TITLE attorney-general

Opinion No. JC-0571

The Honorable Patricia Gray, Chair, House Committee on Public Health, Texas House of Representatives, P.O. Box 2910 Austin, Texas 78768-2910

Re: Whether a building owned and operated by a municipal hospital authority, but leased in part to a private business, is subject to the exclusive public use requirement of article XI, section 9 of the Texas Constitution, and related questions. (RQ-0547-JC)

S U M M A R Y

A building owned and operated by the Tomball Hospital Authority (the "Authority"), but leased in part to a private business for operation as a "long-term care hospital," must satisfy the exclusive public use requirement to qualify for property tax exemption under article VIII, section 2 of the Texas Constitution and section 11.11(a) of the Tax Code. That requirement is not, as a matter of law, satisfied by the statutory tax-exemption language of the Authority's enabling statute, section 262.004 of the Health and Safety Code. To satisfy the exclusive public use requirement, the leased space must be used exclusively "for the health, comfort, and welfare of the public" served by the Authority's hospital. Whether the proposed use of the leased space as a privately operated long-term care hospital satisfies the exclusive public use requirement necessitates investigation and resolution of facts. If the leased space is not used exclusively for public purposes, the Authority would be liable under the law for taxes assessed against the building.

Opinion No. JC-0572

Mr. Richard F. Reynolds, Executive Director, Texas Workers' Compensation Commission, Southfield Building, MS-4D 4000 South IH-35 Austin, Texas 78704-7491

Re: Whether a Workers' Compensation Commission rule requiring that written communications be sent to both a claimant and the claimant's attorney creates an exception to Rule 4.02(a) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits an attorney from communicating with a person who is represented by counsel. (RQ-0551-JC)

S U M M A R Y

A Texas Workers' Compensation Commission rule requiring that written communications related to a claim be sent to both a claimant and the claimant's attorney, see 28 Tex. Admin. Code §102.4(b) (2002), creates an exception to Rule 4.02(a) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits an attorney from communicating with a person who is represented by counsel, see Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof'l Conduct 4.02(a) (precluding communications with a person represented by counsel unless lawyer "is authorized by law to do so").

Opinion No. JC-0573

Ms. Michele L. Henricks, Executive Director, Court Reporters Certification Board, P. O. Box 13131 Austin, Texas 78711-3131

Re: Whether any action is required of the Court Reporters Certification Board in the implementation of section 57.021(d) of the Government Code. (RQ-0553-JC)

S U M M A R Y

Section 57.021(d) of the Government Code, which authorizes the Texas Commission for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing to "maintain a list of persons certified by the Court Reporters Certification Board as specialists in real-time captioning," does not require the Court Reporters Certification Board to take any action. This provision is insufficient to confer on the Board the authority to certify specialists in real-time captioning. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §57.021(d) (Vernon Supp. 2002). No other provision of law confers such certification authority on the Board.

Opinion No. JC-0574

The Honorable Sherry L. Robinson, Waller County Criminal District Attorney, 836 Austin Street, Suite 105 Hempstead, Texas 77445

Re: Procedure by which a prosecutor may obtain a waiver from the state of a conflict of interest. (RQ-0550-JC)

S U M M A R Y

No statute authorizes a county judge to obtain a waiver from the commissioners court on behalf of the county of a conflict of interest under Rule 1.06(b) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. The validity of a judicial proceeding will not be affected if the county judge represents an individual in a court of his or her county without the consent of the commissioners court.

Opinion No. JC-0575

Honorable Gwyn Shea, Secretary of State, State of Texas, P.O. Box 12697, Austin, Texas 78711.

Re: Meaning of "state officer" for purposes of article XVI, section 1 of the Texas Constitution, which requires such individuals to sign an anti-bribery statement. (RQ-0555-JC)

S U M M A R Y

Article XVI, section 1(b) of the Texas Constitution requires elected and appointed officers to sign an anti-bribery statement before taking the oath or affirmation of office required by article XVI, section 1(a). State-level officers, but not local officers, must file the signed statement with the secretary of state. Local officers must sign the statement and retain it with the official records of the office. Questions about whether a particular officer is a "state officer" within article XVI, section 1(c) may be resolved by consulting relevant statutes, constitutional provisions, and judicial decisions.

For information regarding this publication, please access the website at www.oag.state.tx.us or call the Opinion Committee at 512-463-2110.

Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Attorney General

Filed: November 13, 2002