the proposed universal bonding amendments to §3.14
and §3.78 will be approximately: (1) $7.80, if a $50,000 blanket bond
covering 12 wells is filed and the annual bond premium is 12.5% of the bond
amount; or (2) $1.87, if a $50,000 blanket bond covering 12 wells is filed
and the annual bond premium is 3% of the bond amount.
Assuming that the "average" small business operator, as previously defined,
has 30 employees, the annual per employee cost of compliance with the proposed
universal bonding amendments to §3.14 and §3.78 will be approximately;
(1) $208.33, if a $50,000 blanket bond is filed and the annual bond premium
is 12.5% of the bond amount; or (2) $50.00, if a $50,000 blanket bond is filed
and the annual bond premium is 3% of the bond amount. Assuming that the "average"
micro-business operator, as previously defined, has 6 employees, the annual
per employee cost of compliance with the universal bonding amendments to §3.14
and §3.78 will be approximately: (1) $1,041.67, if a $50,000 blanket
bond is filed and the annual bond premium is 12.5% of the bond amount, or
(2) $250.00, if a $50,000 blanket bond is filed and the annual bond premium
is 3%.
The Commission has considered that the amount of the required bond under §3.78
is a function of the total depth of all wells operated, in the case of individual
performance bonds, and a function of the number of wells operated, in the
case of blanket performance bonds. Individual small business and micro-business
operators may therefore incur actual compliance costs per $100 of sales and
per employee that are lower or higher than those the Commission has estimated
for the "average" small business or micro-business operator, depending on
the depth or number of wells operated, the number of employees of the operator,
and the operator's gross receipts. The incremental per $100 of sales and per
employee cost of compliance with the proposed universal bonding amendments
to §3.78 for small business and micro- business operators that have previously
filed an alternate form of financial security will be materially less than
the cost estimated in the previous analyses or will be zero, because the annual
cost of obtaining a bond or letter of credit will be offset, in whole or in
part, by the annual nonrefundable fees these operators now file as financial
security and the annual fees they are required to pay to obtain plugging extensions
for inactive wells. The Commission has considered also that some small business
and micro-business operators now file an individual or blanket performance
bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit as financial security and that the
proposed universal bonding amendments to §3.14 and §3.78 will not
increase the cost of compliance to these operators.
Comparison of the cost to small business and micro-business operators of
compliance with the proposed universal bonding amendments to §3.14 and §3.78
with the cost of compliance to the largest businesses affected by the proposed
amendments is complicated by the fact that most all of the largest operators
subject to the Commission's jurisdiction are not affected by the amendments.
These large operators, for the most part, already file a performance bond,
letter of credit, or cash deposit as financial security. The largest operator,
in terms of gross receipts identified by the Commission based on 2003 production
of oil and gas, that filed an alternate form of financial security operates
10 wells and had 2003 production which, at 2003 prices, accounted for gross
receipts of approximately $44,997,000. Assuming that this operator filed a
blanket bond in the amount of $25,000, the annual per $100 of sales cost of
compliance with the proposed universal bonding amendments to §3.14 and §3.78
would be a fraction of one cent whether the annual bond premium is 12.5% or
3% of the bond amount.
Assuming that a large business operator has 100 employees, the annual per
employee cost to the operator of compliance with the proposed universal bonding
amendments to §3.78 would be approximately: (1) $31.25, if a blanket
bond in the amount of $25,000 is filed and the annual bond premium is 12.5%
of the bond amount; (2) $7.50, if a blanket bond in the amount of $25,000
is filed and the annual bond premium is 3% of the bond amount; (3) $62.50,
if a blanket bond in the amount of $50,000 is filed and the annual bond premium
is 12.5% of the bond amount; (4) $15.00, if a blanket bond in the amount of
$50,000 is filed and the annual bond premium is 3% of the bond amount; (5)
$312.50, if a blanket bond in the amount of $250,000 is filed and the annual
bond premium is 12.5% of the bond amount; or (6) $75.00, if a blanket bond
in the amount of $250,000 is filed and the annual bond premium is 3% of the
bond amount.
The Commission does not foreclose the possibility that some individual,
small business, and micro-business operators may have difficulty in obtaining
a performance bond or letter of credit or be unable to file a cash deposit.
However, under Texas Natural Resources Code, §§91.103 and 91.104,
as amended by Senate Bill 310, 77th Legislature (2001), effective September
1, 2004, the Commission does not have the discretion to exempt small and micro-business
operators from the requirement that all non-exempt operators file financial
security in the form of an individual or blanket performance bond, letter
of credit, or cash deposit. As of April 28, 2004, there were 5,689 operators
having activities which as of that date required the filing of financial security,
and of these, 5,122 had filed financial security in the form of an individual
or blanket performance bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit. As of January
18, 2001, only 8.6% of all operators had filed one of these forms of financial
security. Senate Bill 310, amending Texas Natural Resources Code, §§91.103
and 91.104, to require universal bonding effective September 1, 2004, was
enacted in 2001, and the Commission anticipates that operators will have had
sufficient time to prepare for universal bonding so that the number of operators
that are unable to comply will be minimal.
Ms. Savage has estimated that there will be no economic effect on small
business and micro-business operators of the proposed technical amendments
to §§3.5, 3.8, 3.32, 3.37, 3.38, 3.57, 3.73, 3.86, and 3.96, because
the amendments are non-substantive in nature.
James M. Doherty, Hearings Examiner, Hearings Section, Office of General
Counsel, has determined that for each year of the first five years that the
amendments will be in effect, the primary public benefit will be the implementation
of universal bonding and additional financial security for bay and offshore
wells required by the Legislature. This additional financial security should
reduce the amount of funds required from the OFCUF to plug inactive and abandoned
wells, including bay and offshore wells. Funds from the OFCUF will then be
available for clean-up and plugging operations in the areas of greatest need.
The Commission proposes that the amendments will become effective on September
1, 2004. This proposed effective date is required in order to comply with
Texas Natural Resources Code, §§91.103, 91.104, 91.1041, 91.1042,
91.107, and 91.109.
Comments on the proposal may be submitted to Rules Coordinator, Office
of General Counsel, Railroad Commission of Texas, P.O. Box 12967, Austin,
Texas 78711-2967; online at www.rrc.state.tx.us/rules/commentform.html; or
by electronic mail to rulescoordinator@rrc.state.tx.us. The Commission will
accept comments for 30 days after publication in the
Texas Register
. Comments should refer to Docket No. 20-0239008. The
Commission encourages all interested persons to submit comments no later than
the deadline. The Commission cannot guarantee that comments submitted after
the deadline will be considered. For further information, call James M. Doherty
at (512) 463-7152. The status of Commission rulemakings in progress is available
at www.rrc.state.tx.us/rules/proposed.html.
The Commission proposes the amendments to §§3.5, 3.8, 3.14, 3.32,
3.37, 3.38, 3.57, 3.73, 3.78, 3.86, and 3.96 pursuant to subsection (b) of
Texas Government Code, §2001.006, which authorizes the Commission to
adopt rules in preparation for the implementation of legislation that has
become law but has not taken effect; and pursuant to Texas Natural Resources
Code, §§81.051 and 81.052, which provide the Commission with jurisdiction
over all persons owning or engaged in drilling or operating oil or gas wells
in Texas and the authority to adopt all necessary rules for governing and
regulating persons and their operations under the jurisdiction of the Commission,
and under the provisions of Texas Natural Resources Code, §§91.103,
91.104, 91.1041, 91.1042, 91.107, and 91.109 which relate to financial security
requirements for operators subject to the Commission's jurisdiction.
Texas Natural Resources Code, §§81.051, 81.052, 81.0521, 81.0522,
85.202, 85.2021, 88.011, 91.101, 91.1013, 91.103, 91.104, 91.1041, 91.1042,
91.105-91.108, 91.109, 91.1091, 91.111-91.113, and 91.142, are affected by
the proposed amendments.
Statutory authority: Texas Government Code, §2001.006, and
Texas Natural Resources Code, §§81.051, 81.052, 81.0521, 81.0522,
85.202, 85.2021, 88.011, 91.101, 91.1013, 91.103, 91.104, 91.1041, 91.1042,
91.105-91.108, 91.109, 91.1091, 91.111-91.113, and 91.142.
Cross-reference to statutes: Texas Government Code, §2001.006, and
Texas Natural Resources Code, §§81.051, 81.052, 81.0521, 81.0522,
85.202, 85.2021, 88.011, 91.101, 91.1013, 91.103, 91.104, 91.1041, 91.1042,
91.105-91.108, 91.109, 91.1091, 91.111-91.113, and 91.142.
Issued in Austin, Texas on June 8, 2004.
§3.5.Application To Drill, Deepen, Reenter, or Plug Back.
(a) - (c)
(No change.)
(d)
Testing of existing wells in other reservoirs inside the
casing. For an existing well, an operator may request authorization to commence
operations to deepen inside the casing or plug back prior to the granting
of a permit to deepen or plug back.
(1)
(No change.)
(2)
Operations of deepening inside the casing or plugging back
shall not be commenced until the district office has reviewed and approved
the request. Testing pursuant to this authorization shall be completed within
90 days from the date the district office approves the request.
(A) - (B)
(No change.)
(C)
Within 30 days of completion of testing, the operator must
either file an application for a permit to produce a reservoir tested pursuant
to this subsection or file an amended completion report in accordance with §3.16
of this title (relating to Log and Completion
or
[
(e)
(No change.)
(f)
Drilling permit fee. With each application or materially
amended application, the applicant shall submit to the commission a nonrefundable
fee as determined by §3.78 of this title (relating to
Fees and Financial
Security Requirements
[
(g)
(No change.)
(h)
Plats. An application to drill, deepen, plug back, or reenter
shall be accompanied by a neat, accurate plat, with a scale of one inch equals
1,000 feet. The plat for the initial well on the lease, pooled unit, or unitized
tract shall show the entire lease, pooled unit, or tract, including all tracts
being pooled. If necessary to show the entire lease, the scale may be one
inch equals 2,000 feet. Plats for subsequent wells on a lease or pooled unit
shall show at least the lease or pooled unit line nearest the proposed location
and the nearest survey/section lines. The Division Director or the director's
delegate may approve plats with other scales upon request.
(1) - (2)
(No change.)
(3)
Requirements for plats as provided for in §3.11, §3.37, §3.38,
and §3.86 of this title
(relating to Inclination and Directional
Surveys Required, Statewide Spacing Rule, Well Densities, and Horizontal Drainhole
Wells)
may supplement or replace the plat requirements set out above.
§3.8.Water Protection.
(a) - (c)
(No change.)
(d)
Pollution control.
(1)
Prohibited disposal methods. Except for those disposal
methods authorized for certain wastes by paragraph (3) of this subsection,
subsection (e) of this section, or §3.98 of this title (relating to Standards
for Management of Hazardous Oil and Gas Waste), or disposal methods required
to be permitted pursuant to §3.9 of this title (relating to Disposal
Wells) (Rule 9) or §3.46 of this title (relating to Fluid Injection into
Productive Reservoirs) (Rule 46), no person may dispose of any oil and gas
wastes by any method without obtaining a permit to dispose of such wastes.
The disposal methods prohibited by this paragraph include, but are not limited
to, the unpermitted discharge of oil field brines, geothermal resource waters,
or other mineralized waters, or drilling fluids into any watercourse or drainageway,
including any drainage ditch, dry creek, flowing creek, river, or any other
body of surface water. [
(2) - (9)
(No change.)
(e)
(No change.)
(f)
Oil and gas waste haulers.
(1)
A person who transports oil and gas waste for hire by any
method other than by pipeline shall not haul or dispose of oil and gas waste
off a lease, unit, or other oil or gas property where it is generated unless
such transporter has qualified for and been issued an oil and gas waste hauler
permit by the commission. Hauling of inert waste, asbestos-containing material
regulated under the Clean Air Act (42 USC §§7401 et seq), polychlorinated
biphenyl (PCB) waste regulated under the Toxic Substances Control Act (15
USCA §§2601 et seq), or hazardous oil and gas waste subject to regulation
under §3.98 of this title (relating to Standards for Management of Hazardous
Oil and Gas Waste), is excluded from this subsection. This subsection is not
applicable to the hauling of oil and gas wastes for recycling. For purposes
of this subsection, injection of salt water or other oil and gas waste into
an oil and gas reservoir for purposes of enhanced recovery does not qualify
as recycling. A person who has a salt water hauler permit does not need to
apply for an oil and gas waste hauler permit until the person is scheduled
to file an application for permit renewal.
(A)
Application for an oil and gas waste hauler permit will
be made on the commission-prescribed form, and in accordance with the instructions
thereon, and must be accompanied by:
(i)
the permit application fee required by §3.78 of this
title (relating to
Fees and Financial Security Requirements
[
(ii) - (iv)
(No change.)
(B) - (C)
(No change.)
(2)
(No change.)
(g)
(No change.)
(h)
Penalties. Violations of this section may subject a person
to penalties and remedies specified in the Texas Natural Resources Code, Title
3, and any other statutes administered by the commission. The certificate
of compliance for any oil, gas, or geothermal resource well may be revoked
in the manner provided in
§3.73
[
(i)
Coordination between the Railroad Commission of Texas
and the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality or its successor agencies.
The Railroad Commission and the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
both have adopted by rule a memorandum of understanding regarding the division
of jurisdiction between the agencies over wastes that result from, or are
related to, activities associated with the exploration, development, and production
of oil, gas, or geothermal resources, and the refining of oil. The memorandum
of understanding is adopted in §3.30 of this title (relating to Memorandum
of Understanding between the Railroad Commission of Texas (RRC) and the Texas
Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ)).
[
(j)
Consistency with the Texas Coastal Management Program.
The provisions of this subsection apply only to activities that occur in the
coastal zone and that are subject to the CMP rules.
(1)
Specific Policies.
(A)
(No change.)
(B)
Discharge of Oil and Gas Waste to Surface Waters. The following
provisions apply to discharges of oil and gas waste that occur in the coastal
zone:
(i)
no discharge of oil and gas waste to surface waters may
cause a violation of the Texas Surface Water Quality Standards adopted by
the Texas
Commission on Environmental Quality or its successor agencies
[
(ii) - (iv)
(No change.)
(v)
the commission shall notify the Texas
Commission on
Environmental Quality or its successor agencies
[
(C) - (D)
(No change.)
(2) - (3)
(No change.)
§3.14.Plugging.
(a)
Definitions and application to plug.
(1)
The following words and terms, when used in this section,
shall have the following meanings, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:
(A) - (K)
(No change.)
(L)
Unbonded operator--An operator that has a current and active
organization report on file with the Commission
that filed a nonrefundable
annual fee as financial security prior to September 1, 2004, and is not required
by §3.78 of this title (relating to Fees and Financial Security Requirements)
to file an individual performance bond, blanket performance bond, letter of
credit, or cash deposit as its financial security until the first date for
annual renewal of the operator's organization report after September 1, 2004
[
(M) - (N)
(No change.)
(2)
The operator shall give the Commission notice of its intention
to plug any well or wells drilled for oil, gas, or geothermal resources or
for any other purpose over which the Commission has jurisdiction, except those
specifically addressed in
§3.100(e)(1)
[
(3) - (5)
(No change.)
(b)
Commencement of plugging operations
,
[
(1)
(No change.)
(2)
Plugging operations on each dry or inactive well shall
be commenced within a period of one year after drilling or operations cease
and shall proceed with due diligence until completed. Plugging operations
on delinquent inactive wells shall be commenced immediately unless the well
is restored to active operation. For good cause, a reasonable extension of
time in which to start the plugging operations may be granted pursuant to
the following procedures.
(A)
Plugging of inactive wells operated by unbonded operators.
During the interim period between September 1, 2004, and the first date for
annual renewal of an unbonded operator's organization report after September
1, 2004, the
[
(i)
The well and associated facilities are in compliance with
all other laws and Commission rules;
(ii)
The operator's organization report is current and active;
(iii)
The operator has, and upon request provides evidence
of, a good faith claim to a continuing right to operate the well;
and
[
(iv)
[
(I)
a fluid level test conducted within 90 days prior to the
application for a plugging extension demonstrating that any fluid in the wellbore
is at least 250 feet below the base of the deepest usable quality water stratum;
or,
(II)
a hydraulic pressure test conducted during the period
the well has been inactive and not more than four years prior to the date
of application demonstrating the mechanical integrity of the well.
(B)
Plugging of inactive wells operated by bonded operators.
An operator that maintains valid, Commission-approved financial security in
the form of an individual performance bond, blanket performance bond, letter
of credit, or cash deposit as provided in §3.78 of this title (relating
to
Fees and Financial Security Requirements
[
(i)
The well and associated facilities are in compliance with
all laws and Commission rules; and,
(ii)
The operator has, and upon request provides evidence of,
a good faith claim to a continuing right to operate the well.
(C)
Revocation or denial of plugging extension.
(i)
The Commission or its delegate may revoke a plugging extension
if the operator of the well that is the subject of the extension fails to
maintain the well and all associated facilities in compliance with Commission
rules; fails to maintain a current and accurate organizational report on file
with the Commission; fails to provide the Commission, upon request, with evidence
of a continuing good faith claim to operate the well; or fails to obtain or
maintain financial security as required by §3.78 of this title (relating
to
Fees and Financial Security Requirements
[
(ii)
If the Commission or its delegate declines to grant or
continue a plugging extension or revokes a previously granted extension, the
operator shall either return the well to active operation or, within 30 days,
plug the well or request a hearing on the matter.
(3)
[
(A)
[
(B)
[
(C)
[
(D)
[
(E)
[
[
(4) - (5)
(No change.)
(c) - (k)
(No change.)
§3.32.Gas Well Gas and Casinghead Gas Shall Be Utilized for Legal Purposes.
(a)
The following words and terms, when used in this section,
shall have the following meanings, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.
(1)
Fugitive emissions--Releases of gas from lease production,
gathering, compression, or gas plant equipment components, including emissions
from valve stems, pressure relief valves, flanges and connections, gas-operated
valves, compressor and pump seals, pumping well stuffing boxes, casing-to-casing
bradenheads subject to the provisions of §3.17 of this title (relating
to Pressure on Bradenhead [
(2) - (5)
(No change.)
(b)
Activities authorized by this section may be subject to
rules and regulations promulgated by the United States Environmental Protection
Agency under the federal Clean Air Act or the Texas
Commission on Environmental
Quality
[
(c) - (e)
(No change.)
(f)
Gas Releases in Oil and Gas Production Operations.
(1)
The following releases of gas resulting from routine oil
and gas production operations are necessary in the efficient drilling and
operation of oil and gas wells and are hereby authorized subject to the requirements
of subsection (e) of this section. The released gas shall be measured or estimated
in accordance with §3.27 of this title (relating to Gas To Be Measured
and Surface Commingling of Gas
) and reported and charged against lease
allowable production.
(A) - (E)
(No change.)
(2)
The commission or the commission's delegate may administratively
grant or renew an exception to the requirements or limitations of this subsection
subject to the requirements of subsection (h) to allow additional releases
of gas if the operator of a well or production facility presents information
to show the necessity for the release. The volume of gas that is released
must be measured or estimated in accordance with §3.27 of this title
(relating to Gas To Be Measured
and Surface Commingling of Gas
)
and reported on the appropriate commission form and shall be charged to the
operator's allowable production. Necessity for the release includes, but is
not limited to, the following situations:
(A) - (E)
(No change.)
(g)
Gas releases from gas gathering system, gas plant or gas
handling operations.
(1)
The operator of a gas gathering system, gas plant, gas
compressor facility or other gas handling equipment not directly associated
with lease production of gas, shall not intentionally allow gas to be released
for a period of more than 24 hours after the start of an upset condition.
The operator shall notify the appropriate commission district office by telephone
or facsimile as soon as reasonably possible after the release of gas begins.
The volume of gas that is released must be measured or estimated in accordance
with §3.27 of this title (relating to Gas To Be Measured
and Surface
Commingling of Gas
) and reported on the appropriate commission form.
The provisions of this subsection do not apply to accidental releases which
are subject to or reported pursuant to any other commission rule.
(2)
(No change.)
(h)
Exceptions. The commission or the commission's delegate
may administratively grant an exception authorized by this section provided
that the requirements of this subsection are met.
(1)
The request for an exception shall be accompanied by the
fee required by §3.78(b)(5) of this title (relating to
Fees and
Financial Security Requirements
[
(2) - (7)
(No change.)
(8)
One application for exception to the requirements of this
section may be filed for multiple releases from gas wells, commission-designated
oil leases, gas gathering systems, gas compressors or other gas handling facilities
when the release of gas is the result of a full or partial shut-down of a
gas gathering system, gas plant, gas compressor or other gas handling facility
under subsection (f)(1)(C) or (g)(1). Each well, lease or facility must be
clearly identified by the applicant and a single fee paid under §3.78(b)(5)
of this title (relating to
Fees and Financial Security Requirements
[
(i)
Renewal and Amendment of Exceptions.
(1) - (2)
(No change.)
(3)
An operator shall file an application and fee for renewal
of an exception with the commission 21 days prior to expiration of the existing
exception authority. The request for renewal shall be accompanied by the fee
required by §3.78(b)(5) of this title (relating to
Fees and Financial
Security Requirements
[
(4) - (6)
(No change.)
(j)
(No change.)
§3.37.Statewide Spacing Rule.
(a)
Distance requirements.
(1)
(No change.)
(2)
When an exception to this section is desired, application
shall be made by filing the proper fee as provided in §3.78 of this title
(relating to
Fees and Financial Security Requirements
[
(A) - (B)
(No change.)
(3)
(No change.)
(b) - (m)
(No change.)
§3.38.Well Densities.
(a) - (f)
(No change.)
(g)
Filing requirements.
(1)
Application. An application for permit to drill shall include
the fees required in §3.78 of this title (relating to
Fees and Financial
Security Requirements
[
(2) - (4)
(No change.)
(5)
Certifications. Certifications required under paragraphs
(3) and (4) of this subsection shall be filed on Form W-1A [
(A) - (E)
(No change.)
(h) - (i)
(No change.)
§3.57.Reclaiming Tank Bottoms, Other Hydrocarbon Wastes, and Other Waste Materials.
(a)
(No change.)
(b)
Definitions. The following words and terms, when used in
this section, shall have the following meanings, unless the context clearly
indicates otherwise.
(1)
Tank bottoms--A mixture of crude oil or lease condensate,
water, and other substances that is concentrated at the bottom of producing
lease tanks and pipeline storage tanks (commonly referred to as basic sediment
and water or BS&W
).
(2) - (5)
(No change.)
(c)
Permitting process.
(1) - (9)
(No change.)
(10)
Reclamation plants permitted under this section shall
file financial security as required under
§3.78(l)
[
(d)
Operation of a reclamation plant.
(1)
The following provisions apply to any removal of tank bottoms
or other hydrocarbon wastes from any oil producing lease tank, pipeline storage
tank, or other production facility.
(A)
Notwithstanding the provisions of
§3.85(a)(8)
[
(i) - (ii)
(No change.)
(B) - (C)
(No change.)
(2) - (3)
(No change.)
(e) - (h)
(No change.)
§3.73.Pipeline Connection; Cancellation of Certificate of Compliance; Severance.
(a) - (f)
(No change.)
(g)
If a certificate of compliance has been cancelled, the
Commission may not issue a new certificate of compliance until the owner or
operator of the property covered by the certificate of compliance submits
to the Commission a reissuance fee as required by §3.78 of this title
(relating to
Fees and Financial Security Requirements
[
(1) - (2)
(No change.)
(h) - (j)
(No change.)
§3.78. Fees and Financial Security Requirements [
(a)
Definitions. The following words and terms, when used in
this section, shall have the following meanings, unless the context clearly
indicates otherwise:
(1) - (2)
(No change.)
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
(3)
[
(A)
the facility is permitted under §3.8 of this title
(relating to Water Protection);
(B)
the facility is permitted under §3.57 of this title
(relating to Reclaiming Tank Bottoms, Other Hydrocarbon Wastes, and Other
Waste Materials);
(C)
the facility is permitted under §3.9 of this title
(relating to Disposal Wells) and a collecting pit permitted under §3.8
is located at the facility; or
(D)
the facility is permitted under §3.46 of this title
(relating to Fluid Injection into Productive Reservoirs) and a collecting
pit permitted under §3.8 is located at the facility.
(4)
[
[
(5)
[
(A)
located in or on a lake, river, stream, canal, estuary,
bayou, or other inland [
(B)
located on state lands seaward of the mean high tide line
of the Gulf of Mexico in water of a depth at mean high tide of not more than
100 feet that is sheltered from the direct action of the open seas of the
Gulf of Mexico.
(6)
[
(7)
[
(8)
[
(9)
[
(A)
on a Commission-approved form;
(B)
by and drawn on a third party bank authorized under state
or federal law to do business in Texas; and
(C)
renewed and continued in effect until the conditions of
the letter of credit have been met or its release is approved by the Commission
or its authorized delegate.
(10)
[
(A)
on a Commission-approved form;
(B)
by and drawn on a third party corporate surety authorized
under state law to issue surety bonds in Texas; and
(C)
renewed and continued in effect until the conditions of
the bond have been met or its release is approved by the Commission or its
authorized delegate.
(11)
Director--The director of
the Commission's Oil and Gas Division or the director's delegate.
(b)
Filing fees. The following filing fees are required to
be paid to the Railroad Commission.
(1) - (5)
(No change.)
[
(6)
[
(7)
[
(8)
[
(9)
[
(10)
[
(11)
[
(12)
[
(13)
[
(14)
[
(c)
(No change.)
(d)
Financial security [
(1)
an individual performance bond;
(2)
a blanket performance bond;
or
[
[
[
[
[
(3)
[
(4)
An unbonded operator that has
a current and active organization report and filed a nonrefundable annual
fee as its financial security prior to September 1, 2004, may continue to
perform operations subject to the Commission's jurisdiction with such financial
security until the first date after September 1, 2004, for annual renewal
of the operator's organization report, at which time the operator shall file
financial security as required by subsection (g) of this section.
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
(e)
[
(f)
[
[
(g)
Amount of financial security.
An operator required to file financial security under subsection (d) of this
section shall file financial security described in this subsection.
(1)
Types and amounts of financial security required.
(A)
A person operating one or more wells may file
an individual performance bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit in an amount
equal to the sum of $2.00 for each foot of total well depth for each well
operated.
(B)
A person operating one or more wells may file
a blanket bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit to cover all wells for which
a bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit is required in an amount equal to
the sum of the base amount determined by the total number of wells operated.
A person performing multiple operations shall be required to file only one
blanket bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit unless the person is operating
a commercial facility, in which case the person also shall comply with the
financial security requirements of subsection (l) of this section. The financial
security amount shall be at least the base amount determined by the total
number of wells operated or $25,000, whichever is greater. The base amount
is determined as follows:
(i)
The base amount for a person operating 10 or
fewer wells or performs other operations shall be $25,000.
(ii)
The base amount for a person operating more
than 10 but fewer than 100 wells shall be $50,000.
(iii)
The base amount for a person operating 100
or more wells shall be $250,000.
(2)
Additional financial security for bay wells.
(A)
All operators of bay wells shall file additional
financial security of no less than $60,000 in addition to any other financial
security that is required under this section for any other Commission-regulated
activities.
(B)
For each bay well that is not currently producing
oil or gas and has not produced oil or gas within the past 12 months, including
injection and disposal wells, the operator shall file additional financial
security of $60,000. An operator shall not be required to file additional
financial security in addition to the $60,000 amount set under subparagraph
(A) of this paragraph if the operator operates only a single inactive bay
well.
(C)
In the case of a bay well that has been inactive
for 12 consecutive months or longer and that is not used for disposal or injection,
the well shall remain subject to the provisions of subparagraph (B) of this
paragraph, regardless of any minimal activity, until the well has reported
production of at least 10 barrels of oil for oil wells or 100 mcf of gas for
gas wells each month for at least three consecutive months.
(3)
Additional financial security for offshore wells.
(A)
All operators of offshore wells and operators
of both bay wells and offshore wells shall file additional financial security
of no less than $100,000 in addition to any other financial security that
is required under this section for any other Commission regulated activities.
(B)
For each offshore well that is not currently
producing oil or gas and has not produced oil or gas within the past 12 months,
including injection and disposal wells, the operator shall file an additional
amount of financial security of $100,000. An operator shall not be required
to file additional financial security in addition to the $100,000 amount set
under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph if the operator operates only a single
inactive offshore well.
(C)
In the case of an offshore well that has been
inactive for 12 consecutive months or longer and that is not used for disposal
or injection, the well shall remain classified as inactive for purposes of
this section, regardless of any minimal activity, until the well has reported
production of at least 10 barrels of oil for oil wells or 100 mcf of gas for
gas wells each month for at least three consecutive months.
(4)
Reduction of the additional financial security
that is required for bay and/or offshore wells. An operator may request a
reduction of either the additional $60,000 in financial security required
for all operators of bay wells, or the additional $100,000 in financial security
required for all operators of offshore wells and operators of both bay wells
and offshore wells.
(A)
The director may administratively approve the
reduction if the operator provides documentation that it currently has acceptable
financial assurance in place to satisfy any financial assurance requirements
established by local authorities. The operator must show that the bond or
other form of financial assurance can be called on by or assigned to the Commission
under the following circumstances:
(i)
a well is likely to pollute or is polluting
any ground or surface water or is allowing the uncontrolled escape of formation
fluids from the strata in which they were originally located; or
(ii)
a well is not being maintained in compliance
with Commission rules or state law relating to plugging or the prevention
or control of pollution; or
(iii)
the operator has failed to renew and maintain
an organization report filing as required by §3.1 of this title (relating
to Organization Report; Retention of Records; Notice Requirements) and this
section.
(B)
If the director administratively denies a requested
reduction, the operator may request a hearing to determine whether the reduction
should be granted.
(5)
Reduction in additional financial security required
for bay and/or offshore wells that are not actively producing oil and natural
gas. An operator may request that Commission consider a reduction in any additional
financial security requirement for the operation of bay and/or offshore wells
that are not actively producing oil and natural gas or that are used for disposal
or injection in an amount not to exceed the remainder of 25% of the operator's
certified net worth based on the independently audited calculation for the
most recently completed fiscal year minus the Commission's estimate of the
operator's total plugging liability for all of the operator's active bay and/or
offshore wells.
(A)
The director may administratively grant a full
or partial reduction if the operator meets the following criteria:
(i)
the operator has either five or fewer bay and
offshore wells or at least half of the operator's bay and offshore wells are
actively producing oil and natural gas;
(ii)
the operator provides to the Commission certification
of its net worth from an independent auditor that has employed generally accepted
accounting principles to confirm the operator's stated net worth based on
the most recently available and independently audited calculation;
(iii)
the reduction is less than or equal to the
remainder of 25% of the operator's certified net worth minus the Commission's
estimate of the operator's total plugging liability for all of the operator's
active bay and offshore wells;
(iv)
none of the operator's wells or operations,
including any land-based wells, have been found by Commission staff to be
violating or to have violated any Commission rule that resulted in pollution
or in any hazard to the health or safety of the public in the last 12 months.
(B)
If the director administratively denies the
requested reduction, an operator may request a hearing to determine if a full
or partial reduction should be granted.
(C)
The operator may also request a hearing to challenge
the Commission's presumed estimate of the operator's plugging liability for
bay and offshore wells as applied to any additional financial security required
for any inactive bay and offshore wells. The operator shall present clear
and convincing evidence that the estimated plugging liability is less than
the amount estimated by the Commission. Notice of the hearing shall be provided
by the Commission to the owners of the surface estate and the owners of the
mineral estate for any well that is a subject of the requested hearing, and
all other affected persons as identified by the operator or otherwise required
by the Commission.
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
(6)
[
(7)
[
(8)
[
(9)
[
(h)
[
(i)
[
(j)
[
(1)
The Commission shall not approve a transfer of operatorship
submitted for any well or lease unless the operator acquiring the well or
lease has on file with the Commission [
[
[
(2)
Any existing financial security covering the well or lease
proposed for transfer shall remain in effect and the prior operator of the
well remains responsible for compliance with all laws and Commission rules
covering the transferred well until the Commission approves the transfer.
(3)
A transfer of a well or lease from one entity to another
entity under common ownership is a transfer for the purposes of this section.
[
(k)
[
(l)
[
(1)
Application.
(A)
New permits. Any application for a new or amended commercial
facility permit filed after the original effective date of this subsection
shall include:
(i)
a written estimate of the maximum dollar amount necessary
to close the facility prepared in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
(4) of this subsection that shows all assumptions and calculations used to
develop the estimate;
(ii)
a copy of the form of the bond or letter of credit that
will be filed with the Commission; and
(iii)
information concerning the issuer of the bond or letter
of credit as required under paragraph (5) of this subsection including the
issuer's name and address and evidence of authority to issue bonds or letters
of credit in Texas.
(B)
Existing permits. Within 180 days of the original effective
date of this subsection, the holder of any commercial facility permit issued
on or before the original effective date of this subsection shall file with
the Commission the information specified in subparagraph (A)(i)-(iii) of this
paragraph.
(2)
Notice and hearing.
(A)
New permits. For commercial facility permits issued after
the original effective date of this subsection, the provisions of §3.8
or §3.57 of this title (relating to Water Protection; and Reclaiming
Tank Bottoms, Other Hydrocarbon Wastes, and Other Waste Materials), as applicable,
regarding notice and opportunity for hearing, shall apply to review and approval
of financial security proposed to be filed to meet the requirements of this
subsection.
(B)
Existing permits. Notice of filing of information required
under paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection shall not be required. In the event
approval of the financial security proposed to be filed for a commercial facility
operating under a permit in effect as of the original effective date of this
subsection is denied administratively, the applicant shall have the right
to a hearing upon written request. After hearing, the examiner shall recommend
a final action by the Commission.
(3)
Filing of instrument.
(A)
New permits. A commercial facility permitted after the
original effective date of this subsection may not receive oil field fluids
or oil and gas waste until a bond or letter of credit in an amount approved
by the Commission or its delegate under this subsection and meeting the requirements
of this subsection as to form and issuer has been filed with the Commission.
(B)
Existing permits. Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, after one year from the original effective date of this section,
a commercial facility permitted on or before the original effective date of
this subsection may not continue to receive oil field fluids or oil and gas
waste unless a bond or letter of credit in an amount approved by the Commission
or its delegate under this subsection and meeting the requirements of this
subsection as to form and issuer has been filed with and approved by the Commission
or its delegate.
(C)
Extensions for existing permits. On written request and
for good cause shown, the Commission or its delegate may authorize a commercial
facility permitted before the original effective date of this subsection to
continue to receive oil field fluids or oil and gas waste after one year after
the original effective date of this section even though financial security
required under this subsection has not been filed. In the event the Commission
or its delegate has not taken final action to approve or disapprove the amount
of financial security proposed to be filed by the owner or operator under
this subsection one year after the original effective date of the section,
the period for filing financial security under this subsection is automatically
extended to a date 45 days after such final Commission action.
(4)
Amount.
(A)
Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) or (C) of this
paragraph, the amount of financial security required to be filed under this
subsection shall be an amount based on a written estimate approved by the
Commission or its delegate as being equal to or greater than the maximum amount
necessary to close the commercial facility, exclusive of plugging costs for
any well or wells at the facility, at any time during the permit term in accordance
with all applicable state laws, Commission rules and orders, and the permit,
but shall in no event be less than $10,000.
(B)
The owner or operator of one or more commercial facilities
may reduce the amount of financial security required under this subsection
for one such facility by the amount, if any, it filed as financial
security
[
(C)
Except for the facilities specifically exempted under subparagraph
(D) of this paragraph, a qualified professional engineer licensed by the State
of Texas shall prepare or supervise the preparation of a written estimate
of the maximum amount necessary to close the commercial facility as provided
in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph. The owner or operator of a commercial
facility shall submit the written estimate under seal of a qualified licensed
professional engineer to the Commission as required under paragraph (1) of
this subsection.
(D)
A facility permitted under §3.57 of this title (relating
to Reclaiming Tank Bottoms, Other Hydrocarbon Wastes, and Other Waste Materials)
that does not utilize on-site waste storage or disposal that requires a permit
under §3.8 of this title (relating to Water Protection) is exempt from
subparagraph (C) of this paragraph.
(E)
Notwithstanding the fact that the maximum amount necessary
to close the commercial facility as determined under this paragraph is exclusive
of plugging costs, the proceeds of financial security filed under this subsection
may be used by the Commission to pay the costs of plugging any well or wells
at the facility if the financial security for plugging costs filed with the
Commission is insufficient to pay for the plugging of such well or wells.
(5)
Issuer and form.
(A)
Bond. The issuer of any commercial facility bond filed
in satisfaction of the requirements of this subsection shall be a corporate
surety authorized to do business in Texas. The form of bond filed under this
subsection shall provide that the bond be renewed and continued in effect
until the conditions of the bond have been met or its release is authorized
by the Commission or its delegate.
(B)
Letter of credit. Any letter of credit filed in satisfaction
of the requirements of this subsection shall be issued by and drawn on a bank
authorized under state or federal law to operate in Texas. The letter of credit
shall be an irrevocable, standby letter of credit subject to the requirements
of Texas Business and Commerce Code, §§5.101-5.118. The letter of
credit shall provide that it will be renewed and continued in effect until
the conditions of the letter of credit have been met or its release is authorized
by the Commission or its delegate.
(m)
[
(1)
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection,
the Commission shall not accept an organization report or an application for
a permit or approve a certificate of compliance for an oil lease or gas well
submitted by an organization if:
(A)
the organization has outstanding violations; or
(B)
an officer or
owner
[
(2)
The Commission shall accept a report or application or
approve a certificate filed by an organization covered by paragraph (1) of
this subsection if:
(A)
the conditions that constituted the violation have been
corrected or are being corrected in accordance with a schedule agreed to by
the organization and the Commission;
(B)
all administrative, civil, and criminal penalties, and
all plugging and cleanup costs incurred by the state relating to those conditions
have been paid or are being paid in accordance with a schedule agreed to by
the organization and the Commission; and
(C)
the report, application or certificate is in compliance
with all other requirements of law and Commission rules.
(3)
All fees tendered in connection with a report or application
that is rejected under this subsection are nonrefundable.
§3.86.Horizontal Drainhole Wells.
(a) - (e)
(No change.)
(f)
Drilling applications and required reports.
(1)
Application. Any intent to develop a new or existing well
with horizontal drainholes must be indicated on the application to drill.
An application for a permit to drill a horizontal drainhole shall include
the fees required by Statewide Rule 78, §3.78 of this title (relating
to
Fees and Financial Security Requirements
[
(2)
Drilling unit plat. The application to drill a horizontal
drainhole shall be accompanied by a plat.
(A)
In addition to the plat requirements provided for in §3.5
of this title (relating to Application to Drill,
Deepen, Reenter, or
Plug Back
[
(i) - (vi)
(No change.)
(B)
(No change.)
(3) - (4)
(No change.)
(g)
(No change.)
§3.96.Underground Storage of Gas in Productive or Depleted Reservoirs.
(a) - (b)
(No change.)
(c)
Application. An application to operate a gas storage project
shall be filed with the commission by the owner or operator or proposed owner
or operator. The application shall include the following:
(1) - (3)
(No change.)
(4)
water protection letter--a letter from the Texas
Commission on Environmental Quality or its successor agencies
[
(5)
(No change.)
(6)
fees--the fees required under §3.78 of this title
(relating to
Fees and Financial Security Requirements
[
(d) - (e)
(No change.)
(f)
Notice and hearing.
(1) - (2)
(No change.)
(3)
Notice by publication. The applicant shall make diligent
efforts to ascertain the name and address of each person identified under
paragraph (1)(A)-(D) of this subsection. The exercise of diligent efforts
to ascertain the names and addresses of such persons shall require an examination
of county records where the facility is located and an investigation of any
other information of which the applicant has actual knowledge. If, after diligent
efforts, the applicant has been unable to ascertain the name and address of
one or more persons required to be notified under paragraph (1)(A)-(D) of
this subsection, the notice requirements for those persons are satisfied by
the publication of the notice of application as required in paragraph (2)
of
[
(4) - (5)
(No change.)
(g) - (p)
(No change.)
(q)
Penalties.
(1)
(No change.)
(2)
Certificate of compliance. The certificate of compliance
for any oil, gas, or geothermal resource well may be revoked in the manner
provided in
§3.73
[
(r)
Applicability of other commission rules.
(1)
General. The operator of a gas storage project must comply
with the requirements of
Chapters 7 and 8 of this title (relating to
Gas Services Division, and Pipeline Safety Regulations)
[
(2)
(No change.)
This agency hereby certifies that the proposal has been
reviewed by legal counsel and found to be within the agency's legal authority
to adopt.
Filed with the Office of
the Secretary of State on June 8, 2004.
TRD-200403749
Mary Ross McDonald
Managing Director
Railroad Commission of Texas
Earliest possible date of adoption: July 25, 2004
For further information, please call: (512) 475-1295
Chapter 25.
SUBSTANTIVE RULES APPLICABLE TO ELECTRIC SERVICE PROVIDERS
Subchapter O. UNBUNDLING AND MARKET POWER
5.
COMPETITION IN NON-ERCOT AREAS
16 TAC §25.421
The Public Utility Commission of Texas (commission) proposes
new §25.421, relating to the transition to competition for an area outside
of the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) region. The proposed
new rule addresses El Paso Electric Company's (EPE) readiness to offer retail
competition at the expiration of its rate freeze in August 2005 and defines
the process and the sequence of events for the introduction of retail competition
in the portions of Texas served by EPE. In this rule, if adopted as proposed,
the commission would determine, pursuant to the Public Utility Regulatory
Act, Texas Utilities Code Annotated §39.103 (Vernon 1998, Supplement
2004) (PURA), that the power region in which EPE is located is unable to offer
fair competition and reliable service to all retail customer classes in Texas;
therefore, customer choice will not commence in this area upon the expiration
of EPE's rate freeze in August 2005. The proposed rule also provides that
EPE's rates would be regulated under traditional cost-of-service regulation
until the date on which the commission authorizes EPE to implement full customer
choice. Finally, the proposed rule specifies that EPE would be subject to
the energy efficiency and renewable energy requirements set forth in PURA §39.904-.905,
beginning in 2006. Project Number 28971 is assigned to this proceeding.
The commission's proposal to determine that the power region in which EPE
is located is unable to offer fair competition and reliable service to all
retail customer classes in Texas is based on its experience in introducing
retail competition in the ERCOT region, its attempts to introduce retail competition
in other regions in Texas, and the characteristics of the El Paso region.
The commission's successful efforts to establish retail competition in ERCOT
began after the passage of Senate Bill 7 in 1999. In order to transition to
retail competition in accordance with the statutory timelines of PURA, the
commission and the market participants engaged in various proceedings to restructure
the existing electric utilities, develop protocols for the market, and establish
ERCOT as an independent regional transmission operator. These steps were completed
before the commission opened a pilot project in ERCOT and determined that
the market was ready for retail competition. These necessary preliminary steps
have not been taken in EPE's territory because EPE was exempted from participation
in such processes prior to the expiration of its rate freeze and because the
establishment of a regional transmission organization is subject to voluntary
action by other utilities in the Southwestern United States and regulatory
approval of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Because of the lack
of proper preparation, the commission believes that it is not feasible to
open a pilot project immediately upon the expiration of EPE's rate freeze.
Instead, the commission proposes to require that the necessary preliminary
steps be taken before opening the pilot or proceeding to subsequent steps
on the path to retail competition.
The commission's proposed determination that the EPE region is not able
to offer fair competition and reliable service to all retail customer classes
in Texas is supported by the commission's experience in attempting to establish
retail competition in other areas of Texas outside the ERCOT service area.
The commission conducted pilot programs for retail competition in the non-ERCOT
service areas of Entergy Gulf States, Southwestern Public Service Company
(SPS), and Southwestern Electric Power Company (SWEPCO). In two of these areas,
no retail electric providers (REPs) offered service during the pilot projects,
and no customers switched their service from the utility to a REP. As a result,
the commission delayed the beginning of retail competition in the Entergy
and SWEPCO areas, and the legislature enacted a law to delay competition in
the SPS area. Recently, a single REP served a small number of commercial customers
under the Entergy pilot project, but it has discontinued its service to these
customers.
One of the key elements of the legislation that calls for the introduction
of retail competition in Texas is an independent organization to provide transmission
service, ensure reliability, and settle wholesale accounts. In general, independent
organizations have not developed in the non- ERCOT areas of Texas, and today
there is no independent organization in the Entergy or El Paso areas. (The
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has recently conditionally approved the
Southwest Power Pool as a regional transmission organization that could meet
the criteria for an independent organization in the SWEPCO and SPS service
territories.)
Other factors that lead the commission to propose a determination that
the power region in which EPE is located is unable to offer fair competition
and reliable service to all retail customer classes in Texas are the characteristics
of the El Paso region. These characteristics include the fact that the area
represents a small market that is isolated geographically from other large
markets in the western electric system, and that the local generation supply
is dominated by a single company, EPE. These factors should be addressed before
retail competition begins in the El Paso region. The commission is seeking
comments on whether the proposed determination should be adopted, and urges
interested persons to provide comments on the prospects for providing reliable,
reasonable-cost service, if retail competition were to be instituted in the
region.
The new section, if adopted, will establish an orderly transition to full
customer choice in EPE's service area. The sequence set forth in this rule
would be based upon completing the listed items in each stage before the next
stage is initiated. A pilot project would begin after a regional transmission
organization is established for the region and retail market protocols are
developed to facilitate retail competition. Full retail competition would
begin after a number of other actions are completed, as contemplated by Senate
Bill 7, Act of May 27, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., Ch. 405, §39, 1999 Tex.
Gen. Laws 2558.
Jess Totten, Director, Electric Division has determined that for each year
of the first five-year period the proposed section is in effect there will
be no fiscal implications for state or local government as a result of enforcing
or administering the section.
Mr. Totten has determined that for each year of the first five years the
proposed section is in effect the public benefit anticipated as a result of
enforcing the section will be increased certainty with respect to utility
rates and service and the transition to competition in EPE's service area.
There will be no adverse economic effect on small businesses or micro-businesses
as a result of enforcing this section. There is no anticipated economic cost
to persons who are required to comply with the section as proposed. The introduction
of retail competition requires a regulated utility to undertake a number of
organizational changes and regulatory activities that may have an economic
cost. The proposed rule would sequence these activities in a way that is logical
and that should help avoid unnecessary costs. The proposed rule would not
impose additional costs on the regulated utility.
Mr. Totten has also determined that for each year of the first five years
the proposed section is in effect there should be no effect on a local economy,
and therefore no local employment impact statement is required under Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), Texas Government Code §2001.022.
The commission staff will conduct a public hearing on this rulemaking,
if requested pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, Texas Government
Code §2001.029, at the commission's offices located in the William B.
Travis Building, 1701 North Congress Avenue, Austin, Texas 78701 on Tuesday,
August 24, 2004, at 10:00 a.m. The request for a public hearing must be received
within 31 days after publication of this proposed rule.
Comments on the proposed new section (16 copies) may be submitted to the
Filing Clerk, Public Utility Commission of Texas, 1701 North Congress Avenue,
P.O. Box 13326, Austin, Texas 78711-3326, within 31 days after publication.
Reply comments may be submitted within 45 days after publication. Comments
should be organized in a manner consistent with the organization of the proposed
rule. The commission invites specific comments regarding the costs associated
with, and benefits that will be gained by, implementation of the proposed
section. The commission will consider the costs and benefits in deciding whether
to adopt the section. All comments should refer to Project Number 28971.
When commenting on specific subsections of the proposed rule, parties are
encouraged to describe "best practice" examples of regulatory policies, and
their rationale, that have been proposed or implemented successfully in other
states already undergoing electric industry restructuring, if the parties
believe that Texas would benefit from application of the same policies. The
commission is interested in receiving only "leading edge" examples that are
specifically related and directly applicable to the Texas statute, rather
than broad citations to other state restructuring efforts.
This new section is proposed under the Public Utility Regulatory
Act, Texas Utilities Code Annotated §14.002, which provides the Public
Utility Commission with the authority to make and enforce rules reasonably
required in the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction; and specifically,
PURA §39.051, which requires an electric utility to separate its business
functions prior to the introduction of retail competition; PURA §39.102,
which specifies that at the expiration of EPE's system wide rate freeze, the
utility shall be subject to PURA Chapter 39, relating to restructuring of
the electric utility industry; PURA §39.103, which grants the commission
authority to delay competition if a power region cannot offer fair competition
and reliable service to all retail customer classes; PURA §39.104, which
addresses the retail competition pilot projects; PURA §39.152 and §39.154,
which grant the commission authority to certify a power region and to evaluate
market power; PURA §39.201, which addresses unbundled cost-of-service
rates; PURA §39.202, which establishes the price-to-beat obligation for
affiliated retail electric providers prescribe; and PURA §39.904 and §39.905,
which address the state goals for renewable energy development and energy
efficiency.
Cross Reference to Statutes: Public Utility Regulatory Act §§14.002,
39.051, 39.102, 39.103, 39.104, 39.152, 39.153, 39.154, 39.201, 39.202, 39.904
and 39.905.
§25.421.Transition to Competition for Certain Area Outside the Electric Reliability Council of Texas Region.
(a)
Purpose. The purpose of this section is to address the
process and the sequence of events for the introduction of retail competition
in the portions of Texas served by El Paso Electric Company (EPE).
(b)
Application. This section shall apply to an electric utility
that is subject to Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) §39.102(c), namely
EPE.
(c)
Readiness for retail competition. The commission determines
that the power region in which EPE is located will be unable to offer fair
competition and reliable service to all retail customer classes in Texas upon
the expiration of its system-wide rate freeze period in August 2005. Therefore,
pursuant to PURA §39.103, the introduction of retail competition for
the portions of the power region in Texas is delayed until this region can
offer fair competition and reliable service to all retail customer classes.
(d)
Cost-of-service regulation. Until the date on which EPE
is authorized by the commission to implement retail competition pursuant to
this section, its rates are subject to regulation under Chapter 36 of PURA.
(e)
Transition to competition. The sequence of events set forth
in paragraphs (1) through (5) of this subsection shall be followed to introduce
retail competition in EPE's service territory. All the listed items in each
stage must be completed before the next stage is initiated. Unless stated
otherwise in the rule, each of the activities will be conducted by the commission
in conjunction with EPE and other interested parties. Full retail competition
will not begin in EPE's service territory until completion of the fifth stage.
(1)
The first stage consists of the following activities:
(A)
Develop and obtain approval of a regional transmission
organization for the EPE region by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
and commence independent operation of transmission network under the approved
regional transmission organization.
(B)
Develop retail market protocols to facilitate retail competition.
(C)
Complete an expedited proceeding to develop non-bypassable
delivery rates for the customer choice pilot project to be implemented under
paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection.
(2)
The second stage consists of the following activities:
(A)
Initiate the customer choice pilot project pursuant to
PURA §39.104 and §25.431 of this title (relating to Retail Competition
Pilot Projects).
(B)
Develop a balancing energy market, market for ancillary
services, and market-based congestion management system for the wholesale
market in the region in which the regional transmission organization operates.
(C)
Implement a seams agreement with adjacent power regions
to reduce barriers to entry and facilitate competition.
(3)
The third stage consists of the following activities:
(A)
EPE shall:
(i)
Prepare and file with the commission an application for
business separation pursuant to PURA §39.051 and §25.342 of this
title (relating to Electric Business Separation);
(ii)
Prepare and file with the commission an application for
unbundled transmission and distribution rates pursuant to PURA §39.201
and §25.344 of this title (relating to Cost Separation Proceedings);
(iii)
Prepare and file with the commission an application for
certification of a qualified power region pursuant to PURA §39.152; and
(iv)
Prepare and file with the commission an application for
price-to-beat rates pursuant to PURA §39.202 and §25.41 of this
title (relating to Price to Beat).
(B)
The activities to be completed by the commission in the
third stage are to:
(i)
Approve a business separation plan;
(ii)
Set unbundled transmission and distribution rates;
(iii)
Certify a qualified power region, which includes conducting
a formal evaluation of wholesale market power in the region, pursuant to PURA §39.152;
(iv)
Set price-to-beat rates for EPE; and
(v)
Determine which competitive energy services must be separated
from regulated utility activities pursuant to PURA §39.051 and §25.343
of this title (relating to Competitive Energy Services).
(C)
The activities to be completed by the regional transmission
organization, the statewide registration agent and market participants in
the third stage are testing of retail and wholesale systems, including those
systems necessary for switching customers to the retail electric provider
of their choice and for settlement of wholesale market transactions.
(4)
The fourth stage consists of the following activities:
(A)
The commission shall evaluate the results of the pilot
project pursuant to §25.431 of this title.
(B)
EPE shall initiate capacity auction pursuant to PURA §39.153
and §25.381 of this title (relating to Capacity Auctions) at a time
to be determined by the commission.
(C)
EPE shall separate competitive energy services from its
regulated utility activities, in accordance with the commission order approving
the separation of competitive energy services.
(D)
EPE shall complete the business separation and unbundling,
in accordance with the commission order approving the unbundling.
(5)
The fifth stage consists of the commission evaluating whether
the power region can offer fair competition and reliable service to all retail
customer classes. If the commission concludes that the power region can offer
fair competition and reliable service to all retail customer classes, it shall
issue an order initiating retail competition.
(f)
Applicability of energy efficiency and renewable energy
requirements. No later than January 1, 2006, EPE shall be subject to the energy
efficiency requirements under PURA §39.905 and §25.181 of this title
(relating to Energy Efficiency Goal) and the renewable energy credit requirements
under PURA §39.904 and §25.173 of this title (relating to Goal for
Renewable Energy).
(1)
EPE shall begin administering the energy efficiency programs
prescribed in §25.181 of this title no later than January 1, 2006. EPE
shall meet, at a minimum, 5.0% of its growth in demand through energy efficiency
savings resulting from these programs by January 1, 2007 and 10% of its growth
in demand by January 1, 2008, and each year thereafter.
(2)
EPE shall obtain, at a minimum, renewable energy credits
in an amount sufficient to meet the requirements for the compliance period
beginning January 1, 2006, and for each compliance period thereafter.
(g)
Applicability of other rules. This section governs the
implementation of PURA Chapter 39 requirements as applied to EPE. If there
is an inconsistency or conflict between this section and other rules in this
Chapter (relating to Substantive Rules Applicable to Electric Service Providers),
the provisions of this section shall control.
(h)
Good cause. Upon a finding of good cause, as determined
by the commission, the sequence for retail competition set forth in subsection
(e) of this section may be modified by commission order.
This agency hereby certifies that the proposal has been reviewed
by legal counsel and found to be within the agency's legal authority to adopt.
Filed with the Office of
the Secretary of State on June 10, 2004.
TRD-200403829
Adriana Gonzales
Rules Coordinator
Public Utility Commission of Texas
Earliest possible date of adoption: July 25, 2004
For further information, please call: (512) 936-7223
16 TAC §25.502
The Public Utility Commission of Texas (commission) proposes
new §25.502, relating to Pricing Safeguards in Markets Operated by the
Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). The rule will establish mitigation
procedures to prevent market abuse when prices cannot be determined by the
normal forces of competition, establish disclosure requirements for certain
energy and capacity offers by suppliers, establish limits on congestion revenue
right (CRR) holdings, and establish an ERCOT Independent Market Monitor. Project
Number 27917 is assigned to this proceeding.
Many of the issues that this rule addresses are also discussed in the Market
Mitigation White Paper approved by the ERCOT Board of Directors on May 18,
2004. This white paper, one of 24 pertaining to various aspects of the new
ERCOT wholesale market design required under §25.501, is the result of
deliberations by ERCOT stakeholders participating in the Texas Nodal Team
(TNT) process. Commission Staff has used the white paper as a starting point
for this rule. Nevertheless, there are differences between the proposed rule
and the white paper that reflect serious concerns on the part of Staff. The
commission invites comment on these differences. Comments should address the
substance of how a given problem should be addressed and should avoid relying
solely on the fact that the white paper reflects compromises made by stakeholders.
Issue 1: System-Wide Price Safeguards
Subsection (i) is intended to place a reasonable constraint on prices when
the market is not competitive system-wide and prices cannot be determined
by the normal forces of competition. In particular, it would preclude a pivotal
supplier or "hockey stick offer" from setting any clearing price. "Hockey
stick pricing" is when a supplier prices most of its offer competitively,
but prices a small, economically expendable portion exorbitantly high. The
basic mechanism included in subsection (h), referred to as the Competitive
Solution Method (CSM), was developed by Staff and first proposed in Docket
Number 24770,
Report of the Electric Reliability
Council of Texas (ERCOT) to the PUCT regarding Implementation of the ERCOT
Protocols
. In that docket, the commission approved a limited form of
CSM for quick implementation, and decided to defer further consideration of
CSM to a rulemaking, such as this one, dealing more broadly with market failure
mitigation. See Docket Number 24770, Order (August 22, 2003), pages 26-27.
While CSM is designed to be automatic, the ERCOT white paper addresses hockey
stick pricing by relying on the independent market monitor to identify and
remove hockey stick offers on an ad hoc basis prior to market clearing. Another
difference is that CSM automatically mitigates the influence of suppliers
who are pivotal on a system-wide basis, while the ERCOT white paper does not.
Please compare the automatic mitigation contained in the rule to the ad hoc
mitigation in the white paper as well as practices in other markets (for example,
New York's Automatic Mitigation Procedure), and explain why one is preferable
over the others.
Issue 2: Offers Priced Above System-wide Cap
The system-wide mitigation approved by the commission in Docket Number
24770 allows mitigated offers to be paid at their offer price if selected,
but prevents them from setting any market clearing price. By contrast, the
proposed rule would preserve such treatment only for loads acting as resources,
and would pay all other offers at the greater of the system-wide offer cap
or their verifiable costs. An alternative approach would be to adopt the offer
cap contained in the TNT Market Mitigation White Paper, which is intended
to address local market power only. The TNT approach for mitigating local
market power would cap offers at the greater of verifiable costs plus an adder
based on the unit's historical capacity factor, or a general fixed heat rate
equivalent. If the system-wide offer cap in subsection (i) is ultimately adopted
by the commission, what is the best way to treat offers that are priced above
that cap?
Issue 3: Congestion Revenue Rights
Market participants that own both resources and CRRs under certain circumstances
can use the combination to enhance profits associated with causing congestion.
The white paper directs the market monitor to review the interaction between
ownership of CRRs and generation and take the appropriate remedial action,
but imposes no pre-determined ownership limits. Subsection (k) of the proposed
rule presents a specific, pre-determined approach to CRR holdings consistent
with the general guidelines mentioned in the white paper, except that it establishes
certain limitations on CRR holdings. Please compare the specific, pre-determined
approach to CRR holdings in the rule to the ad hoc approach in the white paper,
and explain why one is preferable over the other.
Issue 4: Disclosure of Resources with High Offer
Prices
Under the current market, ERCOT posts a list of all market participants
who submit offers priced above $300 per megawatt-hour (MWh) for balancing
energy service and $300 per megawatt per hour (MW/h) in the case of ancillary
capacity services. The list is posted the following operating day. Subsection
(d) of the rule continues this disclosure in the new market. In addition,
any offer above $300 that actually causes a price to clear above $300 would
also be identified as a price setter. Is extending the current disclosure
practice an appropriate deterrent to hockey stick pricing?
Issue 5: Safe Harbor
Subsection (j) would provide market participants with a limited safe harbor
against enforcement actions dealing with certain kinds of market power abuse.
Please comment on the appropriateness and effectiveness of such a safe harbor.
Issue 6: Disgorgement of Windfall
Subsection (f) establishes a means by which the commission can correct
any misallocation of costs or payments caused by flaws in ERCOT procedures.
Please comment on the appropriateness of this subsection.
Issue 7: Reliability Must Run (RMR) Resources
Subsection (g) is intended to ensure that a generation resource that ERCOT
has determined is required for reliability remains in operation. In addition,
it is intended to provide an orderly process to resolve a dispute between
the supplier and ERCOT that prevent the signing of an RMR agreement. Finally,
it is intended to ensure that the supplier receives reasonable compensation
for providing RMR service. This issue was discussed in ERCOT's RMR Task Force
and Protocol Revision Subcommittee in the context of Protocol Revision Request
507, but no consensus was achieved. A generation resource that ERCOT has determined
is required for reliability has market power, because ERCOT must take the
steps that are necessary to ensure that the generation resource remains in
operation. This situation gives the generation resource owner bargaining power
to demand excessive compensation from ERCOT to provide RMR service. Consequently,
price protections are needed. The commission is addressing this issue at this
time because ensuring that reliability is maintained is essential; addressing
the issue involves the creation of wholesale price protections, which is the
primary subject of this rule; the proposed subsection involves action taken
by the commission; and there is considerable disagreement among Staff and
a number of stakeholders concerning resolution of the issue. Please comment
on the appropriateness of this subsection.
In addition to the provisions mentioned in the foregoing questions, subsection
(g) deals with mitigating local market power. In the TNT discussions, stakeholders
studied a methodology to distinguish competitive and non-competitive constraints.
Local market power would be mitigated in part by simulating the power flow
of the system without enforcing non-competitive constraints, and using the
results of the simulation to determine reference prices. Many stakeholders
indicated that they wanted to see the formula for measuring local competitiveness
applied to a large sample of ERCOT transmission elements. Due its computational
intensity, this analysis was not completed prior to the time TNT took a final
vote on its market mitigation white paper. Stakeholders directed a task force
to continue the analysis, and subsection (g) allows for the completion of
this analysis. The subsection sets forth principles for guiding the development
of local market power mitigation, and requires that any methodology must be
explicitly approved by the commission.
Subsection (h) establishes an Independent Market Monitor (IMM) who would
be accountable to the independent members of the ERCOT Board of Directors.
The subsection describes how the IMM would coordinate activities with the
commission's Market Oversight and Legal and Enforcement Divisions.
When commenting on specific subsections of the proposed rule, parties are
encouraged to describe "best practice" examples of regulatory policies, and
their rationale, that have been proposed or implemented successfully in other
states already undergoing electric industry restructuring, if the parties
believe that Texas would benefit from application of the same policies. The
commission is only interested in receiving "leading edge" examples which are
specifically related and directly applicable to the Texas statute, rather
than broad citations to other state restructuring efforts.
Dr. David Hurlbut, Senior Economist in the commission's Market Oversight
Division (MOD), has analyzed the effects of the rule. Dr. Hurlbut has determined
that the effects of the rule will largely begin with the start of the new
ERCOT wholesale market design, which §25.501 requires ERCOT to implement
by October 1, 2006. For the first years following that date and beyond, the
public benefit expected as a result of adoption of the rule will be to reduce
inefficient and unreasonable wealth transfers from electricity customers to
electricity suppliers. The inefficiencies addressed by this rule arise when
wholesale prices in markets operated by ERCOT in the ERCOT power region are
not determined by the normal forces of competition, due to reasons such as
market power, limited supply margins, and defects in ERCOT procedures, combined
with the highly inelastic demand in these markets (i.e., when there is market
failure).
The consequences of market failure - and, conversely, the public benefit
of mitigating market failure - are difficult to quantify with accuracy, but
history can offer some guidance. In late February 2003, an extreme weather
event in the ERCOT power region caused demand for electricity and natural
gas to rise suddenly, while at the same time natural gas scarcity reduced
the supply of electric generation available to meet the inelastic demand.
Prices naturally rise under such conditions, but the presence of a one-megawatt
"hockey stick" balancing energy offer caused balancing energy prices to clear
$500 to $700 per megawatt-hour higher than where they would have cleared had
that one megawatt not been present. In its reports on the February 2003 extreme
weather event, the commission's MOD estimated that the hockey stick offer
added $17 million to the cost of balancing energy, and another $20 million
to the cost of ancillary service capacity. (Additional costs such as increased
credit requirements for retail electric providers were not quantified.) Clearing
prices set by hockey stick offers produce unreasonable clearing prices. Consequently,
a plausible minimum estimate of the expected benefit accruing from subsection
(h) of the rule is at least $37 million whenever an extreme weather event
or some other emergency compromises system reliability and requires the deployment
of all available resources.
Another incident occurred in 2002, when a pivotal supplier was able to
set the clearing price for Non-Spinning Reserve Service at $999 per megawatt
per hour for a 12-hour period on April 30. Dr. Hurlbut estimates that CSM
would have mitigated the price to around $225 per megawatt - still higher
than the $70 per megawatt ERCOT was paying for spinning reserves at that same
time, but reasonable relative to how non-pivotal suppliers were pricing their
offers. The difference between the actual clearing price of $999 per megawatt
and the $225 per megawatt that would have resulted under CSM equates to more
than $6 million for that one-day incident.
Consequently, a plausible firm estimate of the benefits of applying CSM
as described in subsection (h) is between $6 million and $37 million per year.
This is a conservative estimate, using the actual direct costs associated
with historical events of 2002 and 2003, the first two full years that ERCOT
operated as a single control area. It assumes only one extraordinary event
occurring per year, and does not take into account any indirect costs. In
the extreme, however, the consequences of having no working price safeguards
could reach into the billions, as demonstrated by the California electricity
crisis of 2000.
The costs of implementing the system-wide offer cap are very small relative
to the potential benefits. In Docket Number 24770, ERCOT estimated that the
implementation costs for the current balancing energy market would be around
$100,000. The implementation cost in the new nodal market (which will require
new support software for most market operations) should be less than that
amount, because it is generally less expensive to including functionality
into software at the time the system is designed than it is to add the functionality
later.
Another source of public benefit is the mitigation of local market power
provided for by subsection (g). One of the expected benefits of the nodal
market design required by §25.501 is reduced congestion management costs.
This benefit arises in part from the efficiency gains caused by dispatching
the most economical resources based on competitive offer prices. System conditions
may be such that a resource does not have to be priced competitively in order
to be selected, however. Transmission constraints may mean that one supplier
is pivotal (i.e., the supplier is so large that without it, remaining supply
would not be enough to meet demand) with respect to delivering electricity
to a particular location. Without local market power mitigation, pivotal suppliers
could routinely be selected at offer prices at the $1,000 MWh or MW/h offer
cap that the commission previously established in Docket Numbers 23220 and
24770. A plausible minimum estimate of the public benefit of mitigating local
market power is about $40 million per year; this is the amount of additional
energy payments (specifically, incremental out- of-merit energy payments)
generators could have received to resolve local congestion in 2003 had they
been able, as a result of local market power, to double the prices on which
their congestion payments were based. Such localized price increases would
be possible in a nodal or zonal market without local market power mitigation.
The cost of managing local congestion under the current zonal ERCOT market
design was $174 million in 2002 and $246 million in 2003. Nodal pricing
The benefits of subsection (d) mirror those of subsections (h) and (i),
to the extent that transparency provides a psychological deterrent to the
same harm that would be mitigated by subsections (h) and (i). Subsection (f)
facilitates the commission's ability to correct any misallocation of revenue
due to flaws in ERCOT procedures.
With respect to subsection (e), pertaining to control of resources, the
primary benefit will be to facilitate accurate implementation of subsections
(h) and (i) as well as any other ERCOT protocol pertaining to resource control.
Staff expects no significant cost for compliance with this subsection, as
the burden is placed on entities already responsible for providing ERCOT with
information on the resources they represent.
With respect to subsection (g), pertaining to reliability must-run (RMR)
resources, the public benefit will be consistent reliability of the electricity
grid. RMR resources, which otherwise would be shut down permanently, are retained
by ERCOT under special contracts to address specific contingency situations
(e.g., prevention of overload or voltage instability in the event of a line
outage that would result in local blackouts in the absence of the RMR resources).
Subsection (g) would simultaneously ensure consistent reliability and ensure
that customers would not over-pay for such reliability.
For the new nodal market, §25.501(j) states: "ERCOT shall apply pricing
safeguards to protect against market failure, including market power abuse,
consistent with direction provided by the commission." In addition, in proposing §25.501,
the commission estimated the public costs of that rule, including the cost
resulting from §25.501(j). Section 25.502 constitutes direction provided
by the commission as contemplated by §25.501(j). Consequently, Dr. Hurlbut
has determined that §25.502 will not impose significant new incremental
economic costs on persons required to comply with the rule.
Dr. Hurlbut has determined that the economic effects on small businesses
or micro- businesses as a result of the rule will not be proportionately larger
than impacts to the largest businesses in any systematic way, using cost for
each $100 of sales of electricity as the standard. Some retail electric providers
(REPs) and power generation companies (PGCs) in ERCOT may be micro-businesses
or small businesses. REPs will benefit from the lower cost of wholesale electricity
resulting from the rule, while PGCs will not benefit from the rule because
they will not obtain profits from market failure that is mitigated by the
rule.
ERCOT's costs of implementing the rule (which as discussed previously are
in fact costs associated with implementing §25.501) will be passed on
to market participants, who will likely be able to pass the costs along to
their customers, because market participants will be affected by ERCOT's cost
increase in a similar way. In addition, reducing the effect of the rule on
small businesses or micro-businesses would not be legal and feasible, because
it would inappropriate to allow PGCs that are small businesses or micro-businesses
to keep profits from market failure that is mitigated by the rule.
Dr. Hurlbut has determined that the rule will not have a direct effect
on a local economy, including for each of the first five years that the rule
will be in effect. However, the rule may have indirect effects. The indirect
effects will be positive, because the rule will indirectly lower the cost
of retail electric service throughout the ERCOT power region.
Dr. Hurlbut states that, generally, for the state and for local governments
for each of the first five years that the rule will be in effect: there is
no additional estimated direct cost expected as a result of enforcing or administering
the rule; there is no estimated direct loss or increase in revenue as a result
of enforcing or administering the rule; and enforcing or administering the
rule does not have foreseeable direct implications relating to cost or revenues.
Administering this proposed rule is expected to reduce the staff time required
by the commission to pursue enforcement actions, as many opportunities for
abuse and consequences of market failure will be mitigated automatically.
The effect of the rule on the state will be that the commission will administer
and enforce the rule using existing resources. There will be no direct effects
of the rule on local governments, other than as market participants.
Initial comments on the rule (16 copies) may be submitted to the Filing
Clerk, Public Utility Commission of Texas, 1701 North Congress Avenue, P.O.
Box 13326, Austin, Texas 78711- 3326, within 30 days after publication. Reply
comments may be submitted within 45 days after publication. Comments should
be organized in a manner consistent with the organization of the rule. The
commission invites specific comments regarding the costs associated with,
and benefits that will be gained by, implementation of the rule. The commission
will consider the costs and benefits in deciding whether to adopt the rule.
All comments should refer to Project Number 27917.
Requests for a public hearing on this rulemaking under the Administrative
Procedure Act, Texas Government Code §2001.029 should be submitted by
the deadline for initial comments. If requested, the commission staff will
conduct a public hearing at the commission's offices, located in the William
B. Travis Building, 1701 North Congress Avenue, Austin, Texas 78701. The tentative
date for a hearing, if requested, is Monday, August 2, 2004 at 9:30 p.m.
This rule is proposed under the Public Utility Regulatory Act,
Texas Utilities Code Annotated §14.002 (Vernon 1998, Supplement 2004)
(PURA), which provides the commission with the authority to adopt and enforce
rules reasonably required in the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction; §35.004(e),
which requires that the commission ensure that ancillary services necessary
to facilitate the transmission of electric energy are available at reasonable
prices with terms and conditions that are not unreasonably preferential, prejudicial,
discriminatory, predatory, or anticompetitive; §39.001(d), which requires
the commission to order competitive rather than regulatory methods to achieve
the goals of PURA Chapter 39 to the greatest extent feasible; §39.151(a)(1),
which requires that ERCOT ensure access to the transmission and distribution
systems for all buyers and sellers of electricity on nondiscriminatory terms; §39.151(a)(2),
which requires that ERCOT ensure the reliability and adequacy of the regional
electrical network; §39.151(a)(4), which requires that ERCOT ensure that
electricity production and delivery are accurately accounted for among generators
and wholesale buyers in the ERCOT power region; §39.151(c), under which
the commission certified ERCOT to perform the functions prescribed by §39.151
for the ERCOT power region; §39.151(d), which requires ERCOT to establish
and enforce procedures, consistent with PURA and the commission's rules, relating
to the reliability of the regional electrical network and accounting for the
production and delivery of electricity among generators and all other market
participants, and which makes these ERCOT procedures subject to commission
oversight and review; §39.151(i), which permits the commission to delegate
authority to ERCOT to enforce operating standards within the ERCOT regional
electrical network and to establish and oversee transaction settlement procedures,
and which permits the commission to establish the terms and conditions for
ERCOT's authority to oversee utility dispatch functions after the introduction
of customer choice; and §39.151(j), which requires a retail electric
provider, municipally owned utility, electric cooperative, power marketer,
transmission and distribution utility, or power generation company to observe
all scheduling, operating, planning, reliability, and settlement policies,
rules, guidelines, and procedures established by ERCOT.
Cross Reference to Statutes: PURA §§14.002, 35.004(e), 39.001(d),
and 39.151.
§25.502.Pricing Safeguards in Markets Operated by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas.
(a)
Purpose. The purpose of this section is to protect the
public from harm when wholesale electricity prices in markets operated by
the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) in the ERCOT power region
are not determined by the normal forces of competition.
(b)
Applicability. This section applies to any entity that
buys or sells energy, capacity, or any other wholesale electric service in
a market operated by ERCOT in the ERCOT power region; any agent that represents
such an entity in such activities; and ERCOT. Entities shall not circumvent
the applicability of this section's requirements through agreements or other
forms of cooperation.
(c)
Definitions. The following terms, when used in this section,
shall have the following meanings, unless the context indicates otherwise.
(1)
Competitive constraint--A transmission element on which
no supplier possesses local market power with respect to the price of electricity.
Prices on a competitive constraint are moderated by the normal forces of competition
between multiple, unaffiliated resources.
(2)
Competitive offers--Offers submitted by suppliers who are
not pivotal or by a pivotal supplier whose offers account for less than 5.0%
of the total offers.
(3)
95th percentile price--The price at which 95% of the total
competitive offer quantity would be paid at or above its offer price.
(4)
Noncompetitive constraint--A transmission element on which
a supplier possesses local market power with respect to the price of electricity.
Prices on a noncompetitive constraint are not moderated by the normal forces
of competition between multiple, unaffiliated resources.
(5)
Pivotal supplier--A supplier and its affiliates from which
ERCOT must purchase at least a part of its offer in order to meet the demand
for the service.
(d)
Disclosure of offer prices. No later than 8:00 a.m. on
the market day following each market day, ERCOT shall publish on its market
information system
(1)
the identities of all resources and virtual offers for
which the energy offer price was $300 per megawatt-hour (MWh) or higher, or
the capacity offer price was $300 per megawatt per hour (MW/h) or higher,
and the corresponding market intervals;
(2)
the identity of a resource or virtual offer that sets a
price for energy above $300/MWh (along with the corresponding market interval
and the corresponding nodes) and the identity of any resource or virtual offer
that sets a price for capacity above $300/MW/h (along with the corresponding
market interval); and
(3)
The identity of any resource that is paid more than the
system-wide offer cap described in subsection (i)(2) of this section, in accordance
with subsection (i)(3) of this section.
(e)
Control of resources. An entity responsible for scheduling
resources with ERCOT shall inform ERCOT as to who controls each resource it
schedules, and provide proof that is sufficient for ERCOT to verify control.
In addition, an entity responsible for scheduling resources with ERCOT shall
notify ERCOT of any change in control of a resource that it schedules no later
than 14 days prior to the date that the change in control takes effect. For
purposes of this section, "control" means ultimate decision-making authority
over how a resource is scheduled, either by virtue of ownership or agreement.
A controlling entity has a substantial financial stake in the resource's profitable
operation. Any resource or specified portion of a resource shall be considered
to have only one controlling entity. Resources under common control shall
be considered affiliated.
(f)
Refund or surcharge due to flaw in procedures. If the commission
determines that a payment, or lack of payment, made by ERCOT in a wholesale
electric service market operated by ERCOT was a result of a flaw in ERCOT's
procedures, either directly or indirectly as a consequence of its effect on
market participant behavior, the commission shall require ERCOT to refund
or surcharge the under or over collected payments. The deadline to initiate
a proceeding under this subsection is one year from the market day giving
rise to the payment or lack of payment at issue.
(g)
Reliability must run resources. Except for the occurrence
of a forced outage, a supplier must notify ERCOT in writing no later than
90 days prior to the date on which it intends to cease or suspend operation
of a generation resource for a period of greater than 180 days. In addition,
a supplier shall not transfer a generation resource to an entity that does
not have a resource entity agreement with ERCOT, unless ERCOT has determined
that the generation resource is not required for ERCOT reliability. A supplier
shall not terminate its resource entity agreement with ERCOT if ERCOT has
determined that its generation resource is required for ERCOT reliability.
If, after 90 days following ERCOT's receipt of the supplier's notice, ERCOT
and the supplier have not finalized a reliability must run (RMR) agreement
for a generation resource that ERCOT has determined is required for ERCOT
reliability, then the supplier may file a complaint with the commission against
ERCOT, pursuant to §22.251 of this title (relating to Review of Electric
Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) conduct). Pursuant to §22.251(d),
absent a showing of good cause to the commission to justify a later deadline,
the supplier's deadline to file the complaint is 35 days after the 90th day
following ERCOT's receipt of the notice. If the supplier files such a complaint,
the compensation ordered by the commission shall be effective the 91st day
after ERCOT's receipt of the notice. If the supplier does not file a complaint
with the commission, the supplier shall be deemed to have accepted ERCOT's
most recent offer as of the 115th day after ERCOT's receipt of the notice.
Until ERCOT and the supplier finalize an RMR agreement or, as a result of
a complaint described herein the commission orders the supplier to provide
RMR service, the supplier shall maintain the generation resource so that it
is available for out of merit order dispatch instruction by ERCOT.
(h)
Local market power. ERCOT, through its stakeholder process,
shall develop and submit for commission approval procedures to mitigate the
effects of local market power caused by congestion.
(1)
The procedures shall specify a method by which noncompetitive
constraints may be distinguished from competitive constraints.
(2)
Competitive constraints and noncompetitive constraints
shall be designated annually prior to the corresponding auction of annual
congestion revenue rights (CRRs). A constraint may be redesignated on an interim
basis, but the criteria for interim designation as a competitive constraint
shall be more stringent than the criteria for annual designation as a competitive
constraint.
(3)
The procedures for mitigating local market power shall
ensure that a noncompetitive constraint will not be treated as a competitive
constraint.
(4)
The procedures for mitigating local market power shall
be submitted to the commission for approval by November 1, 2004. In addition,
any future amendments to the procedures must be approved by the commission.
(i)
System-wide competitiveness.
(1)
An ERCOT system-wide offer cap shall be applied to the
real-time energy market or an ancillary service capacity market operated by
ERCOT if the market fails the two-part Competitive Sufficiency Test described
in this paragraph. The test shall be applied each market interval, and the
cap shall be applied only during the market intervals that fail the test.
This procedure shall also be applied to any ERCOT-operated day-ahead energy
market in which congestion costs are settled.
(A)
Quantity test. A market fails the Competitive Sufficiency
Test if the supply margin falls below the thresholds specified in this paragraph.
"Supply margin" is the difference between the total quantity offered and the
total quantity required, divided by the total quantity required.
(i)
For the real-time energy market, the threshold shall be
1.0%, using all resources available for security-constrained economic dispatch
and all demand on the system.
(ii)
For all other ERCOT-operated markets, the threshold shall
be 5.0%, using the energy or capacity offered into that market and the total
quantity required in that market.
(B)
Pivotal supplier test. A market fails the Competitive Sufficiency
Test if any supplier is pivotal. A supplier is pivotal if removing all of
its offers and those of its affiliates would cause total supply to be less
than total requirements.
(2)
The system-wide offer cap shall be the lower of (1) $1,000/MWh
or $1,000/MW/h, as applicable; or (2) the 95th percentile price of all Competitive
Offers plus an adder that is large enough to permit competitive supply pricing
and small enough to mitigate non-competitive supply pricing. The adder shall
be the greater of:
(A)
$100; or
(B)
50% of the 95th percentile price.
(3)
A supply offer shall not exceed $1,000/MWh or $1,000/MW/h.
If a supply offer does exceed $1,000/MWh or $1,000/MW/h, it shall be set by
ERCOT to $1,000/MWh or $1,000/MW/h, as applicable. A supply offer from a load
acting as a resource that is above the system-wide offer cap and that is procured
shall be paid its offer price, but shall not set any clearing price and shall
not be paid more than $1,000/MWh or $1,000/MW/h, as applicable. Any supply
offer other than one from a load acting as a resource that is above the system-wide
offer cap and that is procured shall have the option to be paid its verifiable
costs instead of the system-wide offer cap, but shall not set any clearing
price and shall not be paid more than $1,000/MWh or $1,000/MW/h, as applicable.
ERCOT's cost for supply procured above the system-wide offer cap shall be
allocated to the buyers of the service in proportion to the quantities that
they purchased.
(4)
Commission staff, in cooperation with the ERCOT Independent
Market Monitor, shall review the specific parameters in this subsection on
an ongoing basis to determine whether they should be amended.
(j)
Interrelationship between subsections (h) and (i) of this
section and their effect on market power abuse remedy.
(1)
To the extent that both subsections (h) and (i) produce
price protections for a particular market interval, the lowest prices produced
by those subsections shall apply.
(2)
If the commission finds that market power abuse, by an
entity that did not have persistent market power, occurred due solely to offer
prices subject to subsections (h) and (i) and finds that subsections (h) and
(i) worked as intended, the commission's remedy for the market power abuse
shall be limited to the price protections afforded by subsections (h) and
(i).
(3)
If the commission finds that market power abuse, by an
entity that did not have persistent market power, occurred due solely to offer
prices subject to subsections (h) and (i) and finds that subsections (h) and
(i) did not work as intended, the commission's remedy for the market power
abuse shall be no more than payment by the market power abuser of an amount
equal to the difference in what it was paid and what it would have been paid
had subsections (h) and (i) worked as intended. In addition, and regardless
of whether the market power abuse was committed by an entity with persistent
market power, all other suppliers in the affected ERCOT- operated market that
benefited from the market power abuse shall pay no more than an amount equal
to the difference in what they were paid and what they would have been paid
had subsections (h) and (i) worked as intended.
(k)
Congestion revenue rights.
(1)
ERCOT shall publish on its market information system the
owners and beneficiaries of CRRs along with the corresponding CRRs. Owners
of CRRs shall notify ERCOT of any change in ownership or beneficiaries no
later than seven days after the effective date of the change, and ERCOT shall
publish these changes on its market information system no later than two market
days after receipt of the notice. In addition, owners of CRRs shall, no later
than seven days of receipt of a request, provide proof that is sufficient
for ERCOT or the commission's staff to verify ownership and beneficiary status.
(2)
A supplier and its affiliates that control effective local
resource capacity on the importing side of a constraint shall not own or be
a beneficiary of CRRs pertaining to that constraint in excess of their local
load minus their effective local resource capacity. "Effective local resource
capacity" is the sum of each resource's capacity multiplied by its shift factor
relative to the constraint. "Local load" is all loads that can be served by
energy that flows through the constraint. Any entity and its affiliates that
own CRRs amounting to more than 25% of the constraint capacity shall provide
ERCOT with sufficient information to confirm compliance with this subsection
no later than seven days after exceeding this percentage.
(3)
For purposes of settling and derating CRRs, ERCOT shall
treat each point-to-point option and each point-to-point obligation as portfolios
of positive and negative power flows on all directional network elements created
by the injection at the specified source point and the withdrawal at the specified
sink point, in the quantity represented by the CRR.
(4)
A transmission constraint for which the aggregate flowgate
capacity contained in the outstanding CRRs exceeds the actual transmission
capacity shall have its available transmission capacity allocated pro-rata
among the affected CRRs for purposes of clearing and settlement. CRR holders
shall be paid for the oversold capacity based on the lesser of the relevant
shadow price of the impacted constraint or the greatest shadow price of the
constraint in all previous CRR auctions that included the relevant time interval.
(l)
ERCOT Independent Market Monitor. ERCOT shall have an Independent
Market Monitor (IMM) by April 1, 2006. The IMM's operations shall be fully
staffed and equipped by the time ERCOT implements §25.501 of this title
(relating to Wholesale Market Design for the Electric Reliability Council
of Texas).
(1)
The IMM shall report to the Independent Market Monitoring
Committee (IMMC) of the Board of Directors, which shall comprise the independent
members of the Board of Directors, and the director of the commission's Market
Oversight Division (MOD) as an ex officio nonvoting member. The IMMC shall
have sole authority to hire, discipline, or fire the IMM.
(2)
The IMM shall have a staff comprising either ERCOT employees
or contract consultants funded by ERCOT.
(3)
The IMM shall work with MOD and other Public Utility Commission
of Texas (PUCT) staff to ensure appropriate integration of IMM and PUCT oversight
of the ERCOT wholesale market. No duty given to the IMM shall in any way affect
PUCT staff's ability to conduct investigations or enforcement actions. The
IMM shall develop public documents that briefly describe IMM functions, procedures,
and processes.
(4)
IMM wholesale market oversight duties shall include:
(A)
All activities that are required of the IMM by the ERCOT
Protocols;
(B)
Monitoring, information gathering, and data analysis ordered
by the ERCOT Board;
(C)
Regularly monitoring any market screens and indices provided
to the IMM by MOD, developed at the direction of the board, or created by
the IMM in order to carry out his or her duties;
(D)
Monitoring compliance with ERCOT operator instructions,
tracking qualified scheduling entity (QSE) and other performance measures,
documenting possible Protocol violations, and generally monitoring daily ERCOT
operations and market activities;
(E)
Reviewing ERCOT actions, practices, and procedures that
have an impact on a market, including but not limited to whether ERCOT actions,
practices, and procedures are consistent with the Protocols; and
(F)
Reviewing actions on the part of a transmission service
provider that has an impact on a market, including but not limited to, verification
of transmission limits, and analysis of requests for outages of lines, transformers,
and busses. When significant changes in nodal prices are observed, the IMM
shall review them to determine the causes.
(5)
The IMM shall provide MOD with information related to unusual
offers or bids, unusual operational behaviors, or other questionable activities
that have been detected, and shall inform MOD before contacting market participants
to investigate the issue. The IMM, in cooperation with MOD, shall develop
procedures to ensure prompt communication with MOD and timely resolution of
issues.
(6)
The IMM shall discuss with PUCT staff and ERCOT legal staff
all identified instances of harmful behavior that cannot be resolved with
the market participant informally or through ERCOT's dispute resolution processes;
all repeated instances of ERCOT non-compliance; and protocol violations repeated
within a six-month period. If necessary, either PUCT staff or ERCOT shall
pursue an enforcement action.
(7)
The IMM shall publish a "State of the Market Report" assessing
the competitiveness of the ERCOT-operated markets and suggesting changes to
commission rules or ERCOT procedures to improve market operation. This report
shall include an assessment of the effectiveness of ERCOT transmission planning
and expansion and the effectiveness and efficiency of ERCOT congestion management.
(m)
Development and implementation. ERCOT shall develop and
implement the requirements of this section in conjunction with its development
and implementation of the requirements of §25.501 of this title, and
shall therefore fully implement the requirements of this section by October
1, 2006.
This agency hereby certifies that the proposal has been reviewed
by legal counsel and found to be within the agency's legal authority to adopt.
Filed with the Office of
the Secretary of State on June 10, 2004.
TRD-200403830
Adriana Gonzales
Rules Coordinator
Public Utility Commission of Texas
Earliest possible date of adoption: July 25, 2004
For further information, please call: (512) 936-7223
Chapter 303.
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Subchapter D. TEXAS BRED INCENTIVE PROGRAMS
of
]
Plugging Report) (Statewide Rule 16) with a copy of the request signed by
the district office and a statement that a permit to produce a tested reservoir
is not being sought, or if the well has been plugged and abandoned, a plugging
report including reservoir and perforation data. If a permit is not obtained
for the tested reservoirs and/or an allowable is not assigned, the producer
shall report all test production in the producer's monthly report filed for
the last permitted reservoir in which the well was completed and may request
authorization to sell the test production. The test production may be sold
after such authorization is granted.
Fees, Performance Bonds, and Alternate Forms
of Financial Security Required To Be Filed
]) (Statewide Rule 78).
For any disposal method required to be permitted
pursuant to §3.75 of this title (relating to Discharges to Waters of
the State) (Rule 77), no permit issued under this section or authorization
contained in this section satisfies the requirements of §3.75.
]
Fees, Performance Bonds, and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required
To Be Filed
]) (Statewide Rule 78);
§3.68
] of
this title (relating to
Pipeline Connection; Cancellation of Certificate
of Compliance; Severance
[
Pipeline Connection and Severance
])
(Rule 73) or violation of this section.
Adoption of memorandum
of understanding by reference. The memorandum of understanding between the
Railroad Commission of Texas, the Texas Water Commission, and the Texas Department
of Health, which concerns the division of jurisdiction among the agencies
over wastes that result from, or are related to, activities associated with
the exploration, development, and production of oil, gas, or geothermal resources,
and the refining of oil, is adopted by reference. The effective date of the
memorandum of understanding adopted by reference is December 1, 1987. Copies
of the memorandum of understanding are available upon request from the Railroad
Commission of Texas, Oil and Gas Division, Underground Injection Control Section,
P.O. Drawer 12967, Austin, Texas 78711-2967, (512) 463-6790.
]
Natural Resource Conservation Commission
] and codified
at Title 30, Texas Administrative Code, Chapter 307;
Natural Resource
Conservation Commission
] and the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department
upon receipt of an application for a permit to discharge oil and gas waste
that is comprised, in whole or in part, of produced waters to waters under
tidal influence.
but that does not have a current individual performance bond,
blanket performance bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit as its financial
security under §3.78 of this title (relating to Fees, Performance Bonds,
and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required to be Filed) (Statewide
Rule 78)
].
§3.100(f)(1)
] of this title (relating to Seismic Holes and Core Holes) (Statewide
Rule 100), prior to plugging. The operator shall deliver or transmit the written
notice to the district office on the appropriate form.
and
] extensions
, and testing
.
The
] Commission or its delegate may administratively
grant an extension of up to one year of the deadline for plugging an inactive
well that is operated by an unbonded operator if the following criteria are
met:
(iv)
The operator has paid the
proper fee as provided in §3.78 of this title (relating to Fees, Performance
Bonds, and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required To Be Filed) (Statewide
Rule 78); and]
(v)
] The operator has tested the
well in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph (3) of this subsection
[
subparagraph (D) of this paragraph
] and files with its
application proof of either:
Fees, Performance
Bonds, and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required to be Filed
])
(Statewide Rule 78) will be granted a one-year plugging extension for each
well it operates that has been inactive for 12 months or more at the time
its annual organizational report is approved by the Commission if the following
criteria are met:
Fees, Performance
Bonds, and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required to be Filed
])
(Statewide Rule 78).
(D)
] The operator of any well more
than 25 years old that becomes inactive and subject to the provisions of this
subsection
[
paragraph
] or the operator of any well for which
a plugging extension is sought under the terms of subparagraph (A) of
paragraph (2) of this subsection
[
this paragraph
] shall plug
the well or successfully conduct a fluid level or hydraulic pressure test
establishing that the well does not pose a potential threat of harm to natural
resources, including surface and subsurface water, oil and gas.
(i)
] In general, a fluid level
test is a sufficient test for purposes of this
paragraph
[
subparagraph
]. The operator shall give the district office written notice
specifying the date and approximate time it intends to conduct the fluid level
test at least 48 hours prior to conducting the test; however, upon a showing
of undue hardship, the district director or the director's delegate may grant
a written waiver or reduction of the notice requirement for a specific well
test. The director or the director's delegate may require alternate methods
of testing if necessary to ensure the well does not pose a potential threat
of harm to natural resources. Alternate methods of testing may be approved
by the director or the director's delegate by written application and upon
a showing that such a test will provide information sufficient to determine
that the well does not pose a threat to natural resources.
(ii)
] No test other than a fluid
level test shall be acceptable without prior approval from the district director
or the director's delegate. The district director or the director's delegate
shall be notified at least 48 hours before any test other than a fluid level
test is conducted. Mechanical integrity test results shall be filed with the
district office and fluid level test results shall be filed with the Commission
in Austin. Test results shall be filed on a Commission-approved form, within
30 days of the completion of the test. Upon request, the operator shall file
the actual test data for any mechanical integrity or fluid level test that
it has conducted.
(iii)
] Notwithstanding the provisions
of
subparagraph (B) of this paragraph
[
clause (ii) of this
subparagraph
], a hydraulic pressure test may be conducted without prior
approval from the district director or the director's delegate, provided that
the operator gives the district office written notice specifying the date
and approximate time for the test at least 48 hours prior to the time the
test will be conducted, the production casing is tested to a depth of at least
250 feet below the base of usable quality water strata, or 100 feet below
the top of cement behind the production casing, whichever is deeper, and the
minimum test pressure is greater than or equal to 250 psig for a period of
at least 30 minutes.
(iv)
] If the operator performs
a hydraulic pressure test in accordance with the provisions of
subparagraph
(C) of this paragraph
[
clause (iii) of this subparagraph
],
the well shall be exempt from further testing for five years from the date
of the test, except to the extent
that
[
compliance with paragraph
(2) of subsection (b) of this section requires more frequent testing. Further,
] the Commission or its delegate may require the operator to perform
testing more frequently to ensure that the well does not pose a threat of
harm to natural resources. The Commission or its delegate may approve less
frequent well tests under this
paragraph
[
subparagraph
]
upon written request and for good cause shown provided that less frequent
testing will not increase the threat of harm to natural resources.
(v)
] A well subject to the testing
requirements of this
paragraph
[
subparagraph
] shall
not be returned to active operation unless a fluid level test of the well
has been performed within 12 months prior to the return to activity or a mechanical
integrity test of the well has been performed within 60 months prior to the
return to activity.
(3)
Transfer of operatorship.
A transfer of operatorship submitted for any well or lease will not be approved
unless the operator acquiring the well or lease has on file with the Commission
financial security as provided in §3.78 of this title (relating to Fees,
Performance Bonds, and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required to be
Filed) (Statewide Rule 78).]
in Oil, Gas or Geothermal Resource Operations
]), pits, and sumps, that cannot reasonably be captured and sold or
routed to a vent or flare.
Natural Resources Conservation commission
] under
the Texas Clean Air Act.
Fees, Performance Bonds and Alternate
Forms of Financial Security Required To Be Filed
]).
Fees, Performance Bonds and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required
To Be Filed
]).
Fees, Performance Bonds and Alternate Forms
of Financial Security Required To Be Filed
]).
Fees,
Performance Bonds, and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required To Be
Filed
]) and the appropriate form according to the instructions on the
form, accompanied by a plat as described in subsection (c) of this section.
A person acquainted with the facts pertinent to the application shall certify
that all facts stated in it are true and within the knowledge of that person.
Fees, Performance Bonds, and Alternate Forms
of Financial Security Required To Be Filed
]) and shall be certified
by a person acquainted with the facts, stating that all information in the
application is true and complete to the best of that person's knowledge.
(revised
5/2001)
], Substandard Acreage Certification.
§3.78(r)
] of this title (relating to
Fees and Financial Security
Requirements
[
Fees, Performance Bonds and Alternate Forms of Financial
Security Required To Be Filed
]).
§3.72(a)(8)
] of this title (relating to Manifest To
Accompany Each Transport of Liquid Hydrocarbons by Vehicle), an operator of
a reclamation plant or an authorized person shall execute a manifest in accordance
with
§3.85
[
§3.72
] of this title (relating
to Manifest To Accompany Each Transport of Liquid Hydrocarbons by Vehicle),
upon each removal of tank bottoms or other hydrocarbon wastes from any oil
producing lease tank, pipeline storage tank, or other production facility.
In addition to the information required pursuant to
§3.85
[
§3.72
] of this title (relating to Manifest To Accompany Each Transport
of Liquid Hydrocarbons by Vehicle), the operator of the reclamation plant
or other authorized person shall also include on the manifest:
Fees,
Performance Bonds and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required To Be
Filed
]) (Statewide Rule 78); and
Fees, Performance Bonds and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required To Be Filed ].
(3)
An acceptable record of compliance--]
(A)
A record of compliance showing:]
(i)
No enforcement orders issued; and]
(ii)
No outstanding violations; or]
(B)
A record of compliance showing:]
(i)
Only one enforcement order, provided the order
specifies that it shall not be considered to meet the elements of subparagraph
(A) of this definition and provided the requirements of the order are met;]
(ii)
No enforcement orders issued other than those
that are resolved in the order referenced in clause (i) of this subparagraph;]
(iii)
No outstanding violations other than those
resolved in the order referenced in clause (i) of this subparagraph.]
(4)
] Commercial facility--A facility
whose owner or operator receives compensation from others for the storage,
reclamation, treatment, or disposal of oil field fluids or oil and gas wastes
that are wholly or partially trucked or hauled to the facility and whose primary
business purpose is to provide these services for compensation if:
(5)
] Financial security--An individual
performance bond, blanket performance bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit
filed with the Commission.
(6)
Alternate form of financial
security--Payment of a nonrefundable annual fee to the Commission.]
(7)
] Bay well--Any well under the
jurisdiction of the Commission for which the surface location is either:
navigable
] waters of the state
and
which requires plugging by means other than conventional land- based methods,
including, but not limited to, use of a barge, use of a boat, dredging, or
building a causeway or other access road to bring in the necessary equipment
to plug the well
; or,
(8)
] Land well--Any well subject
to Commission jurisdiction for which the surface location is not in or on
inland or coastal waters.
(9)
] Offshore well--Any well subject
to Commission jurisdiction for which the surface location is on state lands
in or on the Gulf of Mexico, that is not a bay well.
(10)
] Officers and owners--Any
persons owning or controlling an organization including officers, directors,
general partners, sole proprietors, owners of more than 25% ownership interest,
any trustee of an organization, and any person determined by a final judgment
or final administrative order to have exercised control over the organization.
(11)
] Letter of credit--An irrevocable
letter of credit issued:
(12)
] Bond--A surety instrument
issued:
(6)
With each application for
an extension of time to plug a well pursuant to Commission rules, an applicant
who has filed an alternate form of financial security as provided for under
this rule, shall submit to the Commission a nonrefundable fee of $300.]
(7)
] With each application for
an oil and gas waste disposal well permit, the applicant shall submit to the
Commission a nonrefundable fee of $100 per well.
(8)
] With each application for
a fluid injection well permit, the applicant shall submit to the Commission
a nonrefundable fee of $200 per well. Fluid injection well means any well
used to inject fluid or gas into the ground in connection with the exploration
or production of oil or gas other than an oil and gas waste disposal well.
(9)
] With each application for
a permit to discharge to surface water other than a permit for a discharge
that meets national pollutant discharge elimination system (NPDES) requirements
for agricultural or wildlife use, the applicant shall submit to the Commission
a nonrefundable fee of $300.
(10)
] If a certificate of compliance
for an oil lease or gas well has been canceled for violation of one or more
Commission rules, the operator shall submit to the Commission a nonrefundable
fee of $300 for each severance or seal order issued for the well or lease
before the Commission may reissue the certificate pursuant to §3.58 of
this title (relating to Oil, Gas, or Geothermal Resource Producer's Reports)
(Statewide Rule 58).
(11)
] With each application for
issuance, renewal, or material amendment of an oil and gas waste hauler's
permit, the applicant shall submit to the Commission a nonrefundable fee of
$100.
(12)
] With each Natural Gas Policy
Act (15 United States Code §§3301-3432) application, the applicant
shall submit to the Commission a nonrefundable fee of $150.
(13)
] Hazardous waste generation
fee. A person who generates hazardous oil and gas waste, as that term is defined
in §3.98 of this title (relating to Standards for Management of Hazardous
Oil and Gas Waste), shall pay to the Commission the fees specified in §3.98(z).
(14)
] A check or money order for
any of the aforementioned fees shall be made payable to the Railroad Commission
of Texas. If the check accompanying an application is not honored upon presentment,
the permit issued on the basis of that application, the allowable assigned,
the exception to a statewide rule granted on the basis of the application,
[
the extension of time to plug a well,
] the certificate of compliance
reissued, or the Natural Gas Policy Act category determination made on the
basis of the application may be suspended or revoked.
(15)
] If an operator submits a
check that is not honored on presentment, the operator shall, for a period
of 24 months after the check was presented, submit any payments in the form
of a credit card, cashier's check, or cash.
and alternate forms of financial
security
].
Except for those operators exempted under subsection
(g)(7) of this section, any
[
Any
] person, including any firm,
partnership, joint stock association, corporation, or other organization,
required by Texas Natural Resources Code, §91.142, to file an organization
report with the Commission must also file financial security in one of the
following forms:
(3)
a nonrefundable annual fee
of $1,000, if:]
(A)
the Commission or its designee determines that
individual and blanket performance bonds as specified by this section are
not obtainable at reasonable prices as provided for under subsection (f) of
this section;]
(B)
the person can demonstrate to the Commission
an acceptable record of compliance with all Commission rules, orders, licenses,
permits, or certificates that relate to safety or the prevention or control
of pollution for the previous 48 months and the person has no outstanding
violations; and]
(C)
if the person is a firm, partnership, joint
stock association, corporation, or other organization, its officers, directors,
general partners, or owners of more than 25% ownership interest or any trustee
must also not have any outstanding violations.]
(4)
a nonrefundable annual fee
equal to 12.5% of the face amount of the performance bond that otherwise would
be required; or]
(5)
] a letter of credit or cash
deposit in the same amount as required for an individual performance bond
or blanket performance bond.
(e)
Eligibility for nonrefundable
$1,000 fee.]
(1)
A person filing an organization report for
the first time in order to perform any Commission-regulated operations is
a new organization and is not eligible to file the nonrefundable fee of $1,000.]
(2)
A person who filed an initial organization
report less than 48 months prior to the current filing is not eligible to
file the nonrefundable fee of $1,000.]
(3)
A change in name, without any other organizational
change, of a person registered with the Commission does not indicate a new
organization. If the Commission determines that only a name change has occurred,
then a person operating under a new name may file the nonrefundable fee of
$1,000 if the person meets all other eligibility requirements.]
(4)
An individual registered with the Commission
as a sole proprietor or who is a general partner of a partnership that is
registered with the Commission and who reorganizes his or her oil and gas
operations under a new legal entity or establishes a new and separate entity
will be considered to have satisfied the 48- month eligibility requirement
for filing the nonrefundable fee of $1,000.]
(5)
A surviving or new corporation or other entity
resulting from a merger under the Texas Business Corporation Act, Part Five,
may file the nonrefundable fee of $1,000 if:]
(A)
the existing record of compliance for each
entity that is a party to the merger qualifies;]
(B)
the records of compliance for the officers
and owners of the surviving or new entities qualify; and]
(C)
the number of surviving or new entities eligible
does not exceed the number of parties registered with the Commission at the
time of the merger.]
(6)
In any Commission enforcement proceeding, if
a person is determined not to be the responsible party for a violation and
is dismissed from the proceeding for that reason, that violation shall not
be considered in determining whether that person has an acceptable record
of compliance.]
(f)
Availability of bonds.]
(1)
In determining the applicability of the $1,000
nonrefundable fee as provided for under this section, the Commission presumes
that individual and blanket performance bonds are obtainable at reasonable
prices.]
(2)
An operator who is otherwise eligible under
this section to file a $1,000 nonrefundable annual fee may request an administrative
determination that individual and blanket performance bonds are not available
to that operator at reasonable prices. In order to support an administrative
determination that bonds are not obtainable by a requesting operator at reasonable
prices, the operator must submit declination letters to the Commission's P-5/Financial
Assurance Department establishing that three companies from a list maintained
by the Commission that have issued a bond filed with the Commission in the
past 12 months will not issue a bond to the requesting operator or will only
issue a bond to the operator for an annual fee in excess of 6% of the face
amount of the bond.]
(3)
If an operator requesting a determination that
bonds are not available to it has a bond as its current financial assurance,
one of the three declination letters must be from that operator's current
surety.]
(4)
If an operator's application for the $1,000
nonrefundable fee is administratively denied, the operator may request a hearing
to determine eligibility for the $1,000 nonrefundable fee. The Commission
shall consider cash or other collateral requirements, along with the premium
and any other surety company requirements, in determining if bonds are available
to the requesting operator at a reasonable price.]
(g)
] Forms for financial security.
Operators shall submit bonds and letters of credit on forms prescribed by
the Commission.
(h)
] Filing deadlines for financial
security. Operators shall submit required financial security at the time of
filing an initial organization report or upon yearly renewal, or as
otherwise
required under [
subsection (m) of
] this section.
(i)
New operators. A person filing
an organization report for the first time is a new organization and is not
eligible to file an individual performance bond for the first year of operation.]
(j)
Amount of bond, letter of credit, or cash
deposit.
]
(1)
A person who operates one
or more wells may file an individual performance bond, letter of credit or
cash deposit in an amount equal to $2.00 for each foot of total well depth
for each well, plus an additional amount to be determined by the Commission
in a subsequent rulemaking for each bay and offshore well operated.]
(2)
A person operating wells may
file a blanket bond, letter of credit or cash deposit to cover all wells for
which a bond, letter of credit or cash deposit is required in an amount equal
to the sum of:]
(A)
A base amount determined by the total number
of wells operated, as follows:]
(i)
a person who operates 10 or fewer wells shall
have a base amount of $25,000;]
(ii)
a person who operates more than 10 but fewer
than 100 wells shall have a base amount of $50,000; and]
(iii)
a person who operates 100 or more wells shall
have a base amount of $250,000, plus;]
(B)
an additional amount, to be determined by the
Commission in a subsequent rulemaking, for each bay well operated, plus]
(C)
an additional amount, to be determined by the
Commission in a subsequent rulemaking, for each offshore well operated.]
(3)
]
Persons with non-well
operations not exempted under paragraph (7) of this subsection.
A person
performing other operations who is not an operator of wells and who is not
a person whose only activity is as a first purchaser, survey company, salt
water hauler, gas nominator, gas purchaser or well plugger [
choosing
to cover all operations by a blanket performance bond, letter of credit or
cash deposit
] shall file
financial security
[
a bond,
letter of credit or cash deposit
] in the amount of $25,000.
(4)
]
Persons exempt from financial
security requirements.
No
financial security
[
bond,
letter of credit, cash deposit or alternate form of financial security
]
is required of a person who is not an operator of wells if the person's only
activity is as a first purchaser, survey company, salt water hauler, gas nominator,
gas purchaser and/or well plugger.
(5)
]
Persons with both well
and non-well operations. If a person is engaged
[
A person who engages
] in more than one activity or operation, including well operation,
for which
financial security
[
a bond or alternate form of
financial security
] is required
, the person
is not required
to file
financial security
[
a separate bond or alternate form
of financial security
] for each activity or operation in which the person
is engaged. The person is required to file
financial security
[
a bond or alternate form of financial security
] only in the
greatest
amount required for
any
[
the
] activity or operation
in which the person engages [
for which a bond or alternate form of financial
security in the greatest amount is required
]. The
financial security
[
bond or alternate form of financial security
] filed covers
all of the activities and operations for which
financial security
[
a bond or alternate form of financial security
] is required. The provisions
of this paragraph do not exempt a person from the financial security required
under subsection
(l)
[
(o)
] of this section.
(6)
] Financial security amounts
are the minimum amounts required by this section to be filed. A person may
file a greater amount if desired.
(k)
]
Financial security conditions.
[
Bond Conditions.
] Any financial security required under
this section is subject to the conditions that the operator will plug and
abandon all wells and control, abate, and clean up pollution associated with
the oil and gas operations and activities covered under the required financial
security in accordance with applicable state law and permits, rules, and orders
of the Commission.
(l)
] Conditions for cash deposits.
Operators shall tender cash deposits in United States currency or certified
cashiers check only. All cash deposits will be placed in a special account
within the Oil Field Clean Up Fund account. Any interest accruing on cash
deposits will be deposited into the Oil Clean Up Fund pursuant to Texas Natural
Resources Code, §91.111(c)(8). The Commission will not refund a cash
deposit until either financial security [
or an alternate form of financial
security
] is accepted by the Commission as provided for under this section
or an operator ceases all activity.
(m)
] Well or lease transfer.
one of the following approved
forms of
] financial security in an amount sufficient to cover both its
current operations and the wells
or leases
being transferred[
:
]
(A)
an individual performance
bond, letter of credit or cash deposit; or]
(B)
a blanket performance bond, letter of
credit or cash deposit
].
(4)
An operator who has accepted
a transfer of operatorship of any well or lease on or after September 1, 2001,
with Commission approval based on filing of an individual or blanket performance
bond, letter of credit, or cash deposit is deemed to have elected to file
one of these forms of financial security and shall file or have on file one
of these forms of financial security for each successive year during which
it remains the designated operator of any such well or lease.]
(n)
] Reimbursement liability. Filing
any form of financial security does not extinguish a person's liability for
reimbursement for the expenditure of state oilfield clean-up funds pursuant
to the Texas Natural Resources Code, §89.083 and §91.113.
(o)
] Financial security for commercial
facilities. The provisions of this subsection shall apply to the holder of
any permit for a commercial facility.
assurance
] under subsection
(g)(6)
[
(j)(3)
] of this section. The full amount of financial security required under
subparagraph (A) of this paragraph shall be required for the remaining commercial
facilities.
(p)
] Effect of outstanding violations.
director
] of
the organization
, as defined in subsection (a) of this section,
was,
within seven years preceding the filing of the report, application, or certificate,
an officer or
owner
[
director
] of an organization and
during that period, the organization committed a violation that remains an
outstanding violation.
Fees, Performance
Bonds, and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required To Be Filed
]),
and shall be certified by a person acquainted with the facts, stating that
all information in the application is true and complete to the best of that
person's knowledge.
Recomplete, or Reenter
]) (Statewide Rule 5), the
plat shall include:
Natural Resource Conservation Commission
] stating the depth to which
fresh water strata occur in the project area;
Fees,
Performance Bonds, and Alternate Forms of Financial Security Required To Be
Filed
]) for each gas storage well in the storage project that will be
used for injection.
f
] this subsection. The applicant must submit an affidavit
to the commission specifying the efforts that were taken to identify each
person whose name and/or address could not be ascertained.
§3.68
] of this title (relating
to
Pipeline Connection; Cancellation of Certificate of Compliance; Severance
[
Pipeline Connection and Severance
]) for violation of this
section.
the Transportation/Gas
Utilities Division
] for both pipelines and associated facilities, and
other applicable commission rules and orders.
Part 2.
PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF TEXAS
Subchapter S. WHOLESALE MARKETS
Part 8.
TEXAS RACING COMMISSION