TITLE 7.BANKING AND SECURITIES

Part 8. JOINT FINANCIAL REGULATORY AGENCIES

Chapter 153. HOME EQUITY LENDING

7 TAC §§153.13, 153.18, 153.20, 153.22

(Editor's note: The text of the following sections proposed for repeal will not be published. The sections may be examined in the Office of Consumer Credit Commissioner or in the Texas Register office, Room 245, James Earl Rudder Building, 1019 Brazos Street, Austin.)

The Finance Commission of Texas and the Texas Credit Union Commission ("commissions") jointly propose the repeal of §§153.13, 153.18, 153.20, and 153.22, relating to home equity lending under Texas Constitution, Article XVI, §50(a)(6). The commissions have proposed changes to these interpretations in the form of new interpretations; therefore, these interpretations are proposed for repeal and the new interpretations are proposed elsewhere in this issue of the Texas Register .

Harold Feeney, Credit Union commissioner, on behalf of the Texas Credit Union Commission and Leslie L. Pettijohn, Consumer Credit Commissioner, on behalf of the Finance Commission of Texas have determined that for the first five-year period the repeal as proposed will be in effect, there will be no fiscal implications for state or local government as a result of administering or enforcing the repeal.

Commissioner Feeney and Commissioner Pettijohn also have determined that for each year of the first five years the repeal as proposed will be in effect, the public benefit anticipated as a result of the repeal will be more logical interpretations for lenders and consumers. There is no anticipated cost to persons who are required to comply with the repeal as proposed. There will be no adverse economic effect on small or micro businesses. There will be no effect on individuals required to comply with the repeal as proposed.

Written comments on the proposed repeal may be submitted in to Kerri T. Galvin, General Counsel, Credit Union Department, 914 East Anderson Lane, Austin, Texas 78752-1699, or to Sealy Hutchings, General Counsel, Office of Consumer Credit Commissioner, 2601 North Lamar Boulevard, Austin, Texas 78705-4207 or by email to kerri.galvin @tcud.state.tx.us or sealy.hutchings@occc. state.tx.us. To be considered, a written comment must be received on or before the 31st day after the date the proposed repeal is published in the Texas Register . At the conclusion of the 31st day after the proposed repeal is published in the Texas Register , no further written comments will be considered or accepted by the commissions.

The interpretation repeals are proposed pursuant to Texas Finance Code, §11.308 and §15.413 (as added by Acts 2003, 78th Legislature, Chapter 1207, §2), which separately and independently authorize each Commission to issue interpretations of the Texas Constitution, Article XVI, §50(a)(5) - (7), (e) - (p), (t), and (u), subject to Texas Government Code, Chapter 2001.

The Texas Constitution, Article XVI, §50(a)(6) is affected by the proposed interpretations.

§153.13.Preclosing Disclosures: Section 50(a)(6)(M)(ii).

§153.18.Limitation on Application of Proceeds: Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(i).

§153.20.No Blanks in the Equity Loan Agreement: Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(iii).

§153.22.Copes of Documents: Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(v).

This agency hereby certifies that the proposal has been reviewed by legal counsel and found to be within the agency's legal authority to adopt.

Filed with the Office of the Secretary of State on February 17, 2006.

TRD-200600864

Leslie L. Pettijohn

Commissioner

Joint Financial Regulatory Agencies

Earliest possible date of adoption: April 2, 2006

For further information, please call: (512) 936-7640


7 TAC §§153.13, 153.18, 153.20, 153.22

The Finance Commission of Texas and the Texas Credit Union Commission ("commissions") jointly propose new interpretations §§153.13, 153.18, 153.20 and 153.22, relating to home equity lending under Texas Constitution, Article XVI, §50(a)(6). Existing companion interpretations §§153.13, 153.18, 153.20 and 153.22 are proposed for repeal in this issue of the Texas Register .

Texas Constitution, Article XVI, Section 50 ("Section 50"), sets out the only permissible encumbrances on a homestead. Prior to 1998, Section 50 permitted liens on homestead property for the purposes of purchase money, taxes, an owelty of partition, the refinance of a lien, including tax liens, and home improvements. Effective January 1, 1998, Section 50 was amended to authorize home equity loans, permitting a home owner to obtain a loan secured by a lien on the homestead, without restricting how the owner can use the loan proceeds. Section 50 has since been amended in 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005 to further address aspects of home equity lending. Section 50 addresses only the elements necessary to create a valid lien on a homestead. Other statutes and constitutional provisions must also be consulted to fully evaluate the legality under Texas law of credit transactions involving the homestead.

The commissions are separately and independently charged with interpreting Sections 50(a)(5) - (7), (e) - (p), and (t) of the Constitution, see Texas Finance Code, §11.308 and §15.413, and Texas Constitution, Article XVI, Section 50(u). The commissions seek to jointly exercise their authority to interpret Section 50 in order to promote consistency and better support the confidence of homeowners and lenders transacting home equity loans in compliance with Section 50. In addition, the commissions interpret the extent of their interpretive authority to include not only determinations of the explicit meaning of words and terms in Section 50, but also to encompass "filling in the gaps" with respect to material matters that are inadequately addressed in Section 50, including possible addition of further details to the extent the commissions believe this to be necessary to fully implement the intent and purposes of Section 50.

Because of the significantly adverse consequences that can befall a lender who violates a provision of Section 50, clear and unambiguous guidance regarding the meaning of such provisions supports the stability of the credit markets. This stability benefits consumers by ensuring that home equity loans are as widely available to Texas homeowners as possible. Availability, certainty, and competition result in reducing the overall transaction cost to consumers for equity loans. To that end, the commissions have previously adopted interpretations codified to 7 TAC Chapters 151 and 153. These interpretations are intended to not only construe the actual language of the Constitution, but also to provide a practical framework for home equity lending that reflects the constitutional language and the intent of the legislature and the voters. The commissions interpret the Constitution in harmony with other statutes and provisions that govern loans and other credit transactions to ensure consistency in the application of law.

Concerns have been raised that several jointly adopted interpretations are potentially ambiguous. The commissions have determined to address these concerns, and therefore jointly propose to clarify these interpretations to better state the commissions' views.

Section 153.13

The Texas Constitution protects owners seeking home equity loans by requiring the lender to disclose to the owner all fees, costs, and charges associated with making the equity loan one day prior to closing. (Section 50(a)(6)(M)(ii)) The one-day notice avoids surprise to the owner at closing and allows the owner time to reassess the equity loan if the associated costs of the loan are higher than expected. The Constitution recognizes that there are instances where it may be appropriate to make an exception to the one-day waiting period between the disclosure of fees and the closing of the equity loan. In practice, lenders may experience difficulty in accurately predicting the exact amount of costs incurred in making an equity loan that are outside of the lender's control. For example property tax accruals are often disclosed imprecisely. Determining accurate accruals is further complicated when a closing date changes. For this reason the Constitution allows the owner to consent to a modified disclosure or receipt of a disclosure on the date of closing. This may occur if a bona fide emergency or other good cause exists and the owner concludes that the best alternative is to waive the one-day waiting period.

The commissions interpreted Section 50(a)(6)(M)(ii) by adopting existing §153.13 to clarify the terms "bona fide emergency" and "other good cause" in a way that preserves the constitutional protections for the owner without subjecting the owner to unnecessary regulatory burdens. The commissions developed existing §153.13 in light of the existing Texas law that recognizes the principles of reasonableness, wisdom, and common sense.

Although the commissions believe the existing §153.13 is a valid and consistent interpretation of §50(a)(6)(M)(ii), concerns were raised that this interpretation could allow for a substantial increase in total closing costs if each fee increases by a small amount. Theoretical concerns were also raised that this interpretation could inadvertently allow for any fee to increase so long as one fee decreases. Following the case In Re Box , 342 B.R. 290 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that a signed document alone was not sufficient to evidence owner consent), lenders may need to further document an owner's consent. Therefore, the commissions propose to repeal the existing §153.13 and adopt a new §153.13.

Proposed §153.13 clarifies "bona fide emergency" and "other good cause" by setting out principles and examples for these terms. The commissions base the interpretation of the term "bona fide emergency" on the meaning and use of that phrase in 12 C.F.R. Part 226 (Regulation Z). Under this interpretation only a significant emergency qualifies as a bona fide emergency. The commissions base the definition of good cause on both the common meaning and the legal definition of that term; however, because the definition of this term could be construed broadly, the commissions offer additional guidance for owners and lenders under this standard. The examples provided to illustrate good cause are not intended to be exclusive. The commissions' interpretation offers a presumption that a de minimis increase in the costs, fees, and charges may qualify as good cause with the owner's consent. The commissions base this presumption on the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex -- the law does not concern itself with very small or trifling matters. The doctrine is well established in Texas law and has been applied in the context of consumer credit cases Gawlik v. Padre Staples Auto Mart, Inc. , 666 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e); HSAM, Inc. v. Gatter , 814 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1991, writ dism'd by agr. ).

This doctrine protects the parties where the variance between the disclosures is minute. It seems unlikely that the law designed to protect an owner would require an owner to postpone a closing because of very small variances from previously disclosed costs, especially when the owner desires to proceed with closing. The commissions articulate the boundaries of the de minimis presumption in proposed §153.13. The interpretation is analogous to the standards of accuracy for disclosure in 12 C.F.R. §226.22(a)(2) (Regulation Z), which provides that the disclosed charges are treated as accurate if the amount "is not more than 1/8 of 1 percentage point above or below" the disclosed amount. In the proposed interpretation the de minimis threshold is set at 1/8 of 1 percent of the principal amount of the loan. On an equity loan with an $80,000 principal amount, the 1/8 of 1 percent threshold would be $100. Occasionally, unanticipated additional fees arise in an equity loan transaction shortly before closing. For example, the invoice for a courier or delivery fee may not arrive in time for the preclosing disclosure, and including the fee in the final documents could force a delay in closing the equity loan. The proposed interpretation specifies that any unanticipated fee must be a third party fee to qualify under the de minimis good cause standard. If the difference between the anticipated third party fee and the higher actual fee falls within the de minimis good cause standard, then the owner may elect to proceed with closing the equity loan. This provision recognizes that postponing the date of closing may adversely affect the owner more than the amount of variance between disclosed and actual closing costs. It also allows the owner to decide if hardship would result from postponing the closing for de minimis variances in costs. Additionally, proposed §153.13 would allow the lender to reduce fees or closing costs by any amount without postponing the date of closing.

Proposed §153.13 also protects lenders and owners by offering additional guidelines to address the documentation that should be obtained to support an emergency or other good cause modification. The commissions intend the documentation requirement to ensure true informed consent on the part of the owner and that the standard of a bona fide emergency or other good cause has been met.

Section 153.18

Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(i) of the Constitution provides that an owner can not be required to apply the proceeds of an equity loan to repay another debt except debt secured by the homestead or debt to another lender. This provision is intended to prevent lenders from forcing or otherwise coercing owners to convert existing non-homestead debt to a home equity loan. Particularly concerning are cases where an owner is in default on a non-homestead debt and refinancing the debt into an equity loan secured by the homestead could ultimately result in the owner losing the homestead. The commissions' interpretation of the constitution in §153.18 recognizes the legislative intent to protect owners' interest in their homesteads.

The constitution, however, does not absolutely prohibit conversion of existing debt to debt secured by the homestead. There are instances where it may make sense for an owner to consolidate debt using an equity loan. For example, rates can be lower with an equity loan and the interest paid on an equity loan may be tax deductible. Owners who have a satisfactory relationship with a lender may also want to consolidate their debts into an equity loan with the lender with whom they already maintain an existing relationship.

The commissions adopted existing §153.18 to clarify this constitutional provision, focusing on the words "required" and "another lender." Section 153.18(1) acknowledges an owner's right to voluntarily pay off existing debt owed to the home equity lender. Section 153.18(3) takes this concept one step further, acknowledging that when an owner applies for a home equity debt consolidation loan with the existing lender, the owner makes a voluntary choice to use proceeds from that loan to pay off debt to the home equity lender. This interpretation neither conflicts with, nor modifies, the constitutional provision.

However, since the interpretation was promulgated, a Texas Bankruptcy Court has taken issue with subparagraph (3). In the case In re Box , 324 B. R. 290 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005), the court found that where an owner signed an application for debt consolidation with a lender, allowing the payment of preexisting debt to that lender, the language in the credit application was not conclusive evidence that the owner's election was voluntary. The courts focused on whether an owner could truly choose to pay off existing debt to a lender because the lenders could coerce or pressure the owner during the application or loan process. The court determined that standardized recitals could not conclusively evidence the voluntary intent. So, even though the owner appeared to voluntarily apply for a debt consolidation loan, the owner could actually have been required to apply the proceeds to existing debt as a condition of the loan and this is unconstitutional. The commissions agree that if the election by the owner to pay off preexisting debt to the lender making the home equity loan is truly not voluntary, then making the loan would create an unconstitutional and invalid lien.

Therefore the commissions propose to repeal the existing §153.18 and adopt a new §153.18. This new §153.18 removes the debt consolidation provision contained in the current version because, following the In re Box case, it adds no substantive value. Whether the action on the part of the owner is voluntary will be a question of fact every time, notwithstanding application or contractual provisions. The new rule also reverses the order of subparagraphs (1) and (2) of the current rule to better stress the importance of the lender prohibition and adds a sentence to subparagraph (2) clarifying that whether the act of the owner is voluntary is a question of fact.

Section 153.20

The commissions propose to clarify the interpretation of Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(iii) which provides that a home equity loan must be made on the condition that the owner not sign any instrument in which blanks are left to be filled in. The new interpretation defines the term "instrument," and revises the interpretation to more clearly identify what blanks constitute "blanks left to be filled in" as that phrase is used in the Constitution.

An instrument has been defined as "a formal legal document (as a deed, will, bond, lease, agreement, mortgage, note, power of attorney, ticket on carrier, bill of lading, insurance, policy, warrant, write) evidencing legal rights or duties especially of one party to another" ( See Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged ). Each of the documents cited in the definition creates or alters an obligation of a party. Therefore, for purposes of (a)(6)(Q)(iii), the term should be taken to mean a document that creates or alters an obligation of a party to an equity loan.

The commissions believe that if the Legislature had meant for all documents or records to be included, then the Legislature would have used the more generic term "document" as it did elsewhere in the Constitution (See for instance (a)(6)(Q)(v) which provides that the lender at the time of the extension of credit is made, must provide the owner of the homestead a copy of all documents signed by the owner related to the extension of credit).

In proposing the new interpretation, the commissions considered and gave weight to the usage of the term "instrument" employed by the Legislature in Finance Code §342.454 which defines the term "instrument" for purposes of the Code regulating certain consumer loans, including secondary mortgage loans on a consumer's homestead. In that section, the term "instrument" expressly includes a note, assignment, security agreement, or mortgage. Each of these documents is included within the scope of the Webster's definition, and each of these documents creates or alters a legal obligation. Thus, the commissions believe that the proposed interpretation is consistent with the traditional definition of the term and its historical usage by the Legislature in the context of creation of liens on homesteads.

In the proposed interpretation, the commissions give special consideration to the phrase " blanks left to be filled in ." The phrase, which qualifies the term "instrument," is deemed to mean something more than the requirement that an owner not sign an instrument which contains blanks. If this were the intent, there would be no need to add the phrase " left to be filled in ." The proposed interpretation is consistent with Finance Code §342.506 which prohibits a lender from taking an instrument "in which a blank is left to be filled in after the loan is made." By giving appropriate attention to the phrase " blanks left to be filled in ," the proposed interpretation is consistent with the directive that in interpreting a constitutional provision one should avoid a construction which renders any provision meaningless or inoperative and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make some words idle and nugatory. See Hanson v. Jordan 145 Tex. 320, 198 S.W. 2d 262 (1946).

Contemporary mortgage lending practices rely heavily on the use of preprinted or computer generated "standard forms." The use of these forms benefits consumers by lowering transaction costs and by providing uniformity of documentation with a company's portfolio and within the industry. Often these forms incorporate a menu of options for certain terms such as payment terms and interest rates, or optional insurance coverages. The selection of one of the options necessarily constitutes the rejection of the unselected option. In these instances, the unselected option will be left blank by design. For instance, some documents may provide that in a variable rate product, the customer may select a rate that adjusts monthly, quarterly, or yearly. The checking of a box to select a quarterly adjust period is a de facto rejection of the monthly option or the yearly option, and those boxes are left blank. In a similar context, an instrument may provide the consumer with the option to include credit life insurance. The consumer may initial one blank to accept this optional coverage or may initial the other blank to decline coverage. When the consumer initials the box declining coverage, the instrument should not be deemed to violate the constitution because the "acceptance" blank is left empty. If an unscrupulous lender subsequently altered the instrument, then the legal rules on alteration would protect the consumer. Additionally, because the lender is required to provide the consumer with a copy of all documents signed in connection with the equity loan under Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(v), the consumer would be able to document the consumer's choice and the subsequent alteration.

Section 153.22

Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(v) provides that, at the time the extension of credit is made, the lender must "provide the owner of the homestead a copy of all documents signed by the owner related to the extension of credit." Existing §153.22 interprets Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(v) by requiring the lender to provide the owner with copies of all documents that are signed at closing in connection with the equity loan, but not requiring the lender to provide the owner with copies of documents that were signed prior to closing.

Existing §153.22 was drafted to give meaning to the plain language of the constitution and to avoid unnecessary regulatory burden. By requiring the lender to provide the owner with copies of only those documents signed by the owner at closing, existing §153.22 assures that all of the copies the owner receives are of documents that are signed in the process of obtaining an equity loan, that are in the actual or constructive possession of the lender, and that are signed in direct relationship to the equity loan.

In adopting existing §153.22, the commissions placed greatest importance on assuring that the owner was fully informed. Secondarily, the commissions strove to reduce the number of irrelevant or marginally relevant documents the lender provides the owner at closing. Any information the owner might glean from copies of irrelevant or marginally relevant documents provided at closing, could be overshadowed by the confusion caused by adding more documents to the stack of documents the owner receives at closing. Additionally, the unnecessary regulatory burden of requiring the lender to provide these copies exceeds the benefit, if any, to the owner. The commissions believe that avoiding unnecessary regulatory burden and owner confusion is more important than requiring the lender to provide copies of irrelevant or marginally relevant owner-signed documents that do not create or alter an obligation of a party to the equity loan.

However, because existing §153.22 limits Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(v) to only those documents that are signed at closing, it may occasionally exclude a document that is signed by the owner in direct relation to the equity loan merely because it is signed prior to closing. The commissions determined that there is a way to rewrite existing §153.22 to exclude most or all irrelevant and marginally relevant owner-signed documents and include any directly related documents signed by the owner prior to closing. The commissions believe that proposed §153.22 accomplishes this while giving full effect to the intent of the drafters and voters.

Proposed §153.22 improves on existing §153.22 by requiring that a lender provide the owner with directly relevant documents signed by the owner whether signed at or prior to closing. Further, although different from the exclusion in existing §153.22, proposed §153.22 also contains an exclusion of irrelevant or marginally relevant documents signed by the owner. Specifically, proposed §153.22 requires a lender to provide the owner with all documents in the lender's actual or constructive possession, custody, or control that were signed by the owner as a condition to obtaining the equity loan; and were either: (1) intended for use in the process of evaluating and underwriting the equity loan; or (2) signed by the owner to create a legal obligation of the owner in favor of the originator or lender.

In some equity loan transactions, proposed §153.22 will encompass more owner-signed documents than existing §153.22, and one or more of these documents may already be in the owner's possession. However, the public benefit of requiring the lender to provide the owner with copies of all documents the owner signed directly related to the equity loan transaction outweighs any minimally increased regulatory burden on the lender or risk of further confusion of the owner caused by requiring the additional documents.

Existing §153.22 also addresses providing the owner with copies of documents signed by the owner after closing. Proposed §153.22 does not provide an interpretation regarding documents signed by the owner after closing because, although the commissions believe it is important for owners to have copies of any such documents (such as any document whereby the owner exercises the right of rescission), these documents are not addressed in Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(x)(d).

It is worth noting that Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(x)(d) provides that when an owner notifies a lender or holder that it failed to provide documents required by Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(v), the lender or holder has 60 days to correct the failure by delivering the documents to the owner. If a lender or holder does not deliver the documents within 60 days after such notice, the lender or holder forfeits all principal and interest of the equity loan.

Harold Feeney, Credit Union Commissioner, on behalf of the Texas Credit Union Commission and Leslie L. Pettijohn, Consumer Credit Commissioner, on behalf of the Finance Commission of Texas have determined that for the first five-year period the interpretations are in effect there will be no fiscal implications for state or local government as a result of administering the interpretations.

Commissioner Feeney and Commissioner Pettijohn also have determined that for each year of the first five years the interpretations as proposed are in effect, the public benefit anticipated as a result of the proposed interpretations will be to support the stability of the credit markets and ensure that equity loans are widely available to Texas homeowners, through the creation of reliable standards and guidelines.

There is no anticipated cost to persons who are required to comply with the interpretations as proposed. There will be no adverse economic effect on small or micro businesses.

Written comments on the proposed interpretations may be submitted to Kerri T. Galvin, General Counsel, Credit Union Department, 914 East Anderson Lane, Austin, Texas 78752-1699, or to Sealy Hutchings, General Counsel, Office of Consumer Credit Commissioner, 2601 North Lamar Boulevard, Austin, Texas 78705-4207 or by email to kerri.galvin@tcud.state.tx.us or sealy.hutchings@occc.state.tx.us. To be considered, a written comment must be received on or before the 40th day after the date the proposed sections (interpretations) are published in the Texas Register . At the conclusion of the 40th day after the proposed interpretations are published in the Texas Register , no further written comments will be considered or accepted by the commissions.

The Credit Union Commissioner and the Consumer Credit Commissioner have been delegated the authority to conduct a public meeting on behalf of the commissions for the purpose of receiving oral comments, views, and/or testimony concerning the proposed interpretations. A public meeting will be held in Austin on April 6, 2006, at 2:00 p.m. in the State Finance Commission Building, William F. Aldridge Hearing Room, located at 2601 North Lamar Boulevard. To be considered, an oral comment must be received at this public meeting; at the conclusion of the meeting, no further oral comments will be considered or accepted by the commissions.

Persons with disabilities who are planning to attend the meeting and have special communication or other accommodation needs should contact Joann McAnally at the Office of Consumer Credit Commissioner at (512) 936-7640. Requests should be made as far in advance of the meeting as possible.

The interpretations are proposed pursuant to Texas Finance Code, §11.308 and §15.413, which separately and independently authorize each commission to issue interpretations of the Texas Constitution, Article XVI, §50(a)(5) - (7), (e) - (p), (t), and (u), subject to Texas Government Code, Chapter 2001.

The Texas Constitution, Article XVI, §50(a)(6) is affected by the proposed interpretations.

§153.13.Preclosing Disclosures: Section 50(a)(6)(M)(ii).

An equity loan may not be closed before one business day after the date that the owner of the homestead receives a final itemized disclosure of the actual fees, points, interest, costs, and charges that will be charged at closing. If a bona fide emergency or another good cause exists and the lender obtains the written consent of the owner, the lender may provide the documentation to the owner or the lender may modify previously provided documentation on the date of closing.

(1) A lender may satisfy the disclosure requirement of this section by delivery to the borrower of a properly completed Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) disclosure Form HUD-1 or HUD-1A.

(2) Bona fide emergency.

(A) An owner may consent to receive the preclosing disclosure on the date of closing in the case of a bona fide emergency occurring before the date of the extension of credit. An equity loan secured by a homestead in an area designated by Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as a disaster area is an example of a bona fide emergency if the homestead was damaged during FEMA's declared incident period.

(B) To document an emergency modification, the lender should obtain a written statement from the owner that:

(i) describes the emergency;

(ii) specifically states that the owner consents to receive the preclosing disclosure on the date of closing;

(iii) bears the signature of all of the owners entitled to receive the preclosing disclosure; and

(iv) affirms the owner has received notice of their right to receive a final itemized disclosure containing all fees, costs, points, or charges one day prior to closing.

(3) Good cause.

(A) Good cause to modify the preclosing disclosure or to receive a subsequent disclosure on the date of closing may only be established by the owner.

(i) The term "good cause" as used in this section means a legitimate or justifiable reason, such as financial impact or an adverse consequence.

(ii) The term "de minimus" as used in this section means a very small or insignificant amount.

(B) At the owner's election, a de minimus good cause standard may be presumed if:

(i) the modification does not create a material adverse financial consequence to the owner;

(ii) a delay in the closing would create an adverse consequence to the owner;

(iii) the total actual disclosed fees, costs, points, and charges on the date of closing do not exceed in the aggregate more than 0.125 percent of the principal amount of the loan (e.g. 0.125 percent on a $80,000 principal loan amount equals $100) from the initial preclosing disclosure;

(iv) each itemized fee, cost, point, or charge does not exceed more than 0.125 percent of the principal amount of the loan than the amount disclosed in the initial preclosing disclosure; and

(v) either:

(I) the modification is necessary because of an accidental and bona fide error, such as a mathematical computation error, despite control systems that are in place to detect and prevent this type of error; or

(II) the modification is necessary because of an unanticipated additional fee, that is to be paid only to a third party and not to the lender or the mortgage originator.

(C) To document a good cause modification of the disclosure, the lender should obtain a written statement from the owner that:

(i) describes the good cause standard;

(ii) specifically states that the owner consents to receive the preclosing disclosure on the date of closing;

(iii) bears the signature of all of the owners entitled to receive the preclosing disclosure; and

(iv) affirms the owner has received notice of their right to receive a final itemized disclosure containing all fees, costs, points, or charges one day prior to closing.

(D) Nothing in this section precludes an owner from establishing good cause under independent facts that cause the owner material financial hardship or material adverse consequences if the equity loan were not allowed to close on the scheduled date of closing.

(4) An equity loan may be closed at any time during normal business hours on the next business day following the calendar day on which the owner receives the preclosing disclosure or any calendar day thereafter.

(5) The owner maintains the right of rescission under Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(viii) even if the owner exercises an emergency or good cause modification of the preclosing disclosure.

§153.18.Limitation on Application of Proceeds: Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(i).

An equity loan must be made on the condition that the owner of the homestead is not required to apply the proceeds of the extension of credit to repay another debt except debt secured by the homestead or debt to another lender.

(1) The lender may not require an owner to repay a debt owed to the lender, unless it is a debt secured by the homestead. The lender may require debt secured by the homestead or debt to another lender or creditor be paid out of the proceeds of an equity loan. The lender may not otherwise specify or restrict the use of the proceeds.

(2) An owner may use the proceeds of an equity loan for any purpose. An owner is not precluded from voluntarily using the proceeds of an equity loan to pay on a debt owed to the lender making the equity loan. If the owner uses proceeds from the equity loan to pay any amount on a debt to the lender making the equity loan, whether the payment was voluntary is a question of fact.

§153.20.No Blanks in Any Instrument: Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(iii).

(a) This Section of the Constitution prohibits the owner of the homestead from signing any instrument in which blanks are "left to be filled in". This Section is intended to prohibit a person other than the owner from completing one or more blanks in an instrument after the owner has signed the instrument and delivered it to the lender, thereby altering a party's obligation created in the instrument. Not all documents or records executed in connection with an equity loan are instruments, and not all blanks contained in an instrument are "blanks that are left to be filled in" as contemplated by this Section.

(b) As used in this Section, the term instrument means a document or record which creates a legal obligation of the owner in favor of an originator or lender. A disclosure required under state or federal law is not an instrument if the disclosure does not create or alter the obligation of a party.

(c) If at the time the owner signs an instrument, a blank is completed or box checked which indicates the owner's election to select one of multiple options offered (such as an election to select a fixed rate instead of an adjustable rate) and the owner therefore by implication has excluded the non-selected options, the instrument does not contain "blanks left to be filled in" when the non-selected option is left blank.

§153.22.Copies of Documents: Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(v).

The phrase "documents signed by the owner related to the extension of credit," as used in Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(v), means documents that are:

(1) in the lender's actual or constructive possession, custody, or control;

(2) signed by the owner as a condition to obtaining the equity loan; and

(3) intended either:

(A) for use in the process of evaluating and underwriting the equity loan; or

(B) to create a legal obligation of the owner in favor of the originator or lender.

This agency hereby certifies that the proposal has been reviewed by legal counsel and found to be within the agency's legal authority to adopt.

Filed with the Office of the Secretary of State on February 17, 2006.

TRD-200600863

Leslie L. Pettijohn

Commissioner

Joint Financial Regulatory Agencies

Proposed date of adoption: April 12, 2006

For further information, please call: (512) 936-7640