Part 1.
RAILROAD COMMISSION OF TEXAS
Chapter 3.
OIL AND GAS DIVISION
16 TAC §3.52, §3.53
The Railroad Commission of Texas adopts the amendments to §3.52,
regarding oil well allowable production and to §3.53, regarding annual
well tests and well status reports without changes to the versions as published
in the October 22, 1999, issue of the
Texas Register
(24 TexReg 9134). The adopted amendments to §§3.52 and 3.53
reduce the regulatory burden on oil and gas wells and reduce operating costs
for industry by reducing well testing and reporting requirements.
The proposal published October 22, 1999, also contained proposed amendments
to §3.26, regarding separating devices, tanks, and surface commingling
of oil and to §3.28, regarding requirements to ascertain and report potential
and deliverability of gas wells. The Commission intends to take action with
respect to the proposed amendments to §§3.26 and 3.28 at a later
date.
The Commission simultaneously readopts §§3.52 and 3.53, with
the adopted amendments (in the REVIEW section of this issue of the
Texas Register
), in accordance with Texas Government Code, §2001.039.
The agency's reasons for adopting these rules continue to exist. The notice
of proposed review was filed with the
Texas Register
concurrently with the proposed amendments and published in the October
22, 1999, issue of the
Texas Register
(24
TexReg 9320).
Texas Oil & Gas Association filed comments supporting the amendments.
Issued in Austin, Texas on December 21, 1999.
The Commission adopts these rules pursuant to Texas Natural Resources Code, §§81.051,
81.052, 85.042, 85.046, 85.053, 85.054, 85.201, 85.202, 86.011, 86.012, 86.041,
and 86.042, which authorize the Railroad Commission of Texas to adopt rules
for the following purposes: to govern and regulate persons and their operations
under the jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission; to distribute, prorate
and apportion allowable production; to adjust correlative rights and opportunities;
to determine the daily allowable production for each well; to effectuate the
provisions and purposes of the Natural Resources Code; and to conserve and
prevent waste of oil and gas.
Texas Natural Resources Code, §§81.051, 81.052, 85.042, 85.046,
85.053, 85.054, 85.201, 85.202, 86.011, 86.012, 86.041, and 86.042, are affected
by the amendments.
This agency hereby certifies that the adoption has been reviewed
by legal counsel and found to be a valid exercise of the agency's legal authority.
Filed with the Office of the Secretary of State on December
21, 1999.
TRD-9908942
Mary Ross McDonald
Deputy General Counsel
Railroad Commission of Texas
Effective date: January 10, 2000
Proposal publication date: October 22, 1999
For further information, please call: (512) 475-1295
The Railroad Commission of Texas adopts the repeal of existing §3.56
and adopts new §3.56 with the same title. New §3.56 is adopted with
changes to the proposed text as published in the October 1, 1999, issue of
the
Texas Register
(24 TexReg 8402). The repeal
and new rule are adopted to remove an unnecessary burden on the operation
of gas plants.
In adopting the new rule, the Commission recognizes that it is not necessary
to allocate back to individual hydrocarbon producing properties unidentified
recovered and retained oil scrubbed at the inlet of a gas plant because that
oil has already been accounted for in accordance with §3.27 of this title
(relating to gas to be measured and surface commingling of gas).
The Commission has made two changes to the proposed rule based on comments
received. The first change adds language to §3.56(b)(1) to specify that
an accepted Form R-3 shall be the authority for the movement of accumulated
hydrocarbons to beneficial disposition. The second change rearranges the language
of §3.56(b)(2)(A)-(E) to distinguish the differences in allocation between
single operator and multiple operator systems, and inserts minor clarifying
language.
The Texas Oil & Gas Association (TXOGA) filed comments generally supporting
the repeal and adoption but also suggested changes. TXOGA suggested adding
language to §3.56(b)(1) which would make an accepted Form R-3 the authority
for the movement and disposition of accumulated hydrocarbons. The Commission
agrees to this change. TXOGA also suggests reordering the paragraphs in §3.56(b)(2)(A)-(E)
to clarify the differences in allocation for single operator and multiple
operator systems. The Commission generally agrees with TXOGA's suggested re-arrangement,
but declines to place the allocation requirements for single operator and
multiple operator disposal systems in the same paragraph. In the new arrangement
of §3.56(b)(2)(A)-(E), the first sentence of proposed §3.56(b)(2)(A),
less the opening phrase "Except as provided in subparagraph (E) of this paragraph,"
becomes adopted §3.56(b)(2)(A). Proposed §3.56(b)(2)(B) remains
unchanged. The second sentence of proposed §3.56(b)(2)(A), less the opening
word "Such," becomes adopted §3.56(b)(2)(C). Proposed §3.56(b)(2)(E)
is deleted and replaced with the language "Unidentifiable liquid hydrocarbons
recovered by a multiple operator produced water disposal system, in excess
of a tolerance ratio of one barrel of liquid hydrocarbons for each 2,000 barrels
of produced water received, shall be allocated to each producing property
in the proportion that the volume of water received from the producing property
bears to the total volume of water received by the system during a reporting
period" as the first sentence of adopted §3.56(b)(2)(D). Proposed §3.56(b)(2)(C)
becomes the second sentence of adopted §3.56(b)(2)(D). Proposed §3.56(b)(2)(D),
less the words "skimmed and" after the word "hydrocarbons," becomes adopted §3.56(b)(2)(E).
Additionally, in the first sentence of §3.56(b)(2)(A), after the word
"operator", the Commission has added the words "or multiple operator" to clarify
that both single and multiple operator systems must report the volume of unidentifiable
hydrocarbons recovered on Form P-18. In the first sentence of §3.56(b)(2)(C),
after the word "hydrocarbons," the Commission has added the phrase "recovered
by a single operator produced water disposal system" to clarify the type of
disposal system to which the paragraph applies. In the first sentence of §3.56(b)(2)(E),
after the word "volume," the Commission has added the words "of liquid hydrocarbons"
to clarify the nature of the volume that must be reported as production.
The following groups or associations filed comments supporting the repeal
and adoption: the General Land Office, Phillips Petroleum Company, GPM Gas
Corporation, and the Permian Basin Petroleum Association.
16 TAC §3.56
Issued in Austin, Texas on December 21, 1999.
The Commission adopts the repeal of existing §3.56 pursuant to Texas
Natural Resources Code, §§81.051 and 81.052, which provide the Commission
with jurisdiction over all persons owning or engaged in drilling or operating
oil or gas wells in Texas and with the authority to adopt all necessary rules
for governing and regulating persons and their operations under the jurisdiction
of the Commission. Further, §85.202(a)(1) authorizes the Commission to
promulgate rules to prevent the waste of oil and gas in its storage, piping
and distribution and, under §88.011, to adopt rules to provide for the
method of measuring oil and gas produced from any well in this state. The
Commission is also authorized under §91.101(4) to promulgate rules relating
to the reclamation of oil, condensate and gas.
The Texas Natural Resources Code, §§81.051, 81.052, 85.202(a)(1),
88.011, and 91.101(4) are affected by the repeal.
This agency hereby certifies that the adoption has been reviewed
by legal counsel and found to be a valid exercise of the agency's legal authority.
Filed with the Office of the Secretary of State on December
21, 1999.
TRD-9908927
Mary Ross McDonald
Deputy General Counsel
Railroad Commission of Texas
Effective date: January 10, 2000
Proposal publication date: October 1, 1999
For further information, please call: (512) 936-7308
Issued in Austin, Texas on December 21,
1999.
The Commission adopts new §3.56 pursuant to Texas Natural Resources
Code, §§81.051 and 81.052, which provide the Commission with jurisdiction
over all persons owning or engaged in drilling or operating oil or gas wells
in Texas and with the authority to adopt all necessary rules for governing
and regulating persons and their operations under the jurisdiction of the
Commission. Further, §85.202(a)(1) authorizes the Commission to promulgate
rules to prevent the waste of oil and gas in its storage, piping and distribution
and, under §88.011, to adopt rules to provide for the method of measuring
oil and gas produced from any well in this state. The Commission is also authorized
under §91.101(4) to promulgate rules relating to the reclamation of oil,
condensate and gas.
The Texas Natural Resources Code, §§81.051, 81.052, 85.202(a)(1),
88.011, and 91.101(4) are affected by the new section.
§3.56. Scrubber Oil and Skim Hydrocarbons.
(a)
Definitions. The following words and terms, when used
in this section, shall have the following meanings unless the context clearly
indicates otherwise:
(1)
Identifiable liquid hydrocarbons--Volume of scrubber oil/skim
hydrocarbons that is received at a gas plant/produced water disposal facility
where the origin of such liquid hydrocarbons can be clearly identified.
(2)
Producing property--A location from which hydrocarbons
are being produced that has been assigned a lease identification number by
the Commission and which is used in reporting production.
(3)
Scrubber oil--Liquid hydrocarbons which accumulate
in lines that are transporting casinghead gas and which are captured at the
inlet to a gas processing plant.
(4)
Skim hydrocarbons--Oil and condensate which accumulate
during produced water disposal operations.
(5)
Tolerance--The amount of skim hydrocarbons that may
be recovered before the produced water disposal system operator must allocate
to the producing property.
(6)
Unidentifiable liquid hydrocarbons--Scrubber oil/skim
hydrocarbons received at a gas plant/produced water disposal facility where
the origin of such liquid hydrocarbons cannot be identified.
(b)
Disposition of scrubber oil, skim hydrocarbons, and identifiable
liquid hydrocarbon volumes.
(1)
Scrubber oil. Any scrubber oil that has not been returned
to a producing property by the end of a monthly report period shall be reported
by the operator of the gas plant on the monthly plant report, Form R-3 (Monthly
Report for Gas Processing Plants). The unidentifiable liquid hydrocarbons
recovered and reported on Form R-3 may be disposed of at the point of accumulation.
The accepted Form R-3 shall be the authority for the movement of the hydrocarbons
to beneficial disposition.
(2)
Skim hydrocarbons.
(A)
All unidentifiable liquid hydrocarbons recovered by a
single operator or multiple operator produced water disposal system shall
be reported on the Form P-18 (Skim Oil/Condensate Report) for each reporting
period.
(B)
The unidentifiable liquid hydrocarbons recovered and reported
on Form P-18 may be disposed of at the point of accumulation. The accepted
Form P-18 shall be the authority for the movement of the hydrocarbons to beneficial
disposition.
(C)
Unidentifiable liquid hydrocarbons recovered by a single
operator produced water disposal system shall be allocated to each producing
property in the proportion that the volume of water received from the producing
property bears to the total volume of water received by the system during
a reporting period.
(D)
Unidentifiable liquid hydrocarbons recovered by a multiple
operator produced water disposal system in excess of a tolerance ratio of
one barrel of liquid hydrocarbons for each 2,000 barrels of produced water
received shall be allocated to each producing property in the proportion that
the volume of water received from the producing property bears to the total
volume of water received by the system during a reporting period. The produced
water disposal system operator shall notify the operator of each producing
property of any allocations to that property by furnishing a copy of the allocations
as shown on Form P-18 (Skim Oil/Condensate Report).
(E)
The operator of each producing property shall report the
volume of liquid hydrocarbons allocated to the producing property as production
from the property on either Form P-1 (Producer's Monthly Report of Oil Wells)
or Form P-2 (Producer's Monthly Report of Gas Wells). The volume allocated
back shall be shown as skim oil or skim condensate on the appropriate form.
(3)
Identifiable liquid hydrocarbon volumes.
(A)
Identifiable liquid hydrocarbon volumes returned to the
producing property during the reporting period in which the volume is received
at the gas plant/produced water disposal facility shall not be reported to
the Commission by the gas plant/facility operator. The gas plant/produced
water disposal facility operator shall notify the appropriate Commission district
office by telephone prior to the return of such volumes. The movement of these
volumes back to the producing property shall comply with §3.72 of this
title (relating to manifest to accompany each transport of liquid hydrocarbons
by vehicle), commonly referred to as Statewide Rule 85.
(B)
Identifiable volumes not returned to the producing property
shall be reported to the Commission and to the operator of the producing property
on Form R-3 or Form P-18 as prescribed in paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection.
Volumes shall be specifically credited to the appropriate producing property.
The operator of the producing property shall report the disposition of such
identifiable volumes as either skim hydrocarbons or scrubber oil on the appropriate
production report.
This agency hereby certifies that the adoption
has been reviewed by legal counsel and found to be a valid exercise of the
agency's legal authority.
Filed with the Office of the Secretary of State on December
21, 1999.
TRD-9908928
Mary Ross McDonald
Deputy General Counsel
Railroad Commission of Texas
Effective date: January 10, 2000
Proposal publication date: October 1, 1999
For further information, please call: (512) 936-7308
Chapter 25.
SUBSTANTIVE RULES APPLICABLE TO ELECTRIC SERVICE PROVIDERS
Subchapter H. ELECTRICAL PLANNING
1.
RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCES AND USE OF NATURAL GAS
16 TAC §25.173
The Public Utility Commission of Texas (commission) adopts
new §25.173 relating to Goal for Renewable Energy with changes to the
proposed text as published in the October 22, 1999 issue of the
Texas Register
(24 TexReg 9142). This section is adopted under Project
Number 20944. Section 25.173 will implement the legislative goal for renewable
energy development in the state of Texas as set forth in Senate Bill 7 (SB
7), Act of May 21, 1999, 76th Legislature, Regular Session, chapter 405, 1999
Texas Session Law Service 2543, 2561 (Vernon) (to be codified as an amendment
to the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA), Texas Utilities Code Annotated §39.904).
In adopting this rule, the commission's objective is to establish a renewable
energy credits trading program (trading program) and define the renewable
energy purchase requirements for competitive retailers in Texas. This rule
will (1) implement the statutory mandate in PURA §39.904 to promote the
development of renewable energy technologies; (2) encourage the construction
and operation of new renewable energy projects at those sites in Texas that
have the greatest potential for capture and development of environmentally
beneficial renewable resources; (3) reduce air pollution in Texas that is
associated with the generation of electricity using fossil fuels; (4) respond
to customer preferences that place a high value on environmental quality and
reflect a willingness to pay a higher price for "clean" energy acquired from
renewable resources; (5) increase the amount of renewable energy available
to supply electricity to consumers in Texas; and (6) ensure that all customers
have access to energy from renewable energy resources pursuant to PURA §39.101(b)(3).
Texas possesses a vast amount of untapped renewable resources, perhaps
more than any other state. The Legislature recognized that economic and environmental
benefits would accrue to Texas citizens from the development of those resources
by enacting §39.904, which mandates that an additional 2,000 megawatts
(MW) of generating capacity from renewable technologies be installed in Texas
by January 1, 2009.
The Legislature's commitment to development of the state's abundant renewable
resources is derived from the preferences expressed by Texas consumers in
favor of renewable power. The integrated resource planning process required
that utilities assess customer values and preferences and consider these preferences
in their resource plans. In an effort to assess customer values and preferences,
utilities across the state polled their customers. Statistically significant
samples representing about two-thirds of retail electric customers in Texas
indicated a willingness to purchase electricity that was generated by renewable
energy resources to improve air quality in their communities and across the
state. The customers' preferences, revealed in the polling process, are reflected
in PURA §39.904: cleaner sources of energy should be deployed to develop
the state's renewable resources and improve the quality of the air in Texas.
Texas has long been a leader in the direct use of energy produced by burning
fossil fuels. Although Texas has historically been one of the largest energy
consumers in the nation, it has continued to be near the bottom in the production
and use of renewable energy. The continued growth of the Texas economy and
population will continue to make it one of the leaders in energy consumption.
Relying on energy produced by burning fossil fuels has contributed to the
degradation of air quality in much of Texas, and reliance on fossil-fueled
energy sources in the future will continue this trend. Texas electric customers
have placed a high value on environmental quality and have shown a willingness
to pay a premium for clean energy sources that benefit their communities and
the state of Texas. The renewable energy mandate, coupled with the program
for trading renewable energy credits (RECs), will ensure prudent use of clean,
abundant, and unused Texas renewable resources in the energy production process
in a least-cost manner. Additionally, it allows renewable industry participants
from Texas or any other location to compete in a market for renewable energy.
The staff held a public workshop to begin the evaluation of issues related
to the renewable energy mandate. During this workshop, a technical taskforce
with four working groups was formed to address key issues. Six subsequent
task force meetings were held during which stakeholders participated in painstaking
negotiations to develop a well-balanced rule to implement the requirements
of PURA §39.904. The rule reflects the work products of the task force
and working groups, incorporating numerous compromises reached by parties
in the technical workshops conducted in this proceeding. Where consensus could
not be reached, staff considered all views presented in the workshops and
in written comments in drafting the proposed rule, which was approved for
publication on October 6, 1999.
On November 5, 8, and 10, the following parties filed comments on the proposal:
Automated Power Exchange (APX), Guadalupe Blanco River Authority (GBRA), City
Public Service of San Antonio (CPS), Entergy Gulf States (EGS), Public Utilities
Board of Brownsville (PUB), Texas Industrial Energy Consumers (TIEC), TXU
Electric (TXU), Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA), Texas Renewable Energy
Industries Association (TREIA), Shell Energy Services Company, L.L.C. (Shell),
Duke Solar Energy and The Boeing Company (Duke Solar and Boeing), the City
of Denton, the City of Garland, and the Greenville Electric Utility System
(the Cities), Reliant Energy HL&P (Reliant), Texas-New Mexico Power Company
(TNMP), Enron, Sabine River Authority of Texas (SRAT), Southwestern Public
Service Company (SPS), South Texas Electric Cooperative (STEC), Central Power
and Light Company, Southwestern Electric Power Company, and West Texas Utilities
Company, which are the Texas operating companies of Central and Southwest
Corporation (collectively, CSW), Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), Austin
Energy, East Texas Cooperatives (ETC), Office of Public Utility Counsel and
Cities served by CP&L and TXU (OPC and Cities), Texas Electric Cooperatives
(TEC), Brazos Electric Power Cooperative and Rayburn Country Electric Cooperative
(Brazos and Rayburn), Texas Renewable Power Coalition (Renewable Coalition
or The Coalition), Small Hydro of Texas (Small Hydro), and the Texas Public
Power Association (TPPA).
On November 22, 1999, commission staff held a public hearing pursuant to §2001.029
of the Administrative Procedure Act. Representatives Leo Berman, Jim McReynolds,
Bob Glaze, Tom Ramsay and Senator Bill Ratliff attended the hearing and provided
comments regarding the treatment of existing resources in the proposed rule.
ETC, SPS, and the Cities also provided oral comments on the proposed section.
Any comments provided at the public hearing that were not previously submitted
in written comments during this proceeding are summarized herein.
In general, Austin Energy, CSW, Enron, Small Hydro, EGS, Reliant, Duke
Solar and Boeing, TREIA, EDF, and the Renewable Coalition complimented the
commission and staff for using a consensus-based process involving all interested
parties to define the principal elements of the trading program. EDF noted
that this proceeding was unlike any other, requiring parties new to this concept
to think in new ways about regulatory programs. EDF also commented that the
rule as published is exceptional and that Texas is clearly in the position
of producing a rule that can serve as a model for other states. Shell Energy
commended the commission staff for their work on an extraordinarily difficult
rulemaking, stating that the proposed rule undoubtedly will further renewable
energy capacity development in Texas. The Renewable Coalition commended the
commission and staff for publishing a rule that promises to efficiently achieve
the principal goal for renewable energy established by the Legislature. Reliant
generally supported the proposed rule as published, while STEC stated that
it exceeds the commission's statutory authority, is anti-competitive, discriminatory,
and unconstitutional.
Comments on specific questions in the preamble
to the proposed rule
In the preamble, the commission sought comment on the penalty provisions
set forth in §25.173(n). Parties were asked whether meaningful penalties
are necessary to ensure compliance with the trading program requirements and
to provide examples of penalty provisions contained in other trading programs
such as the Acid Rain Program administered by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). Parties were also asked to comment on appropriate monetary fees
for penalties assessed to competitive retailers participating in the trading
program.
Most of the parties agreed that meaningful penalties were necessary; however,
TNMP commented that penalties should not be assessed for competitive retailers
who fail to meet their allocation of RECs. TNMP contended that there is no
need for a standard dollar per megawatt-hour (MWh) penalty or a penalty based
on a percentage of market value. TNMP suggested that a competitive retailer
should have until March 31 of each year to make up any deficit of RECs through
transactions on the open market.
The Cities commented that the administrative penalty provisions of PURA §15.023
are not applicable to municipally owned utilities or electric cooperatives,
because §15.023 is applicable to a "person" regulated under PURA. Municipally
owned utilities and electric cooperatives are not within the definition of
"person" in PURA §11.003. TXU contended that all trading program participants
must be treated equally and should therefore be subject to penalties. TXU
proposed adopting a provision stating that an electric cooperative or municipality
that opts in to customer choice and participation in the REC trading program
thereby voluntarily submits itself to the administrative penalty provisions
of PURA §15.023 and the proposed rule with respect to its obligations
under PURA §39.904.
Duke Energy, TIEC, TREIA, EDF, CSW, Reliant, TXU, and OPC & Cities
generally agreed that the penalty structure proposed in the rule was appropriate.
Austin Energy and the Coalition commented that the penalties were not strong
enough. Austin Energy recommended that in addition to a monetary penalty,
the retail electric provider should also be required to purchase the additional
deficit credits. The Coalition likewise commented that the penalty amount
should be higher to ensure that the cost of non-compliance is higher than
the cost of compliance. Shell, Reliant, TXU, and CSW disagreed with this position.
Shell, TXU, STEC, Entergy, Enron, OPC, and TEC recommended various penalty
structure solutions. Shell commented that the proposed fixed penalty scheme
violates PURA §15.023(c), which requires the commission to take into
account six factors in determining an appropriate penalty amount and that
the commission should delete subsection (n)(2) and follow the statutory scheme,
using a case-by-case evaluation. If the commission establishes a penalty mechanism,
however, Shell suggested that the commission modify the penalty scheme to
allow competitive retailers to earn back the penalty through future superior
performance, and that the commission preserve the option to assess an appropriate
penalty, based on the circumstances. The Coalition disagreed with Shell on
this point. Shell also suggested that the commission consider waiving penalties
altogether if the year's statewide capacity goal is met. Shell contended that
the $50 per MWh penalty exceeds the tolerance margin for non-affiliate retail
electric providers (REPs), and that the commission should set penalties only
after it knows the prevailing REC market value during the compliance period.
Shell recommended that the commission incorporate a market value, using
a two-prong penalty measure. Shell relied on a penalty proposed in an Arizona
rulemaking. Shell recommended that the penalty be the lesser of $30 per MWh
or the Texas average annual firm peak MWh price during the compliance period.
The $30 per MWh penalty would constitute a ceiling, with the penalty otherwise
determined according to the prevailing market price. With respect to penalties
assessed according to the average market value of credits, Shell contended
that the commission can not determine market value unless parties disclose
all trade prices to the program administrator. The Renewable Coalition pointed
out that the penalty proposed in Arizona is not $30 per MWh, but rather $0.30
per kilowatt-hour (kWh) or $300 per MWh. The Coalition concluded that the
Texas penalty is therefore significantly less costly than the Arizona penalty.
TXU commented that $50 per MWh is an inappropriate penalty figure. TXU
argued that the monetary penalty should be set not at the total cost of a
MWh of renewable energy, but at some multiple of the differential in price
between market and renewable energy. TXU further commented that assuming that
the market value of credits will reflect the cost differential between renewable
power and market power, a reasonable penalty is some multiple of the market
value of credits. TXU also suggested graduated penalty provisions. TXU maintained
that it is reasonable to base the penalty on the average market value of credits
even though price is not required to be reported in connection with the transfer
of RECs, because it is anticipated that the necessary pricing information
will be readily obtainable. TEC disagreed with TXU's proposal that penalties
be assessed on a dollar per MW basis for failure to have sufficient renewable
capacity under contract by January 1, 2003. Such penalties would be duplicative
of penalties for failure to satisfy the energy-based renewable requirement
for 2003. TEC contended such double penalties would be unreasonably punitive.
TEC noted that competitive retailers will likely satisfy their renewable obligations
through the purchase of RECs instead of contracting for renewable capacity
directly, and should not be penalized for failure to contract for the capacity.
TEC noted that electric cooperatives that are parties to an all-requirements
contract would be precluded from contracting for renewable capacity and that
penalties for failure to contract for capacity would discourage such electric
cooperatives from offering customer choice until some time after the capacity
penalties no longer apply, and capacity penalties would fail to recognize
that retail load obligations will change during 2003. TEC observed that this
would have the discriminatory effect of subjecting incumbent suppliers to
capacity-based penalties, but not new retail suppliers. STEC and Enron agreed
that a competitive retailer should not be penalized when it has made a good
faith effort to comply with its REC allocation. STEC also urged the commission
to modify the penalty provision to incorporate the language suggested by TEC
that would expressly exempt competitive retailers from penalties resulting
from shortfalls in the renewable energy supplied by the seller of renewables.
Enron and EGS commented that the proposed $50 per MWh penalty is excessive.
Both parties stated that the market value of traded renewable energy credits
is unknown at this point and contended that penalties that exceed or equal
the market value of credits may deter a REP from deciding to enter the market.
Enron questioned where the penalties collected will go, and recommended that
they be used to offset the program administration costs. Shell agreed with
Enron on this point. Enron recommended building upon what other states, such
as Massachusetts and New Jersey, have done. Similar to those states, upon
the first offense, Enron suggested a public warning be issued and that the
commission specify a deadline by which the REP must rectify the deficiency
of credits. If the REP does not comply with the commission's order, and depending
upon the reason for noncompliance, the commission could suspend the license
of the REP or notify the REP's customers of the noncompliance. Enron suggested
that the commission may prohibit the REP from accepting or soliciting additional
customers if a pattern of noncompliance persists. As a last resort, or in
the case of egregious noncompliance, Enron proposed that the commission revoke
such REP's license. Shell, Reliant, and CSW agreed in their reply comments
with Enron on this type of penalty structure; however, EDF and the Coalition
disagreed. Enron further commented that it would be unfavorable to REPs to
require them to disclose the average market value of their annual credits
in connection with assessing a penalty when the disclosure of the price for
credits is not otherwise required.
OPC and Cities commented that if it is significantly more costly to acquire
credits on the open market, $50 may not be an appropriate fee because REPs
will prefer to pay the fee rather than acquire renewable energy. OPC and Cities
further maintained that price disclosure should be required because the assessment
of the average market value of credits is likely to be highly inaccurate if
price disclosure is not required. OPC and Cities further commented that transaction
reports for RECs should include both price and quantity. OPC and Cities contended
that the purpose of the REC auction is to balance supply and demand, and to
provide a market-based incentive for entry into the renewable resources market.
However, if the price of a REC is not disclosed, a potential producer of renewables
will have no way of knowing whether a potential for profit exists. OPC and
Cities supported the levying of the lesser of two sanctions, such that the
$50 per MWh penalty may act as a ceiling thereby preventing the penalty from
becoming extremely onerous. TEC submitted that the proposed rule's penalty
provisions should recognize the reason for a retail energy seller's failure
to meet renewable energy goals and recognize that the retail energy seller
can not control the action of the renewable energy supplier. TEC also noted
that one element of a competitive market is price disclosure and that prices
paid for RECs should be disclosed and made available to market participants
on an after-the-fact basis. Several parties referred to penalty provisions
contained in the Arizona renewable energy scheme and the Acid Rain program
administered by the EPA.
The commission notes that the penalty provisions contained in this section
were drafted and discussed in several task-force meetings as one element of
a comprehensive program design package. The proposed penalty for non-compliance
is the
lesser
of either $50 per MWh or twice
the average market value of credits. As many parties agreed, meaningful penalties
are a necessary component of a successful trading program; the penalties included
in the rule provide a fair and substantial incentive for all competitive retailers
to comply with their ongoing REC purchase requirement. Moreover, additional
risk-management provisions included in the rule such as six months of early
banking, a 5.0% deficit allowance for the program's first two years, and three-year
banking allowance for all RECs, provide competitive retailers with the flexibility
needed to comply with the requirements set forth in this section. These provisions
eliminate the need for any type of graduated penalties suggested by some parties.
The commission disagrees with Shell's suggestion that penalties be completely
waived if the state's capacity targets are met in any given year. Shell's
proposal would eliminate the incentive for all competitive retailers to comply
with the rule and would encourage free ridership and uncertainty in the REC
market. The commission also rejects Cities' comment that the penalty provisions
in §25.173 do not apply to municipally-owned utilities or distribution
cooperatives. PURA §39.002 specifically states that §39.904 applies
to municipally-owned utilities or electric cooperatives that offer customer
choice. Moreover, §39.002 states that where there is a conflict between
the specific provisions of Chapter 39 and other provisions of PURA, the provisions
of Chapter 39 control. Section 39.904(c) requires that the commission adopt
rules necessary to administer and
enforce
the statute. Under this statutory authority, the commission may enforce the
provisions of the proposed rule. Additionally, the commission finds authority
to enforce the proposed rule under §39.157(e), which gives the commission
jurisdiction to establish a code of conduct that must be observed by municipally-owned
utilities or electric cooperatives and their affiliates to protect against
anti-competitive practices. Enforcing the provisions of the proposed rule
against some competitive retailers and not others would result in competitive
advantages for municipally owned utilities or electric cooperatives that offer
customer choice. The commission finds that municipally-owned utilities or
distribution cooperatives that offer customer choice in the restructured competitive
electric power market must be held accountable to the same enforcement standards
applied to all other competitive retailers. The commission therefore declines
to make any recommended changes to subsection (o) relating to penalties.
Second, the commission asked parties to list the appropriate combination
of requirements that would ensure that the electric industry collectively
achieves the state's capacity goals in the most economically efficient manner.
The commission specifically inquired whether 400 megawatts (MW) of new renewable
generating capacity could be installed in Texas by January 1, 2003 if: the
credits trading program (1) begins in 2003, (2) allows 5.0% deficit banking
for the first two compliance periods, and (3) does not require a new capacity
conversion factor to be used until 2006. The commission also sought comment
on the appropriate trading program start and end dates.
With respect to an appropriate program start date CSW, Duke Solar and Boeing,
EGS, EDF, SRAT, Shell, TIEC, TREIA, and the Coalition stated that the trading
program should begin on January 1, 2002. APX, PUB, and OPC stated that the
program should begin before January 1, 2003. EDF, Shell, SRAT, and TIEC stated
that a January 1, 2002 program start date corresponds with the beginning of
competition in Texas. EDF opined that this timeline would ensure that 400
MWs of fully
performing
new renewable resources
are in place by January 1, 2003 consistent with §39.904(a) and (c)(2).
CSW and TREIA stated that a January 1, 2002 start date would allow renewable
generation developers to gradually install renewable facilities during 2002
and could potentially lower the costs to customers if federal legislation
extends the renewable energy production tax credit (PTC) through mid-2003.
CSW and the Coalition noted that an extension of the PTC would be limited
and require developers to immediately install facilities to insure qualification
for the credit. Using a capacity conversion factor of 35%, CSW quantified
the potential cost savings to Texans. Assuming that the first 400 MW capacity
requirement were installed in time to qualify for the $0.019 tax credit, 1,226,400,000
kWhs could be purchased for $0.019 less than those built without the benefit
of the credit, yielding a cost reduction of $23,301,600 in the first year
of the program. This annual cost reduction would be reflected in each of the
first ten years of service for a project that qualified for the PTC. TXU disputed
the savings presented in the CSW example, stating that the start date should
not be based on hopes or expectations of congressional action.
Reliant, SPS, TNMP, and TXU stated that the start date for the trading
program should be January 1, 2003. Reliant stated that the proposed rule requires
contracts representative of new installed renewable capacity to be in place
and producing a full year's worth of energy, a requirement not expressed in
SB 7. Reliant opined that efforts to enforce penalties against a retail competitor
possessing its full allocation of renewable capacity under contract by January
1, 2003 would be legally unsustainable. TXU remained concerned that by using
a January 1, 2002 start date, it may not be physically possible to construct
the facilities necessary to meet its renewable purchase requirement. TXU submitted
a timeline to justify its assertion. Reliant was concerned that transmission
constraints in ERCOT might limit the ability of the renewables industry to
install 400 MW of capacity in time to meet the target in the draft rule. Reliant
stated that a program commencement date of January 1, 2003 would allow transmission
providers additional time to upgrade the necessary transmission facilities.
CSW, the Coalition, Shell and TREIA sharply disagreed with TXU's claim
that the renewable industry could not install sufficient capacity in time
to build 400 MW of new capacity by January 1, 2003. CSW asserted that it is
likely that renewable resources will be gradually installed throughout 2002,
and the total output supplied by generators will exceed the total energy required
for REPs to meet their renewable purchase requirements. CSW also pointed out
that TXU's estimated schedule for completion of a renewable project is grossly
overstated and maintained that a REP wishing to sign a contract today could
receive energy from a 100 MW wind farm within 18 months or less. CSW justified
its position based upon its experience adding 75 MW to the Southwest Mesa
Wind Energy Project in Upton and Crockett Counties, Texas. This project demonstrated
that a substantial wind project could be completed in much less than the 28-42
months suggested by TXU. For example, the turbine order was placed in November
1998 and delivery began in March 1999 at a time that over 800 MW of wind energy
was installed in the US. Moreover this 75 MW wind farm was completed and operational
within nine months after the commission's approval of the project. CSW also
stated that TXU's schedule for completing new renewable facilities ignores
the following facts: (1) site identification work is in many cases already
done or in process; wind energy sites in Texas have already been leased, optioned
or purchased by developers in excess of 400MW, (2) private developers of these
wind sites are currently conducting meteorological studies, and (3) environmental
studies can be completed in less than three months concurrently with geotechnical
and engineering site layout work.
Shell Energy also disagreed with TXU's assertion that the 400 MW target
can not be met, mentioning that American National Wind Power (ANWP) is currently
developing a 250 MW site in Culberson County. TREIA disputed TXU's assertion,
noting that Texas industry is installing more than 145 MW of new renewable
resources during 1999 alone. The Coalition stated that TXU's lengthy project
schedule may be due to the fact that TXU's Big Spring wind project experienced
a series of delays associated with regulatory intervention and litigation,
external litigation involving patents associated with the initial technology
chosen for the project, and a change in project ownership. The Coalition submitted
a project development schedule that it believed was more typical, indicating
that the wind power industry, contingent upon REPs appropriately contracting
for new renewable energy, could easily achieve the installation of 400 MW
of new generating capacity by the beginning of 2002.
Although TXU stated that it would be challenged to meet its projected 160-MW
requirement, the Coalition replied that the construction of a 160-MW project
is quite feasible. The Coalition illustrated this point with Enron Wind Corporation's
two Storm Lake, Iowa projects, built simultaneously, at the same location,
and equaling more than 192 MW. The Coalition also pointed out that TXU does
not have to obtain all 160 MW of its projected initial REC requirements from
one project; it has the option of contracting for output from multiple projects,
possibly developed by separate entities. The Coalition justified the industry's
ability to build new capacity, stating that during the twelve-month period
from July 1998 through June 1999, approximately 1,000 MW of wind power capacity,
worth approximately $1 billion, was installed in the United States. TXU also
submitted that the time required for wind turbine delivery alone may be closer
to 12 months after the manufacturer's receipt of the order. The Coalition
was perplexed as to the source of such information and NEG Micon, a member
of the Coalition and one of the world's leading turbine suppliers, reported
that it can deliver turbines within 14 to 16 weeks after receiving a "Notice
to Proceed". Representatives of Vestas, another world leader in turbine manufacturing
and Coalition member, stated that deliveries typically occur six to eight
months from the date of an order. Enron Wind currently can deliver its domestically
manufactured turbines within six months of an order, and internationally manufactured
1.5 MW turbines within two to three months of an order. With respect to the
project development schedule, TXU argued that it was aggressively assuming
nine months for engineering, procurement, and construction. The Coalition
countered TXU's assumption by pointing out that the construction of FPL Energy's
75 MW wind farm was accomplished at a remote and challenging location in only
five months.
As an alternative to a January 1, 2003 program start date Reliant, TEC,
and TXU proposed using the actual installed faceplate capacity, as verified
by the commission or program administrator, to determine compliance with PURA §39.904(a),
rather than the energy production required by the proposed rule. The Coalition
disagreed, commenting that it is neither appropriate nor necessary to alter
a fundamental element of the trading program for the first two compliance
periods. Despite the fact that the capacity conversion factor (CCF) is administratively
set at 35% for the first two compliance periods, program efficiencies remain
an important objective, and it would be disruptive to switch from a capacity-based
to an energy-based credits trading program.
With respect to the appropriate trading program end date, CSW, the Cities,
EGS, Reliant, SPS, TIEC, and TNMP stated that the end date for the trading
program should be in 2009 because there is no legislative requirement that
the trading program extend beyond that date. The Coalition disagreed with
this assertion, stating that the directive of PURA §39.904(c) requires
the commission to adopt rules necessary to administer and enforce the renewable
energy mandate; this language sufficiently supports the commission's initiation
of program requirements prior to 2003, any early banking provisions, and continuation
of program requirements beyond 2009. The Cities and SPS stated that §39.904
milestones are evaluated on the basis of whether renewable capacity has been
installed. The Cities also stated that extending the end date beyond 2009
is inconsistent with preamble language that there will be no economic costs
incurred by persons who are required to comply with the new rule beyond those
costs caused by the underlying statute that it implements. Extending the compliance
period an additional ten years, Cities continued, will significantly increase
costs for parties that must purchase renewable energy credits.
EGS and TXU acknowledged the concern that some stakeholders have expressed
that in order for RECs to be available for trading through 2008, renewable
energy generators must have certainty that a market will exist for their renewable
capacity after January 1, 2009. This concern is that investors will be unwilling
to fund a renewable project in years 2007 and 2008, and perhaps earlier, unless
they can be sure that there will be buyers for this capacity after January
1, 2009. Both EGS and Reliant argued that the commission may not unilaterally
decide to continue the program beyond 2009 without a specific mandate in SB
7. CSW, the Cities, EGS and Reliant opined that conformance with the end date
of the statutory goals need not hinder the credits trading program if it needs
to operate beyond 2009. CSW stated that the Legislature would be in a position
to extend the program if necessary.
Austin Energy, Duke Solar and Boeing, EDF, OPC and the Cities, TREIA, and
the Renewable Coalition stated that the end date for the trading program should
be December 31, 2019. Austin Energy, OPC and the Cities, and TREIA, and the
Coalition maintained that the program must have an extended end date to provide
a sufficient level of certainty for financing renewable investments. EDF stated
that ending the program in 2019 should provide enough time for suppliers to
recover the costs of previous investment in renewables as well as those costs
associated with the last 600 MW capacity installment required in 2008. If
the program is not extended, continued EDF, renewable energy providers may
be forced to try and recover these capital costs in only a year or two of
sales with extremely high prices containing an additional risk premium.
CSW, Enron, EDF, OPC and Cities, and Shell suggested that under appropriate
circumstances, the program could be ended earlier than 2019 using a market-based
approach. These parties concurred that the program could essentially end automatically
as the cost of renewable energy decreases over time and the price of a renewable
energy credit becomes zero dollars. These parties proposed that the commission
should determine the program's termination date at a later time based on empirical
evidence justifying that a trading program would no longer be necessary to
sustain the mandate. Shell added that an uncertain end date might accelerate
the installation of new renewable capacity. TREIA countered that an end date
of 2019 was better than a market-based approach. TREIA asserted that self-sunsetting
actually would increase compliance costs by introducing risk for projects
built prior to 2009. If the value of RECs go to zero, TREIA continued, the
only advantage that REPs would gain from "self-sunsetting" would be the elimination
of administration costs, which are expected to be low.
In response to questions regarding deficit banking, PUB, OPC and Cities,
Reliant, TIEC, and TXU, supported the flexibility offered by the prospect
of 5.0% deficit banking. OPC and Cities noted that the concept of deficit
banking is one part of the compromise created by the task force members to
garner support for the strong penalty provisions of this section. Reliant
presented a numerical example of deficit banking that showed it could work
as a risk management tool while still allowing compliance with the 2003 mandate.
EDF, OPUC and Cities, SPS, TREIA and TIEC were concerned that the 5.0%
deficit banking allowance could reduce the commission's ability to ensure
that capacity goals are met. SPS supported the position that any shortage
banked under the deficit banking provision should be made up in the following
year. EDF further stated that deficit banking is not needed as a risk management
tool.
With respect to an appropriate CCF, PUB agreed that the commission should
use actual capacity factors to calculate the CCF in the future as actual performance
of technologies becomes known. Reliant suggested that the CCF be adjusted
biannually. TIEC stated that the CCF should be adjusted in 2004, not 2006.
TREIA argued that the 35% fixed CCF reduces the commission's ability to ensure
capacity goals are met. The Coalition stated that achieving the initial capacity
target set by the Legislature depends in large part on whether the initial
35% CCF is accurate and that the end of the program's first year will illustrate
whether or not that is the case. The commission should therefore reevaluate
the CCF and assess the success of the program during the program's first settlement
period in the first quarter of 2003.
SPS stated that wind turbines likely will perform below the proposed 35%
capacity factor in its service territory. SPS's most recent project is anticipated
to have a 32% capacity factor. SPS argued that it will have to add 10% more
turbines to achieve its energy purchase requirements set forth in the proposed
rule.
The commission agrees with TIEC, CSW, Duke Solar and Boeing, the Renewable
Coalition, Shell, EDF, TREIA, and SRAT, that the REC trading program should
begin on January 1, 2002, for several reasons. First, Congress has extended
the 1.9 cents per kWh PTC for wind energy. To qualify for this credit, facilities
must be producing energy
no later
than December
31, 2001. This credit will significantly reduce the cost of wind energy and
will lower program compliance costs for competitive retailers and their customers.
A January 1, 2002, program start date should provide an incentive to complete
projects before 2002, so as to qualify for the PTC. Second, the commission
is not persuaded by TXU's position claiming that developers can not build
sufficient resources before January 1, 2002. As CSW, the Coalition, and Shell
Energy discussed, prudent buyers and sellers of renewable energy are already
making preparations for developing sufficient renewable capacity to meet the
first 400 MW target. If wind power is consistently the renewable technology
of choice during the next ten years, Reliant's concern about transmission
constraints may become a reality. However, this does not appear to be a hindrance
to wind energy project development in the immediate future. The commission
commits to continue working with the ERCOT ISO and transmission service providers
to ensure that transmission constraints are alleviated across the state. This
should help mitigate any potential increases in trading program costs associated
with transmission congestion. The commission therefore declines to make any
of the recommended changes to the program start-date, noting that the provisions
as proposed are consistent with PURA §39.904(c), directing the commission
to establish a renewable energy credits trading program.
Additionally, the commission declines to amend the program end-date as
set forth in subsection (m) of this section and agrees with Austin Energy,
EDF, OPC and Cities, Duke Solar and Boeing, TREIA, and the Renewable Coalition
that a December 31, 2019, program end date will provide certainty for suppliers
financing renewable investments, ensure that all 2,000 MW are installed, and
would likely reduce the overall cost of compliance to competitive retailers
and their customers. First, the commission notes that the majority of stakeholders
were in agreement during the task force meetings that a trading program extending
beyond 2009 would decrease compliance costs for competitive retailers and
ensure the installation of the final 600 MW of capacity required in PURA §39.904(a).
For example, increased certainty for suppliers would likely reduce their financing
costs, resulting in reduced overall compliance costs for competitive retailers
and their customers. If competitive retailers are not required to hold credits
beyond 2009 it is possible that the costs of the last 1,050 MW of required
capacity may significantly increase, as suppliers seek to recover the above
market costs associated with this capacity over a five or two year period.
If the cost of renewable energy or the credits were to increase significantly,
competitive retailers might choose to pay the penalty instead of purchasing
the energy associated with this high cost capacity, resulting in noncompliance
with the statutory requirements set forth in PURA §39.904.
The commission clarifies that a ten-year continuation of the trading program
to 2019 does not require competitive retailers to purchase additional capacity
beyond the 2,000 MW required in the statute; it merely requires them to hold
credits for this period. If the price of credits falls to zero dollars before
2019, the commission, in assessing the program, would end the program if it
determines that the trading program is no longer necessary. Second, the commission
notes that PURA §39.904(c) requires the commission to adopt rules necessary
to administer and enforce the renewable energy mandate. This language gives
the commission sufficient latitude for the initiation of program requirements
prior to 2003, any early banking provisions, and continuation of program requirements
beyond 2009. Moreover, the 5.0% deficit banking provision allowed under subsection
(m)(2) will not reduce the commission's ability to ensure that capacity goals
are met. All competitive retailers incurring such a deficit must make up the
amount of RECs associated with the deficit in the next compliance period.
All of these elements of the program set out in the rule contribute to meeting
the objective of PURA §39.904, the installation of the specified amounts
of renewable resources in a cost-effective manner. The commission therefore
determines that the language contained in subsection (m) of this section should
not be changed.
Third, the commission sought comment on the metering and verification of
renewable energy output as required by this section, asking which parties
should be responsible for the metering and verification of renewable energy
output data.
Almost all parties agreed that the renewable energy generator should be
responsible for metering and verification of energy output data. Only PUB
suggested that the program administrator or another independent third party
be responsible for metering and verification of energy output data. Reliant,
CSW and EDF proposed that renewable energy metering and verification be subject
to the same standards as that of any other generator interconnecting to the
grid. CSW noted that ERCOT has established generation metering and verification
standards in the ERCOT operating guides and suggested that renewable generation
should meet and comply with the same standards for interconnection as all
other generators in a qualified power region, including metering and verification
requirements. TREIA suggested that the program administrator establish such
standards.
Boeing and Duke Solar suggested that British thermal unit (BTU) calculations
rather than metering could be used to determine the energy saved by generation
offset technologies, such as solar water heating. They also suggested allowing
the energy produced from renewable sources in hybrid plants to be eligible
for credits. OPC and Cities agreed with these changes, TXU objected.
With respect to renewable generators and the reporting of metering and
verification data, parties suggested that data be reported to either the ISO
or the program administrator. TXU, TNMP, and APX favored reporting directly
to the program administrator, while Reliant, TEC, Brazos and Rayburn, and
the Renewable Coalition favored reporting to the ISO. OPC and Cities stated
that metering and verification information should be shared between the generators,
market participants and program administrator.
Many parties proposed that the program administrator would be responsible
for the aggregation of the production data and verification of the accuracy
of the metered production data. TXU, TREIA, the Coalition, and Shell indicated
that this would include making spot checks and audits. Brazos and Rayburn
and TEC maintained that the ISO should be responsible for verifying production
data as well as generation-offset, off-grid, and on-site distributed renewable
resources. According to EDF, the burden of proof remains with the producer,
regardless of who does the verification. Enron argued against the existence
of a program administrator, proposing that each generator issue its own RECs.
The commission agrees with EDF that the burden of proof remains with the
generator. The BTU calculations suggested by Duke Solar and Boeing would be
an acceptable method to determine the energy saved by generation offset technologies.
However, the commission agrees with other parties that accuracy of metered
production data should be verified by the program administrator and amends
subsection (g)(9) to reflect this conclusion.
Fourth, the commission sought comment on the banking provisions currently
proposed in this section, specifically asking whether the three-year banking
provision contained in the proposed section would help ensure that 2,000 MW
of new capacity is installed in Texas by 2009. Parties were also asked whether
renewable power generators should be allowed to receive credits for energy
produced before the first compliance period (early banking) and how the addition
of this provision to the proposed section would impact the achievement of
the statutory goal.
With respect to a three-year banking limit for RECs, PUB, CSW, Duke Solar
and Boeing, Enron, EDF, OPC, SRAT, Shell, SPS, STEC, the Coalition, TIEC,
TNMP, and TREIA supported the banking provision. Brazos, Shell, TEC, and TIEC
stated that banking will encourage early installation of renewable facilities.
EDF stated that the combination of limiting the life of credits to three years
and specifying a program end date of 2019 is a good solution and provides
operational insurance without jeopardizing the fulfillment of the legislative
goal. PUB, the Coalition, Duke Solar, EDF, OPUC, and TREIA stated that the
three-year banking limitation will ensure that participants in the credit
trading program will build new renewable facilities and not just accumulate
credits. These parties argued that unlimited banking might allow competitive
retailers to accumulate enough RECs to meet their assigned requirements without
having to build the full 2000 MW of capacity by 2009. Brazos Electric, Shell
Energy, SPS, TEC, and TNMP noted that the three-year banking provisions will
help smooth normal year-to-year variance in output, provide a more stable
trading program and facilitate renewable resource planning.
Austin Energy and TXU opposed limits on banking credits. Austin Energy
stated that the proposed three-year life of banked RECs arbitrarily restricts
banking, a policy that should be encouraged aggressively. TXU commented that
a REC represents actual energy production from a renewable resource, and the
benefit gained from the production of that energy was actually realized and
does not expire; the benefit of renewable energy production is permanent and
the REC earned by that energy production should also be permanent.
Duke Solar and Boeing, the Coalition, and TREIA proposed that the commission
should articulate the right to alter restrictions on banking at any time in
the future it may be deemed necessary to meet the capacity targets. The Coalition
recommended that the commission explicitly reserve in the rule the authority
to take such action. The Coalition stated that the actions to be taken by
the commission in this regard could include limiting the number of credits
banked in prior compliance periods that can be used to achieve compliance
in the current period, and reducing the effective life of credits to less
than three years. CSW, Shell Energy, and TXU disagreed with this position.
CSW opined that canceling a banked REC in order to correct a shortfall would
in itself lead to shortfalls in renewable resource additions. CSW recommended
that the commission adjust the CCF if needed, as recommended in the proposed
rule, to reallocate renewable resource purchase requirements to competitive
retailers. Shell stated that having the commission retain the discretion to
modify banking requirements at any time during the program's existence would
introduce significant uncertainty into the trading program.
EDF stated that it would be better to be more conservative in the beginning
of the program in determining banking rights and privileges, than to later
be in a position requiring the commission to amend those rights if they are
found to be harming the legislative goal. SPS stated that too many restrictions
imposed on RECs could diminish their value to zero. This limited value greatly
reduces the incentive to own excess RECs.
Although early banking is not allowed in the published rule, Austin Energy,
CSW, Duke Solar and Boeing, Enron, EGS, the Coalition, SRAT, Shell Energy,
STEC, TEC, TREIA, and TXU supported early banking. Duke Solar and Boeing,
the Coalition, and TREIA proposed that six months of early banking be allowed
for new renewable facilities. The Coalition, STEC, and TXU argued that early
banking could provide early liquidity to the REC market. SRAT suggested that
early banking should begin as early as 2000 and should be allowed for existing
resources. EDF did not oppose early banking
per se,
but found it hard to imagine scenarios that could provide incentives
for early construction of new resources and ensure that the interim capacity
targets are met. EDF noted that parties favoring unlimited banking, early
or otherwise, have failed to provide the mathematical examples the commission
requested. Therefore, EDF commented that the three-year limitation on banking
should be maintained and no early banking should be allowed. EDF also stated
that allowing the banking of credits produced prior to January 1, 2002 could
severely affect the goal if qualifying existing post-1995 resources were allowed
to be banked. From a policy view, EDF continued, early banking is a tool to
encourage early development of resources, and so applying early banking to
already existing facilities would be meaningless as an incentive device. EDF
noted that a complicating factor associated with early banking is cost recovery.
CSW disagreed with EDF and TIEC that early banking would provide some existing
eligible resources with an unfair opportunity to double recover their costs,
pointing out that the proposed rule clearly excludes any existing renewables
from eligibility in the trading program if they are currently receiving cost
recovery through base rates or a power cost recovery factor (PCRF).
Austin Energy, CSW, and Shell Energy stated that early banking is an important
component of ensuring that the program achieve the initial target of 400 MW
of new renewable resources in 2002, creating an incentive to build renewables
in advance of the compliance date. Although TREIA stated its concern that
early banking serves to lessen the likelihood that capacity targets will be
met, it supported the overall package embodied in the proposed rule, and agreed
that a modest level of early banking could be tolerated without jeopardizing
compliance with capacity goals. Reliant stated that the intent of forward
banking is a risk management tool. If the first compliance period is 2003
with a requirement of 400 MW, Reliant continued, early banking should not
be necessary.
TIEC opined that early banking does not seem a viable option, because the
commission would need to have the registration and certification procedures
in place, and the resources would have to meet all eligibility requirements
of subsection (e). TIEC also stated that it is likely that the only renewable
facilities which could take advantage of early banking would be new resources
that would happen to be planned, built, and operated during the short window
of September 1, 1999 through December 31, 2001.
The commission notes that the three-year banking provision contained in
the proposed section was as part of a comprehensive program design package
agreed to by a majority of stakeholders during several of the task force meetings.
The majority of parties agreed that this banking provision would provide competitive
retailers with additional flexibility in a trading program based on energy
produced by intermittent generating capacity. Other parties agreed, that while
not ideal, the three-year limitation would help to ensure that competitive
retailers contract for new capacity in lieu of holding accumulated credits
for the duration of the program. Parties opposed to this provision were afforded
the opportunity, both during the workshops and the formal comment period,
to raise and provide justification for changes to the three-year banking limitation
for credits. The commission finds that parties have not convincingly shown
that the three-year banking provision should be either shortened or lengthened
in the context of a comprehensive program design package.
With respect to an early banking provision, the commission notes that,
during the task force meetings, most parties agreed that an early banking
provision would add liquidity to the market by increasing the number of credits
that are available at the start of their program. The commission agrees that
an early banking provision will enhance the market's liquidity and provide
a more functional market at the beginning of the program while maintaining
the economic incentives to build new renewable facilities. This will help
provide competitive retailers with additional flexibility and important risk
management tools needed to comply with the requirements of the trading program,
especially in its early stages. The commission clarifies that an early banking
provision does not require competitive retailers to buy RECs at an earlier
point in time, but rather allows generators to receive RECs for sale in the
trading program prior to the program's first compliance period. The commission
therefore amends §25.173(m) to reflect this conclusion.
The commission agrees with CSW, EDF, Shell Energy, and TXU that modifying
banking requirements at any time during the program's existence would introduce
uncertainty and an additional element of risk for competitive retailers forced
to comply with the trading program requirements. The commission therefore
declines to amend this section to include a provision retaining the right
to alter restrictions on banking at any time in the future as it deems necessary
to achieve the required capacity targets. The commission points out that adjustments
in the capacity conversion factor as set forth in subsection (j) and commission
review of the program as set forth in subsection (q), should adequately correct
any capacity deficiencies. The commission therefore declines to amend subsection
(g)(5) of this section and finds that the language is consistent with PURA §39.904(c)
relating to the establishment of a renewable energy credits trading program.
Fifth, the commission inquired whether it would be necessary to build new
renewable resources to offset any reduction in capacity resulting from the
retirement of any renewable resources in Texas.
Austin Energy, PUB, CSW, EDF, Duke Solar and Boeing, Shell Energy, TEC,
TIEC, TNMP, TREIA, Brazos and Rayburn, TXU, and the Renewable Coalition, stated
that the goal for new renewable energy in Texas is 2,000 MW by 2009. However,
these parties also pointed out that PURA §39.904 also requires a cumulative
renewable capacity of 2,880 MW in Texas by 2009. This assumes that 880 MW
of renewable capacity currently exists, will continue to operate, and should
be replaced by new resources if any are retired. OPC and Cities and Reliant
stated that the Legislature intended to have 2,000 MW of new renewables by
2009. The focus should therefore be on installing 2,000 MW of new capacity
and not providing a mandate for the maintenance of existing resources. Therefore,
the parties concluded, there is no need to build new renewable facilities
if any are retired during the life of the program.
PURA §39.904(a) requires an additional 2,000 MW of renewables to be
installed in Texas by January 1, 2009. However, this subsection also states
cumulative capacity targets for renewables, culminating with 2,880 MW installed
in Texas by January 1, 2009. This illustrates the Legislature's assumption
that 880 MW of renewables existed in Texas at the time SB 7 was drafted and
will continue to be in existence on January 1, 2009. Therefore, if any of
the renewable capacity is retired, new renewables to replace that capacity
will have to be built. Moreover, if customer demand for renewables exceeds
2,880 MW, market forces could lead competitive retailers to purchase renewable
capacity in excess of what is mandated in §39.904(a). Therefore, the
commission concludes that the 2,880 MW requirement indicates the minimum amount
of renewable capacity that should be installed in Texas by 2009, not the maximum.
Changes to the language in subsection (a) are therefore unnecessary. The commission
amends subsection (h) of this section to clarify this conclusion.
Sixth, the commission sought comment on the obligation of municipally-owned
utilities, distribution cooperatives, and retail electric providers to purchase
new renewable resources in the credits trading program if they have existing
renewable resources sufficient to cover their renewable energy purchase requirement.
Parties were specifically asked whether entities with existing resources should
have their obligation to purchase RECs proportionately reduced to reflect
the percent of existing renewables they have under contract. The commission
also inquired whether it would be necessary to allow existing resources to
produce credits for sale in the trading program if those resources are allowed
to offset a party's purchase obligation. The commission also asked parties
to explain how all of the following conditions could be met: (1) a party's
purchase obligation is offset by existing resources, (2) renewable credits
associated with those existing resources are excluded from producing credits
for sale in the trading program, and (3) the capacity requirements set forth
in PURA §39.904 are achieved in a timely, economical, and efficient manner.
Austin Energy, CPS, CSW, EGS, EDF, LCRA, OPC and Cities, Reliant, TEC,
TIEC, TPPA, and the Renewable Coalition generally agreed to a compromise approach
that would exclude existing renewables from participating in the trading program,
but would allow entities participating in retail competition to use existing
resources which they own or purchase to satisfy all or part of their renewable
obligation. The principles of this compromise are as follows: (1) existing
renewable resources as defined in §25.173(c)(5), other than qualifying
existing resources as defined in proposed §25.173(c)(10), that are currently
owned by or under contract to an entity would count toward its allocated requirement
for as long as they remain under contract (including renewal) or are owned
by the entity, (2) existing renewables, other than qualifying existing resources
as defined in proposed §25.173(c)(10), may not participate in the REC
trading program, and (3) regardless of when an entity chooses to opt into
competition, there should be a one-time, up front nomination of the existing
renewable resources (based on a ten-year average MWh output) that will be
used to offset its allocated requirement. LCRA stated that its proposal would
allow those who already own or purchase renewable capacity to count such capacity
or purchases toward the allocated renewable requirement. Such a proposal can
not produce windfalls, precisely because the contracts for such renewables
are already in place and can not arbitrarily be broken. Such resources can
not flood the market because they are already dedicated to existing customers.
The price of credits will not affect the price of energy already under contract,
nor produce benefits to the owners of existing resources, windfall or otherwise.
CPS, OPC, Brazos and Rayburn proposed methodologies that could be used
to offset renewable purchase obligations for entities with existing resources.
The Coalition recommended that the commission take great care in implementing
the offset for existing resources, as different approaches could have dramatically
different implications for the achievement of the program's objectives. For
example, OPC's proposal would actually result in less than 2000 MW of new
renewables being built, as requirements to buy new renewable RECs are reduced
for the owners of existing resources, but are not reallocated to other competitive
retailers. Additionally, Brazos Electric's proposed approach would give disproportionate
value to existing renewables. The initial allocation of REC requirements would
be based on the market shares of all participating retailers. Existing renewables
would offset REC requirements, for those that own existing renewables. The
total REC requirement would then be allocated across the smaller, remaining
base of REPs. The ratio of RECs required to total sales on a per-REP basis
would be higher in this allocation than in the initial allocation. With no
readjustment of the allocation for the exempted owners of existing resources
proposed, the result is that existing resources would have a disproportionate
value, relative to new resources, in achieving compliance with program requirements.
The Coalition agreed with CPS's proposal, stating that it includes two allocation
stages, correctly providing that REC responsibilities are relieved for owners
of existing resources on the same basis as they are assigned for REPs which
own no existing resources. The Coalition stated that the commission must limit
this benefit to output that is under contract exclusively for resale to retail
customers. Without such a limitation, this output could be sold and resold
on a wholesale basis. TXU objected to an "offset" concept that would use a
historical average of energy output from the existing resources in determining
the amount of "offset", maintaining that actual energy production each year
should be used. TXU and CSW also suggested that, to the extent that trading
program compliance is based upon energy, the "offset" provided by existing
resources be based upon actual energy produced, and not capacity.
TXU opposed any offset provision. CSW agreed, but stated it was willing
to accept a compromise comparable to CPS's proposal. TXU stated that it is
unfair and discriminatory to allow those entities to offset their obligation
using old, low-cost, low-capacity factor facilities, the capital cost of which
may have already been recovered through rates, and will also increase the
costs that all REPs, including new REPs, will bear as they enter the competitive
market in 2002. TXU further stated that such an exemption would allow municipally
owned utilities (MOUs) and electric cooperatives to avoid their responsibility
to support the legislative goal at the expense of all other retail competitors.
Only MOUs and cooperatives with existing resources would be able to take advantage
of this exemption because REPs will not be allowed to continue ownership of
generation facilities, renewable or otherwise, following the advent of retail
competition. Brazos and Rayburn and the Cities preferred that existing resources
be included in the trading program, but that a reasonable compromise would
be for municipally owned utilities and distribution cooperatives to offset
part or all of their REC requirements with existing renewable resources currently
under contract. PUB and State Representatives Merritt and Zbranek supported
some form of offset of REC requirements for municipally owned utilities and
distribution cooperatives purchasing power from existing renewable resources.
CSW alternatively suggested using a "cost test" to qualify existing renewable
resources for participation in the trading program. The "cost test" would
allow existing renewable resources to prove that their costs were above those
of other resources for sale in the wholesale market. Any existing renewables
meeting these cost criteria would be allowed to participate in the trading
program.
STEC commented that the offset, in principle, was a good basis for a negotiated
compromise. EDF strongly preferred this type of solution because it maintains
the trading program solely for new resources, allowing that market to operate
correctly by setting prices that minimize the ultimate cost to Texas citizens.
Brazos and Rayburn and ETC stated that for those cooperatives that do offer
customer choice, their load ratio share of their generation and transmission
(G&T) cooperative's existing renewables should count toward such opt-in
cooperative's REC allocation.
Many parties with existing renewable resources explained why these resources
should be allowed to participate in the trading program. APX, Brazos and Rayburn,
PUB, ETC, GBRA, SRAT, TEC, TNMP, and State Representatives Wohlgemuth and
Zbranek commented that the commission should incorporate existing renewables
into the credits trading program, as the continued operation of existing renewables
is important in increasing the total MW of renewables operating in Texas.
APX, Brazos and Rayburn, and TEC stated that the cost of trading RECs from
existing resources would be no higher, and perhaps lower, than the cost of
the trading program in which only new resources earned trading credits. APX
opined that the commission can define the percentage of new RECs and existing
RECs each competitive retailer must purchase to comply with the rule and provide
the regulatory push desired to encourage the development of new renewable
resources.
GBRA explained that many of the large incumbent providers oppose the inclusion
of existing resources in the rule because they have a minimum amount of renewable
capacity in their existing mix. By increasing the number of potential suppliers
in the market to include existing resources along with entities that construct
new projects, the market price for credits should in fact decrease, resulting
in an overall benefit to the market. ETC and State Representatives Telford
and Wohlgemuth also stated that out-of-state renewables should be included
in the trading program in order to be fair to the rural ratepayers and constituents
in East Texas. EDF responded by stating that the list of the 880 MW of renewables
used by the Senate Interim Committee on Electric Utility Restructuring did
not include the 128 MW of out-of-state Southwest Power Administration (SWPA)
hydropower allocated to cooperatives in East Texas.
CPS, Coalition, Duke Solar, EDF, OPUC, Shell Energy, and TXU stated their
opposition to including existing renewables in the credits trading program.
They maintained that awarding RECs to existing renewable resources would seriously
undermine the market for new renewable-resource credits and would jeopardize
the state's ability to achieve the required amounts of new renewable-resource
generating capacity in a cost-effective manner. OPC and the Coalition commented
that the inclusion of existing renewables in the program will be more costly
in the short-run and decrease the margin for competition in the early, formative
stages of the market for electricity. Additionally, the Coalition, Reliant,
Shell Energy, and TXU stated that if existing renewables received RECs that
their owners would receive an undeserved windfall. TXU provided a mathematical
example of such a windfall, concluding that the windfall would be substantial.
For example, assuming that the cost of credits averages $10 per MWh over the
first ten years of the program, and assuming a 20% capacity factor for existing
renewable resources, the value of the credits provided to existing facilities
would be over $153 million. TXU stated that owners of existing renewable facilities
should not receive a windfall of this magnitude.
The Coalition stated that if owners of existing renewable-generation were
awarded only one-half the amount of credits awarded to owners of new facilities,
this windfall would be merely reduced, not eliminated, again without producing
any additional renewable-resource capacity. Likewise, awarding new renewable
resources two credits per megawatt-hour would reduce, but not eliminate, the
number of existing resources wielding a competitive advantage over new renewables.
Shell Energy stated that it has not seen any data or studies to show that
an additional credit per MWh constitutes a sufficient investment incentive
to overcome the deterrent effect that existing resources' incumbency advantage
would create, or that competitive retailers would purchase energy from these
new projects, at a higher cost, simply because they would receive more RECs.
TXU stated that requiring new projects to compete with existing resources
in the market for renewable energy credits would create a serious market power
issue, particularly during the early years of the program, when the amount
of existing renewable capacity will significantly exceed that of new capacity.
Even by 2005 and 2006, the existing amount of renewable energy capacity (880
MW) will exceed the goal for new capacity (850 MW). By restricting the credit-trading
program to new resources, market power concerns will be greatly minimized.
Third, the presence in the credits market of significant amounts of lower-cost,
existing renewable sources could inhibit the timely contracting for credits
from new sources that will be necessary to support the development of those
sources. This could occur if the owners of those lower-cost, existing sources
withhold their credits from the market, in anticipation of higher credit prices
to be set by new renewable generation, and buyers of credits delay their purchases
in hopes of securing lower-cost credits from existing sources. TXU stated
that this would stifle the goal of having new generation in place according
to SB 7.
CPS stated that simple economics dictate that, in a competitive generation
market, the sustainability of an existing renewable resource is jeopardized
only to the extent that the incremental production costs of the resource are
in excess of the market price of electricity. While some parties have presented
data indicating that the
total cost
(i.e.,
embedded and incremental costs)
may
be greater
than the market price for some renewable resources, no data has been presented
that would indicate that any of the existing base of renewable resources has
incremental production costs that exceed the expected market price of electricity.
Given these circumstances, the inclusion of existing renewable resources in
the REC trading program serves only to: (1) provide a market-based subsidy
toward the recovery of embedded costs that are rightfully addressed in the
context of stranded costs (i.e., in the case where the total cost of the renewable
resource is greater than the market price); or (2) provide windfall profits
to the owners of existing renewable resources (i.e., in the case where the
total cost of the renewable resource is less than the market price). CPS does
not believe that the REC trading program was created to provide stranded cost
subsidies or windfall profits; rather, it was created with a sole purpose
in mind-to achieve an
additional
2,000 MW
of renewable resources in the State by 2009.
With respect to the competitiveness of existing hydroelectric facilities,
Brazos and Rayburn, GBRA, LCRA, and SRAT noted that the cost of production
from their existing hydroelectric resources exceeds projected market values.
LCRA stated that the resources are expensive to maintain and the ability to
release water to generate electricity is limited by water rights. The resultant
output, according to LCRA, GBRA, and SRAT, when apportioned over the cost
to operate and maintain the facilities, produces a cost of $36-$38 MWh for
LCRA to over $70 per MWH for GBRA and SRAT. LCRA stated that these costs make
the hydroelectric resources unable to compete against new combined cycle costs
or existing generation for which stranded costs have been recovered. EGS and
LCRA argued it would have little incentive to maintain their hydro resources
under those circumstances. Brazos Electric provided information on several
of its existing hydro contracts, stating that low annual capacity factors
and age of these facilities result in average costs that are above market.
Therefore, the energy associated with these facilities should be used to generate
RECs.
Reliant and TXU expressed skepticism about the claims of the river authorities
and stated that more detailed information would be needed to persuade them
that hydroelectric resources are in need of assistance. In any event, Reliant
and TXU stated that municipal and cooperative electric utilities that opt
in to customer choice could recover their stranded costs pursuant to the relevant
provisions of PURA Chapters 40 and 41, respectively. Shell Energy stated that
the commission should ignore threats that some parties will close their facilities
if it does not extend further preferences and subsidies to these already subsidized
facilities. Most existing resource owners can sell this energy through existing
long-term contracts. Shell questioned the notion that LCRA, whose main purpose
is to build and maintain dams and which is adding even more generation capacity
to meet all its long-term requirements contracts, will shut down its lucrative
generating facilities.
Austin Energy, Brazos and Rayburn, CPS, DGG, Entergy, LCRA, TEC, TIEC,
and TPPA took the position that the Legislative mandate in PURA §39.904
includes existing resources. As such, the rule must provide a mechanism that
allows for the continued operation of these resources because the 880 MW of
renewable resources in existence when the Legislature enacted SB 7 is included
in the mandates for 2003, 2005, and 2007. The proposed rule acknowledges this
mandate by stating that one of its purposes is "to ensure that the cumulative
installed renewable capacity in Texas will be at least 2,880 MW by January
1, 2009."
ETC stated that under the proposed rule none of the hydro power currently
under long term contract to Tex-La, NTEC, or SRG&T would count in the
renewable energy program, and any member distribution cooperative opting in
to retail competition would have to purchase additional renewable energy credits
("RECs") to satisfy the renewable allocation assigned by the program administrator.
Not only is this result inequitable, it could run afoul of the provisions
of the all-requirements contract between each G&T and its member distribution
cooperatives, which already provide for the distribution cooperative's full
requirements. ETC continued by stating that in practical terms, the cost of
having to acquire a completely new renewable energy allocation is estimated
to be, over the 11 year period beginning in 2002 and ending in 2012, on average
more than $1.5 million per year for the East Texas Cooperatives' distribution
cooperatives if they opt in to retail competition.
The Cities stated that the proposed rule does not acknowledge that municipally-owned
utilities were making investments in hydroelectric facilities without having
to be pushed into doing it by the commission or the Legislature. Therefore,
it is only fair that these units, and others like them, be included in the
credits trading program.
TXU stressed that existing renewable resource facilities were built for
purposes other than to meet the requirements of PURA §39.904. Dams were
built mainly for flood control, water storage, or recreation, with low-cost
electricity being a side benefit. TXU emphasized that the ability to obtain
power from hydroelectric projects was generally limited to only certain types
of entities due to federal preference provisions. Thus, ownership of existing
renewable resource facilities constitutes roughly three-fourths of the 880
MW of existing renewable capacity and is skewed towards certain types of entities
(mainly river authorities, cooperatives, and municipalities). It would therefore
be unfair to provide a monetary benefit to these entities when other utilities
in the past simply did not have the opportunity to avail themselves of such
renewable resource facilities. Shell Energy rejected the fairness argument
submitted by entities with existing renewables, questioning whether it is
fair that cooperatives and municipal utilities obtained subsidies and preferences
for their renewable resources, while IOUs could not. Shell opined that the
cooperatives and municipal utilities built these facilities for reasons of
their own choosing to suit their own needs. Shell suggested that the commission
should only care whether its rule complies with the legislation.
The commission concludes that existing resources should not be allowed
to participate in the credits trading program. The purpose of the trading
program is to ensure that 2,000 MW of new renewables are installed in Texas
in an economically efficient and least cost manner. This purpose is consistent
with PURA §39.904(a), which requires 2,000 MW of new renewables to be
installed in Texas by 2009 and §39.904(b), which requires the commission
to establish a renewable energy credits trading program. Allowing existing
resources to participate in the trading program would either increase costs
to all competitive retailers required to comply with the requirements of this
rule or reduce the value of RECs so that they do not provide adequate incentive
for new producers to add new renewables. For example, a trading program that
allowed both new and existing resources to participate would require that
each competitive retailer buy a proportionate amount of energy from its "share"
of a 1,280 MW obligation for the 2003 compliance milestone. Alternatively,
a trading program that allowed only new competitive resources to participate
would require each competitive retailer to buy a proportionate amount of energy
from its "share" of a 400 MW obligation. During the program's first compliance
period, including existing renewables in the trading program would increase
a competitive retailer's REC allocation by approximately 300%. If the market
value of the RECs is based on the cost differential between new renewables
and other new resources, a competitive retailer's costs would increase by
300%. This could serve as a barrier to entry for many REPs attempting to do
business in a newly restructured electric power market. Alternatively, the
availability of RECs from existing resources might create an oversupply of
RECs and depress their value. In this case, the value of the RECs would be
inadequate to provide producers sufficient incentive to build new renewable
capacity.
Additionally, the commission agrees with the statements of some parties
questioning the arbitrary nature of the term "qualifying existing resources"
defined in the proposed rule and concludes that it would be more equitable
not to allow these resources to participate in the trading program.
However, the commission recognizes that cumulative capacity targets also
are stated in PURA §39.904(a). The commission applauds all entities in
Texas that have realized the benefits of renewables and have taken the initiative
to invest in renewables without the requirement of a mandate such as that
contained in SB 7. The commission concludes that an "REC offset allowance"
would realize the benefits of existing renewables and ensure that the 880
MW of these resources envisioned in §39.904(a) continue to be utilized
until January 1, 2009. This offset allowance would allow all entities with
existing renewables to use these resources to proportionately offset their
renewable energy purchase requirement for new renewables. This offset allowance
shall ensure that the cumulative capacity targets required in §39.904(a)
are achieved in a manner that does not unnecessarily raise costs of the overall
program to Texas customers.
The commission reflects these conclusions by (1) allowing only facilities
installed and placed in service on or after September 1, 1999, the effective
date of §39.904, to be considered new and eligible to participate in
the credits trading program, with the exception of small producers as defined
in subsection (c) of this section, and (2) allowing all competitive retailers
to receive an offset for existing facilities owned or under contract by the
competitive retailer, its affiliates, or its predecessor nominating the resource
since September 1, 1999. Allowing an entity that owns existing facilities
or takes power under contract from existing facilities to share the related
renewable offsets with its affiliates will assure an equitable allocation
of the benefits of having obtained those existing resources. For the purposes
of this rule only, the commission determines that all of the individual G&T
members of ETEC and STEC and the distribution cooperative members of the individual
G&Ts, for example, are affiliates of each other. As a consequence of this
determination, these members could use their collective existing facilities
or renewable power contracts--whether individually or collectively owned--to
ratably share the offset created by those resources. The offset approach has
broad support among the parties, will ensure that all entities with existing
resources receive the same benefit for those investments, and supports the
goal of installing 2,000 MW of new capacity in a cost-effective manner. Providing
offsets will also make it easier for cooperatives and municipal utilities
that have rights to such existing resources to opt in to competition. The
commission agrees with the offset methodology proposed by CPS during the formal
comment period. This methodology includes two allocation stages, correctly
providing that REC allocations are reduced for owners of existing facilities
on the same basis as allocations are made for competitive retailers owning
no existing renewable resources. The commission therefore amends subsections
(c), (h), and (i) to reflect these changes.
Seventh, the commission sought comment on alternative ways to restructure
the credits trading program and specifically requested comments on the proposal
outlined in Chairman Wood's October 8, 1999 memo filed under this project
number. Parties were specifically asked whether existing renewables should
be incorporated into the credits trading program and, if so, what impact this
would have on (1) the cost or value of RECs over time, (2) the level of financial
incentive offered to new renewable resources, and (3) the overall cost of
the trading program. Additionally, parties were asked to explain any necessary
changes in the REC allocation methodology set forth in subsection (h) of this
section and the capacity factor calculation methodology set forth in subsection
(i) of this section to accommodate existing and new renewables.
Entergy, GBRA, and TNMP were supportive of Chairman Wood's proposal. Entergy
stated that the distinction between existing and new renewable capacity for
the purposes of awarding credits should not unreasonably complicate the credits
trading program or affect its costs. GBRA stated that the inclusion of all
existing renewable resources in the renewable energy credit (REC) trading
program, except those for which the costs are (1) recovered from retail customers
who do not have customer choice or (2) recovered as eligible stranded costs,
is essential to further the legislative goal of 2,880 MW of cumulative renewable
capacity by January 1, 2009. In addition, GBRA opined that Chairman Wood's
proposed additional one credit/MWH for projects less than ten years old will
create incentives for new projects in the market. ETC viewed the Chairman's
proposal as a good faith, positive effort to resolve the pending disputes
but proposed that it be amended to provide that a distribution cooperative
can opt in whenever it chooses to.
Senator Ratliff, State Representative Telford, Austin Energy, PUB, CPS,
CSW, LCRA, Shell Energy, SPS, TPPA, TREIA, the Texas Renewable Power Coalition,
and TXU disagreed with Commissioner Wood's proposal. Shell Energy stated that
the proposal fails to address the potential renewables market power advantage
that those possessing existing resources would obtain if they participated
in the program. Awarding an additional credit per MWh for the first ten calendar
years, Shell opined, only partially mitigates this concern. Shell Energy questioned
the statement in Chairman Wood's memo that the commission should ensure stability
in pricing for the REC program, commenting that enforced stable REC pricing
could actually prevent reaching the program's goals. SPS stated that preferential
treatment in the issuance of more than one credit for each MWH of production
also adds to the allocation problem. For example, if more than one credit
is issued for some MWHs of generation, then the allocation must be increased
so that these additional credits are absorbed and needed by the REPs, or there
would be no need to build generation because the excess credits can satisfy
the regulatory requirement in energy but not the legislative capacity requirement.
The Coalition argued that awarding new renewables the additional credit
for only the first ten years would effectively require them to compete directly
with lower-cost existing renewables beginning in their eleventh years and
for the remainder of their service lives. As a result, developers of new renewable
projects would seek to recover more of their costs during the initial ten-year
period, resulting in higher costs to consumers during the first ten years
of operation. The Coalition also averred that awarding post-1995 renewable-resource
facilities two credits for each unit of output during the first ten years
of their operation would create two classes of new renewables for the years
after 2005, those ten or fewer years old which receive two credits per megawatt-hour,
and those more than ten years old which receive only one. Over time, the relative
proportions of these two classes would change; adding complexity to the calculation
of the energy production goals needed to achieve the statutory capacity goals.
TXU stated that is was unclear how providing a differential number of credits
to certain resources will result in the levels of capacity set out in PURA §39.904(a)
actually being installed in this state. To the extent double credits are provided,
those double credits simply halve the amount of energy production that must
be achieved by new facilities.
Austin Energy stated that although the collaborative process did not lead
to resolution of every outstanding issue, it is inappropriate to look for
an entirely new approach as a substitute at this time. Instead, Austin Energy
asserted that the commission should act decisively to resolve the few remaining
issues in the renewables rule. Such action will strengthen the collaborative
process that has been used extensively and quite successfully to date during
the remainder of SB 7 implementation rulemakings. Without explicitly opposing
the Chairman's proposal, Reliant and STEC thought the proposal had problems
that could cause complications for enacting the renewables mandate. In considering
alternative ways to restructure the credits trading program, Reliant Energy
urged caution, stating that it is often difficult to predict how changes to
one aspect of the program might affect overall results and could have the
unintended effect of compromising achievement of overarching program goals.
Austin Energy concurred with this opinion, stating that the Chairman's alternative
proposal has simply not undergone the rigors of the collaborative process.
Austin Energy stated that if the details required for his suggested implementation
were fully developed, it would become clear that the alternative is significantly
more difficult to implement and operate than is staff's proposal.
Austin Energy, PUB, CPS, DGG, ETC, LCRA, STEC, State Representative Telford,
TEC, TPPA, and State Representative Wohlgemuth stated that the commission
should not or can not make opting for customer choice by January 1, 2002,
a prerequisite for participating in the credit trading program. PUB, the Cities,
and STEC stated that such an incentive is discriminatory because it creates
a cut off date to participate in the credit-trading program. Austin Energy,
TEC, and TPPA stated that the Chairman's apparent attempt to entice cooperatives
to opt-in sooner rather than later conflicts with the position taken by the
legislature in SB 7. There, the legislature expressly provided individual
cooperatives the ability to determine whether and when they will offer customer
choice. Rather than legislate provisions penalizing cooperatives for not offering
customer choice by a certain date, SB 7 establishes a policy of maximum flexibility
for cooperatives. TPPA also explained that its members' systems are actively
making preparations for industry restructuring, and will consider participating
in new retail markets authorized by SB 7. However, most are taking a cautious
approach, and the local decision to "opt-in" will not be made until local
authorities judge that new markets offer clear benefits to their consumers
and communities. Brazos and Rayburn, ETC, STEC, and TEC stated that not all,
and perhaps few, municipal utilities and G&T cooperatives will opt-in
by the first day of retail competition (January 1, 2002). LCRA presumed that
it would be subject to the same standard as the G&T cooperatives, and,
as a result, none of its 44 wholesale customers could count LCRA's existing
renewables if but one of the 44 declines to opt in. CPS opined that the renewable
energy goal and the REC trading program have nothing to do with retail competition,
as the same type of program could have been implemented in the context of
a mandatory purchase requirement on integrated, regulated utilities. Rather,
the goal and the program are about creating a public good through a market-based
program in an effort to promote least-cost solutions. CPS and TPPA stated
that the rationale for the proposed linkage to retail competition is unclear
and unwarranted, especially as applied to new resources.
If existing resources were somehow included in the REC trading program,
TXU Electric would support the concept that before any of a G&T cooperative's
renewable resources could participate, all of that G&T cooperative's distribution
cooperatives would have to opt in to retail choice. The decision on whether
to opt in to retail choice and participate in the REC trading program would
have to be known some time well in advance of the REC program start date,
so that all of the other REPs would know the overall impact of the inclusion
of existing resources in the REC trading program. Otherwise, REPs will not
have sufficient time in which to know what their likely REC requirement would
be, and to make plans to meet that requirement.
Austin Energy, CPS, STEC, and TPPA were concerned that the proposal is
intended to indefinitely exclude any new renewable resource from the REC trading
program for entities that have not opted-in to retail competition by January
1, 2002. As a general matter, CPS submitted that any new renewable resource
located in the State of Texas will certainly contribute toward the 2,000 MW
goal of PURA §39.904(a), regardless of the opt-in or out status of a
particular entity. Therefore, all new resources should be included in the
wholesale REC trading program that was created by the Legislature to achieve
that goal.
Shell Energy did not support Chairman Wood's proposal, but expressed the
view that if the commission decides to move in that direction, it should not
accept the cooperatives' and municipal utilities' complaints about tying this
provision to their entering competition on January 1, 2002. These entities
never cite any statutory provision that would preclude the commission from
doing so. At best, some of those parties simply cite a supposed legislative
intent they derive from the Act's overall framework. None, however, cite any
provision prohibiting the commission from confining the program to those parties
that enter competition by a certain date. Requiring those entities to enter
competition at the outset to utilize their existing resources does not constitute
any manipulation or usurpation of their statutory rights.
As noted in response to comments received on preamble question six, the
commission concludes that existing resources will not be allowed to produce
RECs for sale in the trading program and that the offset methodology suggested
by CPS is a more cost-effective approach to equitably implement PURA §39.904.
The applicability of this offset provision for distribution cooperatives and
municipally-owned utilities
does not
require
all of a G&T's distribution cooperatives to offer retail choice by 2002,
a concept proposed by Chairman Wood and opposed by many parties.
Comments on proposed subsections
Several parties provided additional comments on various subsections of
the proposed rule. Comments not previously summarized and addressed as part
of responses to questions posed in the preamble are discussed below.
Comments on §25.173(a)
OPC and Cities opposed the language in this subsection ensuring that the
cumulative installed capacity in Texas will be at least 2,880 MW by January
1, 2009. OPC and Cities argued that the legislative goal is met when 2,000
MW of new renewable energy is installed in Texas. These parties proposed that
this language either be deleted, or at a minimum, the words "at least" be
removed.
As noted in response to preamble question number five, the commission does
not find it reasonable to change this language. Subsection (a) expresses the
statutory goal that a cumulative renewable capacity of at least 2,880 MW be
installed in Texas by January 1, 2009.
Comments on §25.173(b)
EPE suggested that an additional sentence should be added to the applicability
subsection of the rule, which states that this section shall not apply to
an electric utility not subject to PURA §39.102(c).
The commission concludes that EPE is not subject to the provisions set
forth in these sections until the expiration of the utility's rate freeze
period and amends subsection (b) to reflect this conclusion.
Comments on§25.173(c)
GBRA and Cities commented that the definition of "small producer" under
subsection (c)(18) of the proposed rule should be increased from two megawatts
to five megawatts to ensure the viability of small hydroelectric units and
to be consistent with the federal law definition. The Coalition opposed GBRA's
proposal, stating that the two MW threshold resulted from a unique situation,
and is designed to assist one 1.8-MW hydroelectric facility that is privately
owned.
The commission declines to amend the definition of small producer and clarifies
that this definition applies to all renewable energy facilities, not just
hydropower. The offset methodology added in subsection (h) of this section
will benefit existing hydropower facilities larger than two MW.
TXU proposed changing the definition of "renewable energy technology" to
include those technologies that use a
de minimus
burning of fossil fuels. CSW agreed with TXU on this recommendation.
The commission declines to amend the definition of renewable energy technology
in this section, as it is consistent with the definition set forth in PURA §39.904(d).
Shell suggested modifying the definition of "renewable energy credit" (REC)
and "new resources" because the definitions as written are impermissible under
the Commerce Clause.
The commission concludes that there is a risk that parties may challenge
this rule on the grounds that it is impermissible under the Commerce Clause.
The commission amends the definition of renewable energy credit in this section
to reduce the likelihood of such a challenge. The commission concludes that
all RECs, whether generated in Texas or elsewhere, must be physically metered
in Texas and verifiable by the program administrator. In order to verify the
output from a renewable source, the generator must demonstrate that the renewable
energy actually reaches Texas. The intent of this requirement is to ensure
that all RECs participating in the trading program represent actual megawatt-hours
of renewable energy for consumption by Texas retail customers. Renewable facilities
that deliver electricity into a transmission system where it is commingled
with electricity from non-renewable resources could not be verified as delivered
to Texas customers. In addition, the commission emphasizes that 2,000 MW of
new renewable capacity shall be installed in Texas by January 1, 2009. Therefore,
any capacity shortfalls that arise during the course of the program shall
be made up in the REC allocation requirements for competitive retailers. The
commission amends subsection (h) of this section to reflect this conclusion.
Comments on §25.173(d)
Shell Energy stated that the rule should require municipal utilities or
cooperatives to bear a proportionate share of RECs upon opting in to competition
during a compliance period.
The commission agrees with Shell and points out that this requirement is
set out in subsection (d)(1) of this section. Therefore, no amendment is necessary.
Shell recommended that renewable generators alone pay program costs. The
Coalition disagreed, stating that generators will interface with the program
through the certification process, and it is perhaps appropriate that the
costs associated with that process be paid by the generators. There may be
other certification processes, the cost of which can be borne by the party
seeking certification. In addition, costs associated with a specific transaction,
such as REC transactions, can be assigned to the transacting parties. However,
RECs are the core of the program, and the Coalition stated that it is most
appropriate to allocate general program costs, as well as costs associated
with allocating REC requirements and monitoring compliance, among REPs on
the basis of market share.
The commission declines to apportion program cost responsibility among
market participants in this section. The commission notes that this issue
was never addressed in any of the technical "task force" meetings and should
therefore be resolved under a separate proceeding related to the program administration
function.
Comments on §25.173(e)
CPS noted, that while the rule as proposed does not necessarily prohibit
the output from facilities meeting the requirements of PURA §39.904(f)
from receiving renewable energy credits (RECs), §25.173(e) should be
amended to specifically include such facilities.
The commission agrees with CPS and amends subsection (e) to clarify that
facilities meeting the requirements of PURA §39.904(f) are eligible for
participation in the trading program.
Duke Solar and Boeing Company strongly recommended modification of subsection
(e) to ensure that the full range of industry-standard solar thermal technologies
will be eligible to compete in the Texas renewable energy market. For a new
renewable energy technology that operates principally on a non-combustible
renewable resource, such as solar thermal or geothermal energy, and uses fossil
fuel as a back-up or secondary fuel, credits may be earned only on the renewable
portion of energy production.
The commission agrees with Duke Solar and Boeing Company's suggested language
and amends subsection (e) to reflect that RECs produced by these types of
facilities would be earned only on the renewable portion of energy production.
The commission additionally amends subsection (e) to clarify that the capacity
contribution toward meeting the capacity goals must be adjusted to reflect
the percentage of energy that is produced by the secondary or back-up fuel.
Shell Energy noted that, while subsection (e)(2) prevents a resource's
above-market costs from being included in the rates of any utility, municipally-owned
utility, or distribution cooperative, the rule does not specify how to determine
whether a resource's above-market costs were included in a utility's rates;
nor does it define "above-market costs." Shell recommended amending the rule
to provide that above-market costs include that portion of costs associated
with a renewable energy resource that the owner can not reasonably recover
from customers in a competitive retail or wholesale market. CSW proposed that
"above-market costs" should be determined by comparing the costs of renewables
with the costs of traditional fossil fuel resources.
The commission declines to accept Shell's proposed definition for the words
"above-market costs." The commission concludes that the term "above-market
costs" when referring to costs associated with new renewable energy facilities,
is self-explanatory; they are the difference between the cost of these facilities
and the cost of any other type of new generating facility. The commission
declines to incorporate Shell's suggested definition into this section, as
it is unnecessary.
The Coalition endorsed the requirement set forth in subsection (e)(2),
and added that all resources owned or under contract with municipal utilities
and distribution cooperatives should also be subject to this provision. The
coalition explained that municipally owned utilities and distribution cooperatives
not offering customer choice will not be subject to the same competitive discipline
as REPs. Nor will they be subject to the type of rate review traditionally
applied by the commission to fully regulated electric utilities. As a result,
they may be able to allocate some of the above-market costs of their renewable-resource-based
power to their captive retail customers, while reducing the prices of their
renewable energy credits and thereby undercutting competing suppliers in the
credits market. This would depress prices in the credits market and, in turn,
dilute the incentive for competing developers to construct the new renewable
generating facilities envisioned by the Legislature.
The commission agrees with the Coalition and points out that this requirement
is already set out in subsection (e)(2) of this section. Therefore, no amendment
is necessary.
The Coalition also recommended establishing a date certain to serve as
a cutoff date for capacity additions at existing renewable-resource generating
facilities allowed under subsection (e)(3). Capacity additions made prior
to this date would not be eligible for the credits trading program.
The commission agrees with the Coalition that incremental capacity additions
made prior to September 1, 1999 should not be allowed to participate in the
trading program. The purpose of the trading program is to allocate the above-market
costs associated with new renewable capacity in a least cost manner. The commission
amends (c)(7) to reflect this conclusion.
TXU pointed out a slight inconsistency between two provisions concerning
repowered facilities. Subsection (e) provides that only a qualifying existing
resource, a new resource, or a small power producer is eligible to earn credits.
TXU noted that a repowered facility does not fall within one of these categories.
This is inconsistent with subsection (e)(3) allowing the energy produced by
the incremental capacity from the repowering of existing renewable facilities
to earn RECs. If the intent is to allow the energy associated with the incremental
capacity obtained by repowering facilities to earn RECs, then §25.173(e)
should be modified. CSW agreed with this change but added that the provision
should be further revised to clarify that expansions of existing resources
are also eligible to produce RECs in the trading program.
The commission agrees with TXU and CSW and amends subsection (c)(7) to
include incremental capacity and its associated energy in the definition of
a new resource. New resources are eligible to produce RECs in the trading
program; additional changes to subsection (e) are therefore not necessary.
Comments on §25.173(f)
OPC and Cities opposed the exclusion of renewable energy capacity additions
associated with an emissions reductions project under Health and Safety Code §382.01593,
stating that PURA does not require an exclusion of such capacity additions.
In fact, the prohibition preventing renewable energy capacity from qualifying
for both programs is likely to reduce or even eliminate the possibility that
renewable resources would be built to meet the requirements of the Health
and Safety Code. Instead, the commission should use every opportunity to encourage
utilities to reduce emissions and improve air quality through the installation
of new renewable energy technology. EDF contended that the clean air provisions
of SB 7 including this renewable energy program were contemplated separate
from the renewable energy option in Senate Bill 766 (SB 766), Act of May 30,
1999, 76th Legislature, Regular session, chapter 406, 1999 Texas Session Law
Service 2626, 2628 (Vernon) (to be codified as an amendment to Health and
Safety Code §382.05193) relating to emissions reductions projects. Double-counting
a "grandfathered" facility's requirements under Health and Safety Code §382.05193
and PURA §39.904 does just the opposite, it would diminish the clean
air benefits contained in SB 7 and SB 766. CSW disagreed with EDF's position.
The Coalition agreed with EDF, reporting that it has submitted comments in
a rulemaking proceeding of the Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission
(TNRCC) regarding modifications to its rules implementing SB 766. In those
comments, the Coalition supported a corresponding prohibition on units of
output from renewable-resource facilities being simultaneously eligible for
both (1) the credits trading program established to implement the renewables
mandate of SB 7 and (2) the TNRCC's emission reduction credit program established
under SB 766.
The commission agrees with EDF and the Coalition that the provisions contained
in SB 7 and SB 766 are two separate programs relating to the policy of cleaner
air for Texas citizens. Allowing a company to satisfy two requirements by
complying with a single project would reduce the overall deployment of these
resources and associated goal of cleaner air. The commission also points out
that the language contained in subsection (f)(1) is consistent with language
contained in the rulemaking currently underway at the TNRCC. No amendment
to this subsection is therefore necessary.
OPC and Cities, TXU, and CSW opposed the prohibition against counting capacity
generated by an existing fossil plant re-powered to use renewable fuel, stating
that a former fossil fuel plant that is converted to burn renewable fuel is
essentially new generating capacity from renewable energy technologies and
should count toward the goal in PURA §39.904. These parties contended
that such conversions may be among the most cost-effective way to achieve
the goal because the avoided capital expenses could be substantial. Furthermore,
such a site already has access to the transmission and distribution network
and may even possess all the required permitting. EDF argued that the point
of the legislation is to provide for new capital investment. Opportunities
such as fossil repowering and its close cousin, co-firing, allow arbitrage
opportunists to make minimal capital investments to earn credits that do nothing
to increase economic development in Texas by providing jobs, producing new
equipment for use in Texas, or providing the deployment levels that cause
renewable energy costs to go down. The Coalition agreed with EDF, stating
that allowing bio-fuels to replace fossil fuel in existing generators to be
eligible for RECs would displace and preclude the development of new renewable
capacity and violate SB 7's mandate for the development of 2000 megawatts
of new renewable capacity
The commission agrees with EDF and the Coalition that one purpose of the
trading program is to provide an incentive for new capital investment in cleaner
energy technologies. The commission points out that all existing renewable
facilities are not eligible to participate in the trading program. One reason
for this is that existing facilities have enjoyed cost recovery. This is true
for existing fossil fuel facilities; they too have enjoyed cost recovery over
the years. The commission also notes that during the task force meetings,
not one party was able to adequately explain the process by which an existing
fossil fuel facility is repowered to become a renewable facility or the capital
costs associated with this repowering concept. Without this type of cost data,
it would be difficult to concur with OPC and Cities that allowing repowered
fossil fuel facilities participation in the program would be a more cost effective
way to fulfill the 2,000 MW requirement. The commission declines to amend
subsection (f)(2) allowing these types of facilities to participate in the
trading program.
Comments on §25.173(g)
Shell Energy proposed that this subsection should specify the program administrator's
funding source, independence, selection process, and whether the parties under
its jurisdiction may appeal decisions to the commission. Shell also recommended
a requirement that the program administrator undergo an independent audit
every two years, both of its own expenses and of all REC accounts. CSW agreed
with Shell Energy's proposals with respect to program independence, audits
and appeals changes but does not agree with the selection process changes.
This type of selection process takes too much time. The majority of the parties
have already expressed that the ISO is well suited to take on this responsibility.
The Coalition commended Shell for offering a number of useful recommendations
with respect to the Program Administrator's status and responsibilities. These
included audits of generators and the Program Administrator, appeal procedures
for program administrator actions, and the necessity to keep the Program Administrator
independent of program participants. The Coalition and CSW agreed with Shell
that REC account status information be kept confidential. This is consistent
with the Coalition's recommendation that REC transactions, including prices,
should not be recorded. Shell recommended that the Program Administrator provide
regular information on total statewide retail sales, in order that REPs be
able to predict their market share, and thus their REC requirements. The Coalition,
CSW, Reliant, and TXU agreed that such information will be very useful to
program participants, particularly retail providers. The Coalition added that
performance information of renewable energy systems and technologies, both
those installed and participating in the program and those anticipated projects
would be valuable information for competitive retailers. The Coalition recommended
that the program administrator assess penalties to competitive retailers for
non-compliance. TXU disagreed with this concept, stating that the authority
to assess penalties lies with the commission. CSW recommended that competitive
retailers not in compliance with the trading program should not be reported
to the commission as required pursuant to this subsection.
The commission commends Shell for providing useful suggestions that will
help ensure effective operation of the trading program, which will benefit
all market participants. The commission amends subsection (g) to incorporate
Shell's suggested language pertaining to appeals, audits, confidentiality,
and program administrator functions. However, as noted previously, cost responsibility
and the program administrator selection process will be addressed under a
separate proceeding. The commission agrees with TXU that the commission, not
the program administrator, should assess the penalties. This is consistent
with the language set forth in subsection (o) of this section. The commission
declines to accept CSW's proposed change that would eliminate the reporting
of non-compliant competitive retailers to the commission. The commission concludes
that this type of information is necessary and will assist the commission
in enforcing this section.
Comments on §25.173(h)
Enron suggested language clarifying that providers of last resort would
be subject to the requirements of this section. CSW disagreed with Enron's
proposed revision, stating that it is unnecessary because the term "retail
electric provider" is already defined to include the provider of last resort.
The commission agrees with CSW that this change is unnecessary; PURA §31.002(17)
defines a retail electric provider as a person that sells electric energy
to retail customers in Texas. A provider of last resort is therefore by definition
a REP; no amendment to this subsection is necessary.
Comments on §25.173(i)
Shell proposed that the rule should require the program administrator to
use generation data that the generation facility reports to NERC's Generation
Availability Data System ("GADS") program in evaluating the "actual generator
performance data." Almost all generators report their performance to NERC,
which compiles the Generation Availability Report ("GAR"), used by utilities,
regulators and others for a variety of purposes. In general, the Coalition
supported the methodology for calculating the capacity conversion factor set
forth in the Rule. The Coalition supported the use of actual performance data
as the basis of the CCF, although it is important for the commission also
to reserve for itself, as it appears to have done implicitly in subsection
(i)(2)(D), the authority to make adjustments as necessary to achieve the statutory
goals. As the profile of new renewable-resource generating projects participating
in the credits program changes over time, performance of new projects may
vary from the historical performance of operating projects. Thus, it may not
be possible to precisely project the performance characteristics of the next
block of capacity using only the historical data of operating projects. Some
judgment may be called for to make this projection more accurately, so as
to enhance the likelihood of achieving the targeted amount of capacity.
The Coalition also recommended the use of whole-year periods of actual
performance data as the basis for recalculating the CCF. This is particularly
important when the generating facilities are wind-powered. While inter-annual
variation in the wind and solar resources is modest, seasonal or intra-annual
variations can be significant. Thus it is critical to include four consecutive
seasons (one full year) in sampling periods. For this reason, it may not be
practical to recalculate the CCF in the fourth quarter of 2003, as set forth
in subsection (i)(2). The Coalition preferred a readjustment in the first
quarter of 2003, even though it would be based on only one year of performance.
Twelve months' performance data is acceptable as a minimum basis for this
calculation, as indicated in subsection (i)(2)(A). And doing so at that point
would give REPs an additional three-quarters in which to adjust their contractual
arrangements, as needed, before the compliance period begins.
TXU strongly disagreed with the Coalition's suggestion that the CCF be
readjusted after the program's first compliance period. TXU maintained that
only one year of data will not provide a reasonable approximation of likely
average capacity factors. Forced outages, unusual weather, and transmission
constraints may all impact energy production in 2002. At least two years,
if not three years, is much more likely to produce a reasonable figure. TXU
commented that the initial CCF of 35% is too high, but provides a necessary
degree of certainty and should apply for three years, not two. TXU agreed
in principle with the Coalition that the CCF should be recalculated during
the first quarter of a compliance period, not the fourth. CSW opposed TXU's
proposed changes, maintaining that the language proposed in this subsection
should remain as written. CSW explained that there will be at least four years
of data that could be applied towards the CCF calculation if the 1999 wind
projects, totaling approximately 150 MW, are included in the data set. Waiting
three years could result in missing the legislative targets on either the
high or low side.
The commission notes that an accurate CCF is fundamental to successful
implementation of PURA §39.904. An accurate CCF helps to ensure that
the capacity targets are achieved in a timely and efficient manner. An administratively
set CCF of 35% for the first two compliance periods, followed by biennial
readjustments based on actual facility performance data, will ensure that
the capacity targets are met in an efficient manner. The commission notes
that this issue was painstakingly discussed and negotiated in the "task-force"
meetings as part of a comprehensive program design package. The commission
therefore declines to accept the changes to this subsection as requested by
TXU, Shell, or the Renewable Coalition.
Comments on §25.173(j)
Shell Energy recommended that this subsection should more clearly state
that competitive retailers and others may trade RECs. Uncertainty may hamper
trading activities and defeat the proposed rule's and the statute's goals.
Shell also recommended that the trading program should ensure anonymity in
the trading process. For example, the EPA has delegated the SO
2
allowance auction responsibility to the Chicago Board of Trade, which
conducts annual auctions of both allowances that EPA has held in reserve and
those that private parties have offered for sale. Such a system could allow
competitive retailers to trade RECs without fear that entities will gain a
market power advantage in trading. Shell also maintained that the rule also
should expressly permit several commercially recognized types of transactions.
First, it should expressly allow parties to enter into long-term contracts
to sell their surplus RECs. Second, it should allow a futures market, where
entities agree to sell RECs in given forward periods. The EPA's Acid Rain
Rules permit trades in future allowances. Finally, the commission should expand
the trading program to allow entities other than competitive retailers, such
as brokers, to trade RECs. This latter provision addresses the fear some parties
have expressed that an entity might corner the market on RECs. The more entities
that can trade RECs, the less likely that any one entity can "corner the market."
The Coalition agreed with Shell that the rule should explicitly make allowance
in the REC trading program for a multiplicity of types of transactions and
market participants. The Coalition disagreed with Shell's proposal that the
commission should establish a trading/auction system. The Coalition recommended
commission intervention only in the event that effective market mechanisms
fail to develop of their own accord. TXU did not agree that any of Shell's
proposals were necessary.
The commission declines to incorporate Shell's suggestion, noting that
such types of transactions are not prohibited under this section. The transactions
listed by Shell would be permissible in this trading program.
Shell proposed that the rule should provide for "rounding", stating that
a generator producing 0.5 MWh or greater as its last unit generated should
be awarded one REC. Doing so will recognize and reward production at the margins,
and will especially benefit small producers. TXU agreed with Shell, clarifying
that this was the intent of the parties during the workshops, and including
an explicit rounding provision in the rule would be appropriate.
The commission agrees with this change, noting that this was the intent
of the parties during the task-force meetings. The commission amends subsection
(k)(1) to reflect this conclusion.
Comments on §25.173(m)
Shell proposed that the word "periodic" be eliminated from this subsection
because one might interpret the word as limiting the times the commission
may inspect a facility. Shell also recommended additional language that would
clarify that, in the event that decertification occurs, RECs awarded prior
to decertification remain valid. The Coalition, CSW and TXU agreed with this
change.
The commission agrees with Shell and amends subsection (m) to reflect this
conclusion.
Comments on proposed forms
The Coalition and CPS proposed minor modifications to the form to accommodate
multiple unit wind facilities and landfill gas facilities. These changes were
incorporated into the certification form.
General Comments
The commission received comments regarding the effect of the rule on interstate
commerce. ETC argued that the limitation to renewables installed in Texas
is a violation of the Commerce Clause, in Article 1, Section 8 of the United
States Constitution. ETC contended that the proposed rule's exclusion of out-of-state
renewables from the credit trading program or from the required allocation
imposed on each REP, MOU, and electric cooperative violates the Commerce Clause,
because it treats in-state economic interests more favorably than their out-of-state
counterparts. ETC argued that the proposed rule creates a clear, unmistakable
preference for in-state renewable resources solely on the basis of their physical
location, without regard for the fact that renewable generation sold in Texas
by Texas companies for use by Texas consumers furthers the goal of cleaner
air in Texas regardless of its origin. ETC maintained that, if the ultimate
purpose of the renewables mandate is to provide for cleaner air in Texas,
as opposed to creating a market, then the proposed rule should recognize all
renewable resources that result in energy sold in Texas, regardless of their
origin.
STEC agreed with ETC that the exclusion of out-of-state renewables in the
trading program is unconstitutional because it places an impermissible burden
on interstate commerce; however, OPC and Cities disagreed with ETC, stating
that the proposed rule accurately reflects the intent of PURA §39.904.
Shell commented that the REC definition, which requires a retailer to purchase
renewable energy generated in Texas, violates Constitutional prohibitions
against a state discriminating against out-of-state commerce. Shell argued
that the Commerce Clause prohibits states from engaging in economic protectionism
against other states, and that state statutes discriminating against out-of-state
commerce are constitutional only if justified by a valid factor unrelated
to economic protectionism. Shell asserted that the proposed rule discriminates
against out-of-state commerce by requiring competitive retailers to purchase
a portion of their energy supplies from Texas sources. Shell interpreted the
statute as not requiring competitive retailers to purchase their renewable
energy requirement from Texas sources. Shell recommended that the commission
allow a retailer to meet its renewable energy requirement by purchasing either
Texas or out-of-state renewable energy, while applying the same performance
standards to out-of-state suppliers under subsection (e). Shell further noted
that line losses and transmission constraints will lead most potential suppliers
to locate in Texas anyway, therefore a modified rule will lead to more renewable
energy capacity in Texas without violating the Constitution.
The Renewable Coalition disagreed with ETC and Shell, contending that state
statutes distinguishing between in-state and out-of-state interests are constitutional
if justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism. In the
case of the renewable energy mandate, the legitimate local purpose of §39.904
is the Legislature's desire to capture and develop, rather than neglect and
lose, the environmental benefits gained from using Texas' vast, untapped store
of renewable resources. This legitimate public purpose can not be furthered
without "installing in Texas" the renewable facilities at those sites in Texas
where the resources are located; it was not the Legislature's intent to be
protectionist.
The Coalition also stated that any person in the country is free to participate
in the development of these renewable capacity additions. The Coalition commented
that allowing renewable resources from outside of Texas to qualify would totally
disconnect the implementation of the statute and rule from the legitimate
objectives of the program as conceived by the Legislature. EDF generally concurred
with the statements made by the Coalition.
The proposed rule as published is permissible under the commerce clause.
The object of the proposed rule was the entirely legitimate goal of improving
the air quality for Texas citizens, and the rule was crafted to achieve this
goal through efficient and economical development of local renewable resources
for the local generation of clean energy. The commission has modified the
rule, however, by removing the exclusion of out-of-state renewable resources.
The purpose of this modification is to reduce the risk that implementation
of this statutory program would be delayed by a commerce-clause challenge
to the rule. Beyond the clean-air benefits, the rule provides incentives for
the development of an abundant natural resource. The commission finds that
the means for achieving these goals are reasonable and do not unfairly discriminate
against other states through economic favoritism.
The federal Clean Air Act is implemented through state plans that focus
on emissions in local areas. Texas has several areas that are not in compliance
with the Clean Air Act standards, including Dallas-Fort Worth, Houston, Corpus
Christi, and Beaumont-Port Arthur, and areas that are nearing non-attainment,
such as Austin and San Antonio. To help meet the Clean Air Act standards,
specific provisions of Senate Bill 7 require the clean-up of plants with high
emissions, and the use of clean-burning fossil fuels, such as natural gas,
and the use of renewable resources. Cleaning the air in Texas, however, has
significant associated costs, and the state agency responsible for preparing
implementation plans is in the process of developing a laundry list of air
clean-up measures that will affect a number of industries.
New renewable resources, although potentially more expensive than other
electric resources, are an effective means for cleaning the air. Through PURA §39.904,
the legislature clearly sought to support the development of renewable resources
in Texas to efficiently and economically reduce emissions from electricity
generation. The demand for electricity in Texas has been and is projected
to continue to increase, and the legislature mandated the use of energy derived
from renewable resources in Texas so that a portion of the additional future
energy generated and consumed by Texans would result in cleaner air for all
Texans.
The commission acknowledges the local economic benefits that incidentally
result from the rule and concludes that it is permissible for the state, under
its sovereign powers, to use markets and market forces to achieve environmental
benefits for its citizens. The rule is not a measure for economic protectionism,
but, rather, a legitimate program that is consistent with state and federal
goals under the Clean Air Act, and is consistent with the mechanism (state
action) that is at the heart of the Clean Air Act.
While the commission believes that the rule, as originally proposed, was
consistent with the Commerce Clause, it is modifying the rule to reduce the
risk of a constitutional challenge. Renewable facilities would qualify for
RECs if the output of the renewable facility reaches Texas, so that it can
be physically metered and verified in Texas. It is anticipated and intended
that the rule will encourage the development of renewable resources within
Texas. Renewable resources are distinctly different from coal or natural gas.
The wind and solar energy not captured and used today vanishes and can not
be recovered. In addition, they are distinctly different in their ability
to be transported. Coal and gas can be transported to a suitable location
for conversion to electricity, but most renewable resources must be exploited
where they are found. Texas has a vast untapped array of renewable resources
available for the clean generation of energy. Using these resources will improve
the air quality, yet their environmental benefits are wasted unless they are
exploited. Clean generation of electricity outside of Texas also may provide
environmental benefits if it is located close to Texas and serves Texas consumers,
but it is difficult to draw a line between a location that would and would
not benefit Texas air. The rule therefore, allows credits to be accorded to
all new facilities located out of the state as long as the energy produced
by those facilities meets the eligibility requirements of the rule and is
physically metered and verified in Texas.
Any local economic benefits that may result from the state's development
of new renewable capacity are incidental to the legitimate goal of providing
cleaner air for Texans and developing Texas renewable resources. To foster
the development of renewable generation plants in Texas, it is necessary to
create incentives. PURA §39.904(c)(2)(B) specifically requires the commission
to encourage development, construction, and operation of new renewable energy
projects in this state to bring the environmental benefits of clean air to
Texas. The rule accomplishes this objective without impeding the flow of interstate
commerce.
EDF pointed out that the provisions in this section are interrelated, noting
that each commission decision on individual provisions can tend to either
promote development of renewable capacity slightly earlier, or to retard development
of resources to meet the interim legislative goals. EDF added that decisions
were already made in the legislative process to accommodate risk and cost
issues raised by utilities. These accommodations have had the effect of delaying
and back-loading the acquisition of new renewables relative to a simple and
consistent proposal that would have developed 200 MWs of new renewable energy
each year for ten years. EDF provided a table illustrating that the graduated
increase of new renewables as required in PURA §39.904(a) provided 50%
less reduction when compared with a simple program that would have required
200 MW of new renewable energy each year for ten years.
All comments, including any not specifically referenced herein, were fully
considered by the commission. In adopting this section, the commission makes
other minor modifications for the purpose of clarifying its intent.
This new section is adopted under the Public Utility Regulatory
Act, Texas Utilities Code Annotated §14.002 (Vernon 1998) (PURA), which
provides the Public Utility Commission with the authority to make and enforce
rules reasonably required in the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction,
and specifically, Senate Bill 7, Act of May 21, 1999, 76th Legislature, Regular
Session, chapter 405, 1999 Texas Session Law Service, 2543, 2558 (Vernon)
(to be codified as an amendment to the Public Utility Regulatory Act, Texas
Utilities Code Annotated §39.101(b)(3) and §39.904) which entitles
all customers access to providers of renewable energy, requires an additional
2,000 MW of renewable generating capacity to be installed in Texas by 2009,
directs the commission to establish a renewable energy credits trading program
and to adopt rules necessary to enforce and administer the program outlined
in this section.
Cross Reference to Statutes: Public Utility Regulatory Act §§11.002(a),
14.001, 14.002, 39.101(b)(3), and 39.904.
§25.173.Goal for Renewable Energy.
(a)
Purpose. The purpose of this section is to ensure that
an additional 2,000 megawatts (MW) of generating capacity from renewable energy
technologies is installed in Texas by 2009 pursuant to the Public Utility
Regulatory Act (PURA) §39.904, to establish a renewable energy credits
trading program that would ensure that the new renewable energy capacity is
built in the most efficient and economical manner, to encourage the development,
construction, and operation of new renewable energy resources at those sites
in this state that have the greatest economic potential for capture and development
of this state's environmentally beneficial resources, to protect and enhance
the quality of the environment in Texas through increased use of renewable
resources, to respond to customers' expressed preferences for renewable resources
by ensuring that all customers have access to providers of energy generated
by renewable energy resources pursuant to PURA §39.101(b)(3), and to
ensure that the cumulative installed renewable capacity in Texas will be at
least 2,880 MW by January 1, 2009.
(b)
Application. This section applies to power generation companies
as defined in §25.5 of this title (relating to definitions), and competitive
retailers as defined in subsection (c) of this section. This section shall
not apply to an electric utility subject to PURA §39.102(c) until the
expiration of the utility's rate freeze period.
(c)
Definitions.
(1)
Competitive retailer--A municipally-owned utility, generation
and transmission cooperative (G&T), or distribution cooperative that offers
customer choice in the restructured competitive electric power market in Texas
or a retail electric provider (REP) as defined in §25.5 of this title.
(2)
Compliance period--A calendar year beginning January
1 and ending December 31 of each year in which renewable energy credits are
required of a competitive retailer.
(3)
Designated representative--A responsible natural person
authorized by the owners or operators of a renewable resource to register
that resource with the program administrator. The designated representative
must have the authority to represent and legally bind the owners and operators
of the renewable resource in all matters pertaining to the renewable energy
credits trading program.
(4)
Early banking--Awarding renewable energy credits (RECs)
to generators for sale in the trading program prior to the program's first
compliance period.
(5)
Existing facilities--Renewable energy generators placed
in service before September 1, 1999.
(6)
Generation offset technology--Any renewable technology
that reduces the demand for electricity at a site where a customer consumes
electricity. An example of this technology is solar water heating.
(7)
New facilities--Renewable energy generators placed
in service on or after September 1, 1999. A new facility includes the incremental
capacity and associated energy from an existing renewable facility achieved
through repowering activities undertaken on or after September 1, 1999.
(8)
Off-grid generation--The generation of renewable energy
in an application that is not interconnected to a utility transmission or
distribution system.
(9)
Program administrator--The entity approved by the
commission that is responsible for carrying out the administrative responsibilities
related to the renewable energy credits trading program as set forth in subsection
(g) of this section.
(10)
REC offset (offset)--An REC offset represents one
MWh of renewable energy from an existing facility that may be used in place
of an REC to meet a renewable energy requirement imposed under this section.
REC offsets may not be traded, shall be calculated as set forth in subsection
(i) of this section, and shall be applied as set forth in subsection (h) of
this section.
(11)
Renewable energy credit (REC or credit)--An REC represents
one megawatt hour (MWh) of renewable energy that is physically metered and
verified in Texas and meets the requirements set forth in subsection (e) of
this section.
(12)
Renewable energy credit account (REC account)--An
account maintained by the renewable energy credits trading program administrator
for the purpose of tracking the production, sale, transfer, purchase, and
retirement of RECs by a program participant.
(13)
Renewable energy credits trading program (trading
program)--The process of awarding, trading, tracking, and submitting RECs
as a means of meeting the renewable energy requirements set out in subsection
(d) of this section.
(14)
Renewable energy resource (renewable resource)--A
resource that produces energy derived from renewable energy technologies.
(15)
Renewable energy technology--Any technology that
exclusively relies on an energy source that is naturally regenerated over
a short time and derived directly from the sun, indirectly from the sun, or
from moving water or other natural movements and mechanisms of the environment.
Renewable energy technologies include those that rely on energy derived directly
from the sun, on wind, geothermal, hydroelectric, wave, or tidal energy, or
on biomass or biomass-based waste products, including landfill gas. A renewable
energy technology does not rely on energy resources derived from fossil fuels,
or waste products from inorganic sources.
(16)
Repowering--Modernizing or upgrading an existing
facility in order to increase its capacity or efficiency.
(17)
Settlement period--The first calendar quarter following
a compliance period in which the settlement process for that compliance year
takes place.
(18)
Small producer--A renewable resource that is less
than two megawatts (MW) in size.
(d)
Renewable energy credits trading program (trading program).
Renewable energy credits may be generated, transferred, and retired by renewable
energy power generators, competitive retailers, and other market participants
as set forth in this section.
(1)
The program administrator shall apportion a renewable resource
requirement among all competitive retailers as a percentage of the retail
sales of each competitive retailer as set forth in subsection (h) of this
section. Each competitive retailer shall be responsible for retiring sufficient
RECs as set forth in subsections (h) and (k) of this section to comply with
this section. The requirement to purchase RECs pursuant to this section becomes
effective on the date each competitive retailer begins serving retail electric
customers in Texas.
(2)
A power generating company may participate in the
program and may generate RECs and buy or sell RECs as set forth in subsection
(j) of this section.
(3)
RECs shall be credited on an energy basis as set forth
in subsection (j) of this section.
(4)
Municipally-owned utilities and distribution cooperatives
that do not offer customer choice are not obligated to purchase RECs. However,
regardless of whether the municipally-owned utility or distribution cooperative
offers customer choice, a municipally-owned utility or distribution cooperative
possessing renewable resources that meet the requirements of subsection (e)
of this section may sell RECs generated by such a resource to competitive
retailers as set forth in subsection (j) of this section.
(5)
Except where specifically stated, the provisions of
this section shall apply uniformly to all participants in the trading program.
(e)
Facilities eligible for producing RECs in the renewable
energy credits trading program. For a renewable facility to be eligible to
produce RECs in the trading program it must be either a new facility or a
small producer as defined in subsection (c) of this section and must also
meet the requirements of this subsection:
(1)
A renewable energy resource must not be ineligible under
subsection (f) of this section and must register pursuant to subsection (n)
of this section;
(2)
The facility's above-market costs must not be included
in the rates of any utility, municipally-owned utility, or distribution cooperative
through base rates, a power cost recovery factor (PCRF), stranded cost recovery
mechanism, or any other fixed or variable rate element charged to end users;
(3)
For a renewable energy technology that requires fossil
fuel, the facility's use of fossil fuel must not exceed 2.0% of the total
annual fuel input on a British thermal unit (BTU) or equivalent basis;
(4)
The output of the facility must be readily capable
of being physically metered and verified in Texas by the program administrator.
Energy from a renewable facility that is delivered into a transmission system
where it is commingled with electricity from non-renewable resources can not
be verified as delivered to Texas customers. A facility is not ineligible
by virtue of the fact that the facility is a generation-offset, off-grid,
or on-site distributed renewable facility if it otherwise meets the requirements
of this section; and
(5)
For a municipally owned utility operating a gas distribution
system, any production or acquisition of landfill gas that is directly supplied
to the gas distribution system is eligible to produce RECs based upon the
conversion of the thermal energy in BTUs to electric energy in kWh using for
the conversion factor the systemwide average heat rate of the gas-fired units
of the combined utility's electric system as measured in BTUs per kWh.
(6)
For industry-standard thermal technologies, the RECs
can be earned only on the renewable portion of energy production. Furthermore,
the contribution toward statewide renewable capacity megawatt goals from such
facilities would be equal to the fraction of the facility's annual MWh energy
output from renewable fuel multiplied by the facility's nameplate MW capacity.
(f)
Facilities not eligible for producing RECs in the renewable
energy credits trading program. A renewable facility is not eligible to produce
RECs in the trading program if it is:
(1)
A renewable energy capacity addition associated with an
emissions reductions project described in Health and Safety Code §382.05193,
that is used to satisfy the permit requirements in Health and Safety Code §382.0519;
(2)
An existing facility that is not a small producer
as defined in subsection (c) of this section; or
(3)
An existing fossil plant that is repowered to use
a renewable fuel.
(g)
Responsibilities of program administrator. No later than
June 1, 2000, the commission shall approve an independent entity to serve
as the trading program administrator. At a minimum, the program administrator
shall perform the following functions:
(1)
Create accounts that track RECs for each participant in
the trading program;
(2)
Award RECs to registered renewable energy facilities
on a quarterly basis based on verified meter reads;
(3)
Assign offsets to competitive retailers on an annual
basis based on a nomination submitted by the competitive retailer pursuant
to subsection (n) of this section;
(4)
Annually retire RECs that each competitive retailer
submits to meet its renewable energy requirement;
(5)
Retire RECs at the end of each REC's three-year life;
(6)
Maintain public information on its website that provides
trading program information to interested buyers and sellers of RECs;
(7)
Create an exchange procedure where persons may purchase
and sell RECs. The exchange shall ensure the anonymity of persons purchasing
or selling RECs. The program administrator may delegate this function to an
independent third party. The commission shall approve any such delegation;
(8)
Make public each month the total energy sales of competitive
retailers in Texas for the previous month;
(9)
Perform audits of generators participating in the
trading program to verify accuracy of metered production data;
(10)
Allocate the renewable energy responsibility to each
competitive retailer in accordance with subsection (h) of this section; and
(11)
Submit an annual report to the commission. Beginning
with the program's first compliance period, the program administrator shall
submit a report to the commission on or before April 15 of each calendar year.
The report shall contain information pertaining to renewable energy power
generators and competitive retailers. At a minimum, the report shall contain:
(A)
the amount of existing and new renewable energy capacity
in MW installed in the state by technology type, the owner/operator of each
facility, the date each facility began to produce energy, the amount of energy
generated in megawatt-hours (MWh) each quarter for all capacity participating
in the trading program or that was retired from service; and
(B)
a listing of all competitive retailers participating in
the trading program, each competitive retailer's renewable energy credit requirement,
the number of offsets used by each competitive retailer, the number of credits
retired by each competitive retailer, a listing of all competitive retailers
that were in compliance with the REC requirement, a listing of all competitive
retailers that failed to retire sufficient REC requirement, and the deficiency
of each competitive retailer that failed to retire sufficient RECs to meet
its REC requirement.
(h)
Allocation of REC purchase requirement to competitive retailers.
The program administrator shall allocate REC requirements among competitive
retailers. Any renewable capacity that is retired before January 1, 2009 or
any capacity shortfalls that arise due to purchases of RECs from out-of-state
facilities shall be replaced and incorporated into the allocation methodology
set forth in this subsection. Any changes to the allocation methodology to
reflect replacement capacity shall occur two compliance periods after which
the facility was retired or capacity shortfall occurred. The program administrator
shall use the following methodology to determine the total annual REC requirement
for a given year and the final REC requirement for individual competitive
retailers:
(1)
The total statewide REC requirement for each compliance
period shall be calculated in terms of MWh and shall be equal to the renewable
capacity target multiplied by 8,760 hours per year, multiplied by the appropriate
capacity conversion factor set forth in subsection (i) of this section. The
renewable energy capacity targets for the compliance period beginning January
1, of the year indicated shall be:
(A)
400 MW of new resources in 2002;
(B)
400 MW of new resources in 2003;
(C)
850 MW of new resources in 2004;
(D)
850 MW of new resources 2005;
(E)
1,400 MW of new resources in 2006;
(F)
1,400 MW of new resources in 2007;
(G)
2,000 MW of new resources in 2008; and
(H)
2,000 MW of new resources in 2009 through 2019.
(2)
The final REC requirement for an individual competitive
retailer for a compliance period shall be calculated as follows:
(A)
Each competitive retailer's preliminary REC requirement
is determined by dividing its total retail energy sales in Texas by the total
retail sales in Texas of all competitive retailers, and multiplying that percentage
by the total statewide REC requirement for that compliance period.
(B)
The adjusted REC requirement for each competitive retailer
that is entitled to an offset is determined by reducing its preliminary REC
requirement by the offsets to which it qualifies, as determined under subsection
(i) of this section, with the maximum reduction equal to the competitive retailer's
preliminary REC requirement. The total reductions for all competitive retailers
is equal to the total usable offsets for that compliance period.
(C)
Each competitive retailer's final REC requirement for a
compliance period shall be increased to recapture the total usable offsets
calculated under subparagraph (B) of this paragraph. The additional REC requirement
shall be calculated by dividing the competitive retailer's adjusted REC requirement
by the total adjusted REC requirement of all competitive retailers. This fraction
shall be multiplied by the total usable offsets for that compliance period
and this amount shall be added to the competitive retailer's adjusted REC
requirement to produce the competitive retailer's final REC requirement for
the compliance period.
(i)
Nomination and calculation of REC offsets.
(1)
A REP, municipally-owned utility, G&T cooperative,
distribution cooperative, or an affiliate of a REP, municipally-owned utility,
or distribution cooperative, may apply offsets to meet all or a portion of
its renewable energy purchase requirement, as calculated in subsection (h)
of this section, only if those offsets are nominated in a filing with the
commission by June 1, 2001. A G&T may nominate the combined offsets for
itself and its member distribution cooperatives upon the presentation of a
resolution by its Board authorizing it to do so.
(2)
The commission shall verify any designations of REC
offsets and notify the program administrator of its determination by December
31, 2001.
(3)
REC offsets shall be equal to the average annual MWh
output of an existing resource for the years 1991-2000 or the entire life
of the existing resource, whichever is less.
(4)
REC offsets qualify for use in a compliance period
under subsection (h) of this section only to the extent that:
(A)
The resource producing the REC offset has continuously
since September 1, 1999 been owned by or its output has been committed under
contract to a utility, municipally-owned utility, or cooperative nominating
the resource under paragraph (1) of this subsection or, if the resource has
been committed under a contract that expired after September 1, 1999 and before
January 1, 2002, it is owned by or its output has been committed under contract
to a utility, municipally-owned utility, or cooperative on January 1, 2002;
and
(B)
The facility producing the REC offsets is operated and
producing energy during the compliance period in a manner consistent with
historic practice.
(5)
If the production from a facility producing the
REC offset energy ceases for any reason, the competitive retailer may no longer
claim the REC offset against its REC requirement.
(j)
Calculation of capacity conversion factor. The capacity
conversion factor used by the program administrator to allocate credits to
competitive retailers shall be calculated as follows:
(1)
The capacity conversion factor (CCF) shall be administratively
set at 35% for 2002 and 2003, the first two compliance periods of the program.
(2)
During the fourth quarter of the second compliance
year (2003), the CCF shall be readjusted to reflect actual generator performance
data associated with all renewable resources in the trading program. The program
administrator shall adjust the CCF every two years thereafter and shall:
(A)
be based on all renewable energy resources in the trading
program for which at least 12 months of performance data is available;
(B)
represent a weighted average of generator performance;
(C)
use all valid performance data that is available for each
renewable resource; and
(D)
ensure that the renewable capacity goals are attained.
(k)
Production and transfer of RECs. The program administrator
shall administer a trading program for renewable energy credits in accordance
with the requirements of this subsection.
(1)
A REC will be awarded to the owner of a renewable resource
when a MWh is metered at that renewable resource. A generator producing 0.5
MWh or greater as its last unit generated should be awarded one REC on a quarterly
basis. The program administrator shall record the amount of metered MWh and
credit the REC account of the renewable resource that generated the energy
on a quarterly basis.
(2)
The transfer of RECs between parties shall be effective
only when the transfer is recorded by the program administrator.
(3)
The program administrator shall require that RECs
be adequately identified prior to recording a transfer and shall issue an
acknowledgement of the transaction to parties upon provision of adequate information.
At a minimum, the following information shall be provided:
(A)
identification of the parties;
(B)
REC serial number, REC issue date, and the renewable resource
that produced the REC;
(C)
the number of RECs to be transferred; and
(D)
the transaction date.
(4)
A competitive retailer shall surrender RECs to
the program administrator for retirement from the market in order to meet
its REC allocation for a compliance period. The program administrator will
document all REC retirements annually.
(5)
On or after each April 1, the program administrator
will retire RECs that have not been retired by competitive retailers and have
reached the end of their three-year life.
(6)
The program administrator may establish a procedure
to ensure that the award, transfer, and retirement of credits are accurately
recorded.
(l)
Settlement process. Beginning in January 2003, the first
quarter following the compliance period shall be the settlement period during
which the following actions shall occur:
(1)
By January 31, the program administrator will notify each
competitive retailer of its total REC requirement for the previous compliance
period as determined pursuant to subsection (h) of this section.
(2)
By March 31, each competitive retailer must submit
credits to the program administrator from its account equivalent to its REC
requirement for the previous compliance period. If the competitive retailer
has insufficient credits in its account to satisfy its obligation, and this
shortfall exceeds the applicable deficit allowance as set forth in subsection
(m)(2) of this section, the competitive retailer is subject to the penalty
provisions in subsection (o) of this section.
(m)
Trading program compliance cycle.
(1)
The first compliance period shall begin on January 1, 2002
and there will be 18 consecutive compliance periods. Early banking of RECs
is permissible and may commence no earlier than July 1, 2001. The program's
first settlement period shall take place during the first quarter of 2003.
(2)
A competitive retailer may incur a deficit allowance
equal to 5.0% of its REC requirement in 2002 and 2003 (the first two compliance
periods of the program). This 5.0% deficit allowance shall not apply to entities
that initiate customer choice after 2003. During the first settlement period,
each competitive retailer will be subject to a penalty for any REC shortfall
that is greater than 5.0% of its REC requirement under subsection (h) of this
section. During the second settlement period, each competitive retailer will
be subject to the penalty process for any REC shortfall greater than 5.0%
of the second year REC allocation. All competitive retailers incurring a 5.0%
deficit pursuant to this subsection must make up the amount of RECs associated
with the deficit in the next compliance period.
(3)
The issue date of RECs created by a renewable energy
resource shall coincide with the beginning of the compliance year in which
the credits are generated. All RECs shall have a life of three compliance
periods, after which the program administrator will retire them from the trading
program.
(4)
Each REC that is not used in the year of its creation
may be banked and is valid for the next two compliance years.
(5)
A competitive retailer may meet its renewable energy
requirements for a compliance period with RECs issued in or prior to that
compliance period which have not been retired.
(n)
Registration and certification of renewable energy facilities.
The commission shall register and certify all renewable facilities that will
produce either REC offsets or RECs for sale in the trading program. To be
awarded RECs or REC offsets, a power generator must complete the registration
process described in this subsection. The program administrator shall not
award offsets or credits for energy produced by a power generator before it
has been certified by the commission.
(1)
The designated representative of the generating facility
shall file an application with the commission on a form approved by the commission
for each renewable energy generation facility. At a minimum, the application
shall include the location, owner, technology, and rated capacity of the facility
and shall demonstrate that the facility meets the resource eligibility criteria
in subsection (e) of this section.
(2)
No later than 30 days after the designated representative
files the certification form with the commission, the commission shall inform
both the program administrator and the designated representative whether the
renewable facility has met the certification requirements. At that time, the
commission shall either certify the renewable facility as eligible to receive
either RECs or offsets, or describe any insufficiencies to be remedied. If
the application is contested, the time for acting is extended by 30 days.
(3)
Upon receiving notice of certification of new facilities,
the program administrator shall create an REC account for the designated representative
of the renewable resource.
(4)
The commission may make on-site visits to any certified
unit of a renewable energy resource and may decertify any unit if it is not
in compliance with the provisions of this subsection.
(5)
A decertified renewable generator may not be awarded
RECs. However, any RECs awarded by the program administrator and transferred
to a competitive retailer prior to the decertification remain valid.
(o)
Penalties and enforcement. If by April 1 of the year following
a compliance year it is determined that a competitive retailer with an allocated
REC purchase requirement has insufficient credits to satisfy its allocation,
the competitive retailer shall be subject to the administrative penalty provisions
of PURA §15.023 as specified in this subsection.
(1)
Except as provided in paragraph (4) of this subsection,
a penalty will be assessed for that portion of the deficient credits.
(2)
The penalty shall be the lesser of $50 per MWh or,
upon presentation of suitable evidence of market value by the competitive
retailer, 200% of the average market value of credits for that compliance
period.
(3)
There will be no obligation on the competitive retailer
to purchase RECs for deficits, whether or not the deficit was within or was
not within the competitive retailer's reasonable control, except as set forth
in subsection (m)(2) of this section.
(4)
In the event that the commission determines that events
beyond the reasonable control of a competitive retailer prevented it from
meeting its REC requirement there will be no penalty assessed.
(5)
A party is responsible for conducting sufficient advance
planning to acquire its allotment of RECs. Failure of the spot or short-term
market to supply a party with the allocated number of RECs shall not constitute
an event outside the competitive retailer's reasonable control. Events or
circumstances that are outside of a party's reasonable control may include
weather-related damage, mechanical failure, lack of transmission capacity
or availability, strikes, lockouts, actions of a governmental authority that
adversely effect the generation, transmission, or distribution of renewable
energy from an eligible resource under contract to a purchaser.
(p)
Renewable resources eligible for sale in the Texas wholesale
and retail markets. Any energy produced by a renewable resource may be bought
and sold in the Texas wholesale market or to retail customers in Texas and
marketed as renewable energy if it is generated from a resource that meets
the definition in subsection (c)(14) of this section.
(q)
Periodic review. The commission shall periodically assess
the effectiveness of the energy-based credits trading program in this section
to maximize the energy output from the new capacity additions and ensure that
the goal for renewable energy is achieved in the most economically-efficient
manner. If the energy-based trading program is not effective, performance
standards will be designed to ensure that the cumulative installed renewable
capacity in Texas meets the requirements of PURA §39.904.
This agency hereby certifies that the adoption has been reviewed
by legal counsel and found to be a valid exercise of the agency's legal authority.
Filed with the Office of the Secretary of State on December
21, 1999.
TRD-9908924
Rhonda Dempsey
Rules Coordinator
Public Utility Commission of Texas
Effective date: January 10, 2000
Proposal publication date: October 22, 1999
For further information, please call: (512) 936-7308
Subchapter R. PROVISIONS RELATING TO MUNICIPAL REGULATION AND RIGHTS-OF-WAY MANAGEMENT
Chapter 3.
OIL AND GAS DIVISION
Part 2.
PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF TEXAS
Chapter 26.
SUBSTANTIVE RULES APPLICABLE TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDERS